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The thesis introduces the Archetypal Market Hypothesis (AMH). Based on complex 
psychology and supported by insights from other (mind) sciences it describes the 
unconscious nature of investing and how it shapes price patterns. Specifically, it 
emphasises the central role of numerical archetypes in price discovery. Its 
ontological premise is the market’s mind, a complex adaptive system in the form of 
collective consciousness which originates from the collective unconscious. This 
premise suggests that investing involves more than cognition and reaches beyond 
rationality and logic. 
Among others, the thesis clarifies the affective impact of price discovery: it is not 
only what we can do with prices, but also what they can do with us. Numbers 
receive their affective powers from the numerical archetypes. They preconsciously 
create order in the mind by facilitating the dynamics of symbolic mapping as the 
mind attempts to make sense of what it senses, bridging the imaginative with the 
real. This autonomous and often dominating impact of the numerical archetypes 
manifests itself: 
 in individual consciousness via numerical intuition, and 
 in crowd consciousness via participation mystique which underlies 
intersubjectivity. 
The thesis will argue that both are supported cerebrally. 
The collective intersubjective nature of the market’s mind and its symbolic 
expression via prices make it an exemplary phenomenon to be researched because 
the archetypal dynamics are strongest in such spheres.  
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The PhD’s goal, as part of the AMH proposition, is twofold. First, to formalise 
theoretically the concept of the market’s mind, in particular the collective experience 
of market states, generally known as market moods, and how these shift as a result 
of herd instinct. Second, to propose a framework for further empirical research to 
show that representing market data in a non-traditional way, based on Jung’s active 
imagination and similar techniques, can improve investors’ understanding of those 
states. If successful, the method (including bespoke software) can complement 
analytical investment research methods currently used by investors.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
I take my milk from many cows but I make my own butter. 




This introductory chapter includes a brief overview of the relevant literature 
(sections 1.3). It is in the form of a representative sample of the type of references 
included in this manuscript. In other words, the representative sample in this 
chapter is expanded, during the remainder of this thesis, to a purposive sample of 
references concerning the topic of research.  
The reason for this consideration is that other approaches to a literature review are 
not practical in light of the three main disciplines from which this thesis extracts its 
material. It focuses on capital markets as the space where humans collect both 
material possessions and mental experiences at a massive global scale. Specifically, 
its central premise is that capital markets manifest collective consciousness, called 
the market’s mind, and the three main disciplines informing this premise are finance, 
complex psychology, and philosophy (of mind). It should be obvious that, for 
                                           
1 In this thesis I will randomly switch between gender as any writings apply to both masculine and 
feminine, unless specifically stated otherwise. I will use the double apostrophe symbols (“”) for 
quotes, whereas I will use the single ones (‘’) for emphasis, uses of ‘figure of speech’, etc. 
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example, an exhaustive review of these disciplines would demand too much time 
and eventually would lead to a ‘crowding out’ of the other chapters because of its 
sheer size. On the other hand, this multi-disciplinary approach also leads to 
inevitable limitations in terms of the selective choice of sources (and the related 
exclusion of other references). That choice has not only been motivated by 
theoretical arguments but, crucially, also by practical relevance from an investor’s 
perspective. Among the central questions driving this motivation was, for example, 
“How does this possibly relate to (the experience of) price discovery?” Specifically, I 
have included many references, e.g. quotes, from investment practitioners who have 
hinted at some of the concepts to be discussed, whereas I have excluded sources 
whose theories are related to the aforementioned disciplines but offer no practical 
insights.  
As an exhaustive review is not required anyway, the specific problem formulation 
stated in chapter 6 allows this thesis to gradually shift from an initial representative 
sample in this chapter to a focus on pivotal articles and other publications which are 
central to it, i.e. morph into a purposive sample. 
First, it is perhaps useful to provide a brief overview, including terminology, for 
those unfamiliar with economics, finance and investing, respectively mind sciences 
and complex psychology (e.g. archetypes). They will be discussed in more detail in 
the remaining chapters. 
1.1.1. ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
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Economics and finance are nested disciplines, with shared assumptions, particularly 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH).2 Economics is the discipline which 
studies the economy, both at the macro level (regions and countries) and the micro 
level (corporations and individuals). The economy is generally prefixed with the word 
‘real’ to signify that it consists of tangible objects, like factories, machines and 
products. Other physical manifestations of the economy include processes like the 
production, transportation and distribution of goods. They are often referred to as 
economic fundamentals. Finance deals with a subset of issues that belong more 
generally to economics, and particularly studies the capital markets3 which 
determine the (allocation of) investments in the real economy. Specifically, capital 
markets facilitate transactions between owners of capital (e.g. investors and savers) 
and users of capital (e.g. companies and borrowers). Capital markets form the space 
where the real economy is bridged with the imagined one, where economic objects 
connect with economic subjects. By extension, investing is psychological arbitrage 
between myth and reality. Crucially, capital markets manifest both physical and 
mental properties. Physical properties include assets like real estate and 
commodities. Another example is the communication networks which facilitate 
trading, including computers and telephones. They form part of the market’s 
fundamentals. Mental properties primarily involve market sentiment or mood4 which 
emerge from price dynamics, like volatility. To roughly relate this to the mind 
                                           
2 For a brief overview of uncommon explorations of economic theory, see for example Kutler (2010). 
3 I use the term capital markets to refer to all security markets. Formally only securities with a duration 
beyond one year are traded on capital markets, whereas those with shorter durations are traded on 
“money markets”. I also on occasion use the term “financial markets”.   
4 For the purpose of this thesis the reader can equate the two, but there are slight differences, and I 
prefer to use the term mood. See explanation in next section. 
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sciences (see next section), fundamentals can be considered the market’s ‘brain 
states’, whereas moods are the market’s ‘mental states’.5  
Obviously humans, in all their bodily and mental capacities, inhabit both the 
economy and the capital markets. On that note, economics and finance, reflecting 
collective human nature, have something to contribute in answering the question 
whether physical laws exhaust nature’s laws (or whether there is something in 
addition).  
The main tool used in the exchanges that take place in markets (of goods and 
services, respectively securities) is money. Money is a social, trust-based construct 
that is used as a medium of exchange and (electronic) record of account. In today’s 
modern (fiat) currency system money is credit and has symbolic, but no intrinsic 
value. As Bagehot (1873, p. 151) pointed out: “The peculiar essence of our financial 
system is an unprecedented trust between man and man; and when that trust is 
much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident may greatly hurt it, and a great 
accident for a moment may almost destroy it.” In fact, there is not much evidence to 
support the general assumption that the earliest trade was purely based on barter. 
Rather promises to pay for goods and services ‘later’ facilitated such trade (e.g. 
Graeber, 2011). This underlines the ancient use of credit, as well as trust (e.g. 
‘credit-worthy’) being the early psychological foundation of trade. The social and 
symbolic nature of money puts it right into the collective dynamics that complex 
psychology studies.  There are various forms of money, the main ones being cash 
(e.g. coins) and deposits. For more details of the modern monetary system, money 
creation and the role of banks, see McLeay et al. (2014-i and 2014-ii). 
                                           
5 In the following, “the market” refers to the (complex adaptive) system of markets, so the composite of 
global bond, equity, currency and other capital markets. 
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Within economics and finance there are various sub-branches. As far as finance is 
concerned, the dominant paradigm is called the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
which assumes investors behave rationally and advocates an equilibrium approach to 
markets. Equilibrium is an idealised market state where demand equals supply. In 
recent decades behavioural finance has started to challenge this paradigm. EMH also 
argues that active investment management, i.e. trying to “beat the market” is futile. 
Not surprisingly, practitioners have always been sceptical about EMH’s assumptions 
and apply fundamental, quantitative and technical analysis in an attempt to 
outperform their markets and/or their peers. 
Price discovery is the process of finding the price of an asset in a market through the 
interactions, specifically exchanges, of buyers and sellers, i.e. by way of trading. A 
market ‘clears’ at that price, suggesting a temporary equilibrium between demand 
and supply during which an exchange or trade takes place. The topic of intrinsic 
value is important but also vast, and I can’t discuss it in too much detail here. 
Although EMH argues that the price equals the intrinsic value of an asset, this is not 
a generally accepted assumption. Value in general is in the eye of the beholder. 
Living investment legend Warren Buffett6 defined intrinsic value as “the discounted 
value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life”. 
Furthermore he emphasised that “Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in 
selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns.” Others7 have translated this as: a 
risk asset’s intrinsic value is the maximum price an investor is willing to buy the 
asset for without the ability to ever sell it again. For example, compared to a 10-
year risk-free bond, where the investor is guaranteed to get her money back in 10 
                                           
6 In his 1999 letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/owners.html. Downloaded 14/04/2012. 
7 See, for example, Philosophical Economics (http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2014/12/what-is-
intrinsic-value-and-who-decides-it/; downloaded 28/12/2014) 
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years, buying a stock for its intrinsic value means that at that price the investor is 
willing to hold the stock forever. In other words, the ability to trade, with related 
issues like liquidity and sentiment, is crucial as far as the relativity of intrinsic value 
is concerned. 
In capital markets assets are mostly traded on exchanges via securities (like bonds 
and stocks). Any trading that does not take place via exchanges is called over-the-
counter (OTC). Securities are contracts embedding rights of ownership to assets, 
including their cash flows. A security, e.g. Apple stock or UK Gilt, is the object of 
shared attention between investors, expressed symbolically in numbers and letters. 
That is to say, apart from prices a security is also characterised by an accompanying 
story which justifies buying respectively selling the security. Particularly in times of 
heightened excitement, when e.g. “insecurities [reveal] themselves in securities” 
(Haldane, 2015, p. 5), as well as in hindsight, this can turn into confabulation. The 
observation that these stories are often anchored to a recurring theme, across time 
and markets, makes mythology so relevant, for example. 
Our environment throws up events (external surprises) which have a potential 
economic impact on our lives, e.g. lifestyles. Being exposed to, respectively hedged 
against those events can be beneficial compared to not having such status. The way 
to achieve this is to buy or sell resources which help to deal with those events. As 
such they offer value, e.g. compensation for any loss.  Specifically, by trading 
securities investors can gain or remove exposure to resources in the real economy. 
Those resources are scarce and can vary from purely physical, like gold or property, 
to less tangible resources like the right to tax (often the monopoly of a government). 
The motivation to engage in such transactions is thus to deal with uncertainty and, 
to the extent possible, to manage risk emanating from these events. This points to 
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the type of events we can encounter. Uncertainty means that neither the outcome 
nor the distribution of events is known. Risk means that the outcome of events is 
unknown but the distribution is. The difficulty to assess these two, or rather to make 
a distinction, is among the biggest challenges in price discovery.  
Prices are like Janus’ head: they reflect the polarities of economic life, in particular 
the past and the (‘discounted’) future, as well as risk and return. Risk embedded in 
exposure is compensated with a potential return, i.e. each asset has a risk/return 
profile. Among the most significant risk characteristics of assets, which 
simultaneously signifies the transition between physical and mental properties of the 
market, is liquidity. In short, liquidity is a measure of the ease with which an asset 
can be exchanged for another asset. An asset is more or less “liquid” if it can be 
more or less easily traded. This is intimately related, among others, to the balanced 
number of investors who trade in the security. In other words there need to be 
buyers and sellers who are willing to expose themselves to, respectively rid 
themselves of the risks of the underlying asset. A large number of participants (both 
buyers and sellers) increase the market for a security and consequently its liquidity. 
Another way of saying this is that they occupy a large space for price discovery. 
Cash, for example, is the most liquid asset. This lowers its risk profile and therefore 
the likely return.  
1.1.2. MIND SCIENCES 
Mind sciences consist of the various disciplines involved in studying the brain, mind, 
and consciousness. I include neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, and sociology. 
Mind, in simplified terms, consists of the processes involved in the interaction of the 
brain with the body-proper, including the nervous system. Often a distinction is 
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made between brain states and mental states, whereby any correlation between the 
two is an important area of research. These processes extend to the outside world, 
particularly other minds, and can be experienced which involves consciousness. I 
use the terms mind-body problem and psychophysical or “hard” problem 
interchangeably to refer to the problem of explaining the nature of consciousness. 
When I mention and discuss minds separately from other objects or entities it is to 
clarify the distinction between these spheres, rather than reflect agreement with, let 
alone promote, dualism. I have attempted to follow generally accepted uses of terms 
like qualia, sensations, feelings and intersubjectivity. Specifically, in contemporary 
philosophy, as well as psychology, intersubjectivity8 is the general term used to 
describe the state of shared experience which manifests itself in social behaviour, for 
example via herding. 
Mood should be interpreted according to contemporary mind sciences. Mood in 
general is the term philosophers use to refer to phenomenal consciousness which 
concerns the highest qualitative characteristics (or qualia) of a state of mind. Moods 
are peculiar. For example, while they complete other mental expressions (e.g. 
emotions and thoughts), compared to these moods have no unconscious variant. 
Neither can they be accessed consciously as they are not representations nor 
representational. Moods are general feelings not directed at anything particular. 
They generally have a longer duration than, say, emotions. Although moods are 
often labelled as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, in the words of philosopher Jaegwon Kim, 
“moods don’t have satisfaction conditions; they cannot be accurate or inaccurate, 
true or false . . . Evaluating moods in terms such as “accuracy” and “fidelity” doesn’t 
make any sense”. (2011, pp. 278, 293). For our purposes mood refers to the quality 
                                           
8 Interpretations of intersubjectivity evolved from the philosophies of, among others, Buber, Husserl, 
Heidegger, Sartre and Habermas. 
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of the market’s mind in terms of a composite feel, i.e. what the market feels like 
when you’re ‘in it’. In other words, mood infuses the market as a shared feeling 
experienced, although not necessarily uniformly, by participants who have skin in 
the game. It is this intersubjectivity of participation that distinguishes it from 
whatever any individual investor9 feels subjectively about the market, e.g. even if 
you are worried, you can sense the market’s exuberance simultaneously (you can’t 
escape it and ignoring it, to paraphrase Keynes, is at your own peril). Finance, 
however, has misinterpreted mood (see, e.g., chapter 6) and modern finance in 
particular (conditioned by its “physics envy”, see chapter 2.2) considers it as 
epiphenomenal: its properties make no difference to the compositional or causal 
facts of the market that are already determined by its physical properties.  
1.1.3. ARCHETYPES 
Complex psychology, also known as analytical psychology, was originally developed 
by the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung. The collective unconscious and the 
archetypes are the best known among the concepts he popularised. The following 
provides a brief interpretation of archetypes which is further explained, applied, and 
expanded upon in this document. Motivated by the essence of price discovery, there 
are two main aspects to my thesis that distinguish it from mainstream complex 
psychology. First, it emphasises the phenomenal manifestation of archetypes (i.e. 
archetypes are experienced by way of their images and this experience is crucial for 
their understanding).  Second, I make a distinction between traditional archetypes 
and the numerical archetypes.  
                                           
9 Let alone a non-participating observer. 
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An archetype is an inherent psychic subroutine in the form of an unconscious 
mandate to symbolise via a self-image, called the archetypal image. Stated 
differently, the archetype is an unconscious entity and the archetypal image is its 
conscious identity. Specifically, within an archetypal situation the archetype 
mandates the release of the neuronal firing pattern underlying its image. This makes 
an archetype self-referential/reflexive, whereby the archetypal image influences the 
release (and by extension shape) of the neuronal firing pattern while it emerges. It 
is this recursive feedback between the archetype and its image, combined with the 
interaction with other archetypes, which makes an “archetypal experience” dynamic 
and an “archetypal situation” evolve.  
The unconscious, by way of the archetypes, enables the mind to deal with the 
uncertainty of the unknown, i.e. to imagine. It is in the unconscious where such 
novelty and innovations like ‘insights’ endogenously originate for the mind, a 
necessary requirement for any complex adaptive system (or CAS) to flourish. The 
adaptive purpose of archetypes is thus to provide prerational ‘surprise’ information 
as inputs to form categorised symbolic meaning, leading to an intuitive 
understanding of an emerging archetypal situation. In healthy humans this reduces 
incomplete knowledge and increases emotional fitness in terms of a ‘gut feeling’ 
response to this situation. Often this response is of a compensatory and selective 
nature in order to rebalance emotional, respectively rational, excesses.  
Numerical archetypes are archetypes which symbolise via numbers, e.g. the natural 
integers. They are the prime archetypes because they enumerate, both cardinals 
and ordinals, thereby providing values required for selection, the main dynamic of 
evolution. Applied to the mind, and in terms of archetypal dynamics, numerical 
archetypes facilitate the selection by archetypes of “. . . those contents which are 
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best suited to themselves” (Jung, 1911-1912, para. 232). In general, numerical 
archetypes enable the numerical operations required for all archetypal dynamics, 
typical examples being differentiation and integration, while bridging the mental with 
the physical. 
I thus use the plural ‘numerical archetypes’, not because each number requires an 
archetype, but because the (e.g. biophysical) numerical operations mandated via 
these archetypes involve multiple numerical archetypes. Their interaction, more than 
that among any other archetypes, underlies the complexity of archetypal dynamics. 
In that light, numerical archetypes can be viewed as mandates to exchange values 
with, and thus influence, the emerging archetypal situation. Specifically, these 
include the coordinates for archetypal images to emerge in consciousness, i.e. in 
space time. In the final analysis, numerical archetypes perform the autonomous 
valuation of, i.e. attach a number to, our emotions. This category of archetypes 
“preconsciously orders both psychic thought processes and the manifestations of 
material reality. As the active ordering factor, it represents the essence of what we 
generally term ‘mind’” (Von Franz, 1974; emphasis mine). Translated for finance, 
the numerical archetype is most directly reflected in price, which is the ratio of the 
respective number of units of the items that are exchanged, with the embedded 
oppositional tension between supply and demand (see also sections 5.4 and 8.2). As 
I will emphasise repeatedly throughout this thesis, the question is not only what we 
do with prices, but what they do with us. Archetypes are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3 as well as in the Appendix.  
1.1.4. RELEVANCE OF JUNG FOR FINANCE 
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In the spirit of observations by Leibnitz, Twain, and others, financial history may not 
repeat itself exactly, but it clearly rhymes. Yet, despite many attempts to explain the 
repetitive patterns in collective behaviour of investors, best exemplified in booms 
and busts, economics (and by extension finance) has been unable to provide a 
comprehensive hypothesis as to the underlying causes for this. Ironically it was Alan 
Greenspan10 who hit the nail on the head when he stated that current practice does 
not 
fully capture what I believe has been, to date, only a peripheral 
addendum to business-cycle and financial modelling – the innate human 
responses that result in swings between euphoria and fear that repeat 
themselves generation after generation with little evidence of a learning 
curve. Asset-price bubbles build and burst today as they have since the 
early 18th century, when modern competitive markets evolved. To be 
sure, we tend to label such behavioural responses as non-rational. But 
forecasters’ concerns should be not whether human response is rational 
or irrational, only that it is observable and systematic. This, to me, is 
the large missing “explanatory variable” . . . Current practice is to 
introduce notions of “animal spirits”, as John Maynard Keynes put it, 
through “add factors”. That is, we arbitrarily change the outcome of our 
model’s equations. Add-factoring, however, is an implicit recognition 
that models, as we currently employ them, are structurally deficient; it 
does not sufficiently address the problem of the missing variable. 
(2008; emphasis mine) 
Jung specialised in such “innate human responses”, particularly those expressed 
collectively via highly charged and uniform emotions. After a dispute with his 
erstwhile mentor Sigmund Freud, Jung developed complex psychology of which the 
collective unconscious and the archetypes are probably the best known concepts. 
Jung explains the key difference between their theories: 
Freud . . . derives the unconscious from the conscious. . . . I would put 
it the reverse way: I would say the thing that comes first is obviously 
the unconscious. . . . In early childhood we are unconscious; the most 
important functions of an instinctive nature are unconscious, and 
consciousness is rather the product of the unconscious. (Jung, CW18, 
14f) 
                                           
10 Former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve. 
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Due to the observed uniformity (across time, cultures, and individuals) in the 
expressions of the unconscious (e.g. dreams, myths, symbols, etc.) Jung developed 
the concept of the collective unconscious. It forms a deeper layer within the 
unconscious mind, like a cellar in a public museum containing primordial artefacts of 
past generations which continue to influence individual contemporary art. To 
emphasise this collective characteristic Jung (1957/1972) contrasts the collective 
unconscious to the personally acquired contents of the more superficial layers of the 
personal unconscious. Among the early economists who touched on the unconscious 
processes that guide our behaviour Hayek (1967, p. 60-62), for example, prefers to 
call them “supra-conscious” or “meta-conscious”. Interestingly, he links this to 
Gödel’s theorem, states that creativity is “due to processes of this kind”, and 
considers the unconscious causal and primary. Specifically, he talks about the 
“primacy of the abstract” as if to echo Jung’s primacy of numbers.   
In terms of contemporary mind models, Jung’s archetypal hypothesis is one of the 
earliest dual-aspect (or dual-systems11) models of the mind, which in turn fall under 
neutral monism. For a more detailed discussion on specifically the Pauli-Jung version 
of dual aspect theory of mind see Atmanspacher (2012; but see also Atmanspacher 
and Primas, 2006). For a psychoanalytical angle on dual-aspect, see particularly 
Epstein (1994). More recently, see Kahneman (2011), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 
(2004) and Slovic et al (2004) as well as the references therein. Finance and dual 
aspect theory can be mutually relevant to each other. Their meeting ground lies in 
the treatment of information. Specifically, finance tells us that prices can be 
considered concentrated information conduits. They are objective and verifiable data 
points while, simultaneously, being intersubjectively experienced. Consequently, the 
                                           
11 So I place dual-aspect theory in this broader category. 
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gap that is usually assumed in dual-aspect approaches between sterile raw 
information on the one hand and the intimate feelings associated with consciousness 
on the other, i.e. the phenomenal properties of becoming aware of that which is ‘in 
formation’, does not exist, i.e. is bridged, when prices are discovered. 
Although I will focus on complex psychology, I briefly want to touch on the 
(ir)relevance of other depth psychology approaches. For example, in psychoanalysis 
a number of references are made to economics.12 Freud himself once held the view 
of psychoanalysis as “a sort of economics of nerve force” (Freud, 1895). It was an 
early application of the laws of supply and demand to mental resources.13 Birken 
(1999) argued that Freud's use of the term "economic" implied that his new 
psychology was somehow analogous to the earlier science of political economy, 
precisely because he had extended to the private sphere the quantitative approach 
already employed to analyse the public sphere. Primarily by analysing children’s 
play, Melanie Klein expanded Freud’s theory (e.g. Segal, 1988), for example by 
developing the concept of the internal object and clarifying symbol formation. 
Perhaps by considering investing as a play and investor behaviour as infantile14 
Klein’s approach offers a possible psychoanalytical extension of game theory as 
applied to investing? In light of the collective aspect of market psychology, as well 
as the central role of numbers (and math) in investing, Ignacio Matte Blanco’s 
approach to the unconscious seems relevant (e.g. 1988). Specifically, his principle of 
“Generalization” whereby the unconscious does not take account of individuals as 
such but considers them as members of (classes of) classes, provides a possible 
explanation for the subliminal forces that drive group/crowd behaviour in markets. 
                                           
12 The US investor Randy Updyke is among the few practitioners who are known to have combined finance 
and psychoanalysis. 
13 For a modern, albeit non-psychoanalytical view, see for example Rolls, 2007. 
14 E.g. B. Barber and T. Odean. 2001. “Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock 
Investment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 116, Issue 1,pp. 261-292. 
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His second principle of “Symmetry” may be applicable to the phenomenon of 
reversals in price action, whereby the initial price move is “symmetrically” reversed. 
The theory of Jacques Lacan (e.g. 2007) centres on three orders of mentality, which 
he called The Imaginary, The Symbolic, and The Real. He also emphasises language, 
for example to transform images into words. Perhaps the most relevant aspect of 
Lacan’s theory is his positive view on trial and error, i.e. learning, whereby his 
“discourse” shows a close resemblance to Kuhn’s “paradigm”. Paul Kugler (2003) 
explores the role of language, e.g. sound and images, in psychological life, 
particularly at the origin of subjectivity. Among others, he links Jung’s early word 
associations with Lacanian psychoanalysis. Although language is not the prime focus 
in this thesis, this book could be relevant for future explorations of narratives of 
investment themes, as well as the broader role of sounds and images in recognising 
(psychic) patterns. More recently, Anne Dailey (2000), a professor of law, argues 
that cognitive psychology fails to comprehend the important role that unconscious 
emotions and irrational motives play in human affairs. She advocates that 
psychoanalytic research offers law and economics, in part, an economic theory of the 
mind, “a model for understanding how internal mechanisms of exchange affect our 
transactions in the world”. David Tuckett (2011) has introduced his interpretation of 
'emotional finance' which draws on principles of psychoanalysis to understand 
financial markets. Among the more innovative elements of his research were his 
interviews with fund managers.15 His interpretation of “phantastic objects” in terms 
of wishful fantasies during financial hypes is an interesting alternative to existing 
ones. Finally, Niklas Hageback (2014) published an excellent introduction to viewing 
markets through a Jungian perspective. Although he only makes a casual reference 
                                           
15 Although Kames Capital participated in the early phase, in a private conversation David told me he 
hadn’t included Kames’ results in the final findings. 
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to numerical archetypes he introduces an interesting framework for categorising 
words and other items from newsfeeds and social media according to archetypal 
symbols. 
Overall, however, I feel I am stretching my imagination here. Apart from Hageback I 
find it hard to see any (practical) relevance in these approaches. Compared to my 
interpretation of complex psychology, all these sources lack a clear link to price 
discovery. In particular, they overlook the crucial archetypal role of numbers in the 
process of price discovery, as the ultimate reflection of the “oppositional structure” 
of the market’s mind. This theoretical angle and its practical implications are what 
makes Jung unique and what this thesis focuses on. Specifically, the limitations of 
the psychoanalytic approach to capital markets in general, and investing in 
particular, originate from its lack of any coherent hypothesis on the autonomous, i.e. 
unconscious, (collective) dynamics of numbers, as symbolised in prices. 
Furthermore, compared to Jung’s active imagination, it lacks a method which allows 
market data to be presented in a format which appeals to the non-analytical 
capabilities of the mind (see chapter 10). 
There are a few analogies to make the relevance of Jung’s theory to the capital 
markets more intuitive. First, the following quote from Jung about the collective 
unconscious echoes the general sense investors have about the “market’s mind”: 
we might think of it as a collective human being combining the 
characteristics of both sexes, transcending youth and age, birth and 
death, and, from having at its command a human experience of [more 
than] two million years, practically immortal. If such a being existed, it 
would be exalted above all temporal change; the present would mean 
neither more nor less to it than any year in the one hundredth 
millennium before Christ; it would be a dreamer of age-old dreams and, 
owing to its immeasurable experience an incomparable prognosticator. 
It would have lived countless times over again the life of the individual, 
the family, the tribe, and the nation, and it would possess a living sense 
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of the rhythm of growth, flowering and decay. (CW8, para. 673; 
emphasis mine) 
Second, whereas the collective unconscious rebalances via archetypes, the market 
rebalances via the elusive risk factors. Both archetypes and risk factors deal with 
systematic themes (this analogy will also be explained in more detail in chapter 9).  
Another overlap is that archetypal situations become more pronounced, in the sense 
of becoming more sensitive to primordial responses, when they involve large 
numbers of interacting humans whose minds converge towards numerical symbols. 
This is the implied conclusion from Jung’s most crucial insight: towards the end of 
his life Jung realised that numbers must form the core or prime archetypes. 
Numbers are prime archetypes because they cannot be further reduced, in the sense 
that: 
[If] a group of objects is deprived of every one of its properties or 
characteristics, there still remains, at the end, its number, which seems 
to indicate that number is something irreducible. (1955, p. 57)  
This captures the spirit of EMH and technical analysis, for example, which both 
emphasise the primacy of prices, e.g. as information carriers. The numerical 
archetypes also represent the dynamics between the physical (quantity) and the 
psychic (quality), as well as between nature (discovery) and nurture (learning): 
I always come upon the enigma of . . . number. I have a distinct feeling 
that number is a key to the mystery, since it is just as much discovered 
as it is invented. It is quantity as well as quality16. . . [number] may 
well be the most primitive element of order in the human mind . . . thus 
we define number psychologically as an archetype of order which has 
become conscious. (In Von Franz, 1974, p. 9, 45) 
Furthermore, Jung always emphasised the probability structure within the 
unconscious that archetypes provide to the mind: “The archetype represents psychic 
                                           
16 Jung’s original term here was translated as “meaning”, but I feel “quality” better fits the distinctions 
he’s making.  
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probability” (CW8, para. 964). This again underlines the primacy of the numerical 
archetype because it subliminally enables the mind to assess the potentialities of 
other archetypal images (e.g. instincts) occurring, in short to subliminally translate 
them into archetypal expectations.  
But what about the person Jung, and what did others think of his theory? As a 
person Jung is, ironically and sadly, the archetypal persona-non-grata in science. His 
reputation remains so controversial that hardly any scientist dares to refer to his 
theories or mention his name. As a consequence of this taboo, it has become 
common and accepted practice, albeit shameful, to poor his old wine in new flasks 
without crediting him. This has been highlighted in various books (e.g. Cope, 2006; 
Stevens, 2002; Mlodinow, 2012). Combined with the disastrous management of his 
legacy by his average followers, the Jungians, this forms the true tragedy of Jung. 
A historically well-researched account which attempts to correct the misperception of 
Jung is Jung and The Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science by 
professor Shamdasani (2005). He also coordinated the much anticipated recent 
publication of Jung’s Red Book which generated renewed interest, both from 
academia as well as from the media. 
There are other exceptions to, what Cope calls, the “fear of Jung”. The contribution 
by Jung to build a bridge between mind and matter was acknowledged, for example, 
by Heisenberg-pupil Fritjof Capra who stated that “ . . . many others have published 
books about this subject, many of them preceding  The Tao of Physics, beginning 
way back with Carl Gustav Jung” (1999, p. 340). Capra’s own work, linking physics 
to psychology, builds on Jung’s cooperation with physicist Wolfgang Pauli. Pauli 




    
 
When one analyzes the pre-conscious step to concepts, one always finds 
ideas which consist of “symbolic images.” The first step to thinking is a 
painted vision of these inner pictures whose origin cannot be reduced 
only and firstly to the sensual perception but which are produced by an 
“instinct to imagining” and which are re-produced by different 
individuals independently, i.e. collectively . . . But the archaic image is 
also the necessary predisposition and the source of a scientific attitude. 
To a total recognition belong also those images out of which have grown 
the rational concepts. (1948; emphasis mine) 
Potentially of even more relevance for investing, Pauli wrote regarding archetypal 
expectations: 
It cannot be excluded that the images, which certainly exert a strong 
influence on the direction of conscious attention (even if they remain 
unperceived), are not only to be causally evaluated as a backslide to 
pre-scientific thinking but also finally directed to a goal. In the latter 
regard, they might contain the seeds of anticipated future 
developments. (In Atmanspacher and Primas, 2006; emphasis mine) 
Beyond Pauli, a few other physicists were aware of the archetypal hypothesis. One of 
Pauli’s contemporaries, Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, referred to it during a lecture 
which he gave a few years after the death of both Jung and Pauli: 
Science itself is based on archetypes. The archetypes predominant in 
modern science are those Plato called mathematical. . . . But what is 
given us as the a priori of mathematics, what belongs to the 
preconditions of the possibility of distinguishing objects that differ from 
one another and remain identical with themselves in time, by no means 
constitutes the whole of the Platonic idea: i.e., what Plato calls the idea 
itself.  This idea contains a great deal beyond the mathematical, and it 
is into these regions that Jung, I think, cast a glance, to see, if only for 
a fleeting moment, a contour amidst the swiftly moving clouds.  More is 
not to be expected at this point. (In Card and Morariu, 1998) 
Jung’s collective unconscious relates closely to the collective consciousness concept 
of Emile Durkheim according to Pierre Janet, the famous child psychologist who 
knew both men. In a tribute to Jung, he stated: 
that which Durkheim, prophet and sociologist just as Jung is a prophet 
and psychologist, attributes to “collective consciousness”, Jung searches 
in the “collective unconscious”. And yet these anti-thetical entities come 
close more often than one believes and it would be very interesting, in 
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times to come, to analyse their possible interference. (In Shamdasani, 
2003, p. 288, 289) 
Finally, Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz, one of the founding fathers of animal ethology 
(in which evolutionary psychology is rooted) acknowledged the validity of Jung’s 
archetypal hypothesis. Discussing the innate human responses, he commented: 
this innate releasing mechanism, as we call it, combining with the 
human faculty of visualizing—dreaming about a situation, results in 
phenomenal reactions which are more or less identical with Jung’s 
concepts of the archetypes. I think archetypes are innate-releasing 
mechanisms invested in visualizations, in fantasy. (Ibid, p. 258) 
Further advances in evolutionary psychology, as well as neuroscience and other 
mind disciplines have indeed largely confirmed, albeit using their own terminology 
and often without credit, Jung’s earlier insights regarding the mind (see, for 
example, Stevens, 1990; Solomon, 2000; Mlodinow, 2012). 
To conclude, if nothing else, the ongoing financial crisis suggests modern finance is 
in need of a revision which reaches beyond the description of anomalies that 
behavioural finance provides. Although the latter has undisputedly shot holes in the 
ivory tower of the EMH, the early foundations for an alternative structure are being 
built on shaky grounds because they are ignoring the underlying cave upon which 
these foundations are being build: the unconscious. In markets, the collective nature 
of the unconscious is the source of the uniform affects which drive investor 
behaviour. Ultimately, all routes to and from consciousness return to this important 
element in complex psychology. 
For the remainder of this chapter I will, first, give reasons why the topic of my thesis 
is important. Second I will provide an overview of the additional literature on issues 
relevant for this topic. Finally and consequently, I will place my research in the 
proper theoretical context in terms of the disciplines which provide the insights for it. 
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1.2 RELEVANCE TOPIC 
 
As aforementioned, complex psychology was originally developed by the Swiss 
psychologist Carl Gustav Jung. Among the concepts he popularised are the collective 
unconscious and archetypes. These and other Jungian concepts will be particularly 
discussed in chapter 3.  
In a broad sense, Jung’s advice to take an integrative approach to the unconscious 
in general and the emotions in particular seems, at first, outdated in the world of 
modern finance where rationality and algorithms dominate current thinking and 
practise. However, looking more closely the servants of Mammon have not changed. 
In fact, such crowding out of emotions has contributed to the problems we have 
been experiencing, possibly building up since the late 1970’s when modern finance 
emerged. 
More specifically, the main topic of this thesis is the role of numerical archetypes in 
price discovery, based on the premise that capital markets manifest collective 
mentality or consciousness, called the market’s mind. The latter, combined with the 
market’s body, forms an animated entity, a composite of human market participants 
and their extensions. This ontological commitment to the mind-body contrasts with 
the commitment to the machine made by the currently dominant finance theories. 
Counter arguments to my overall thesis ultimately boil down to not recognising (or 
simply dismissing) this distinction. In short, and at the risk of generalising, I believe 
readers will broadly agree with me once they recognise that the market’s mind 
cannot be reduced to ‘just’ investor psychology, but actually involves consciousness. 
And the phenomenal qualities of the market’s mind, experienced for example as 
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despair or exuberance, are distinct features. As we know, that is already a hard 
problem in and of itself, but its denial by mainstream finance is adding to our 
troubles. On that note, those who disagree will generally consider the economy and 
capital markets as machine-like. I am not so naive to believe I can convince them of 
my arguments. On the other hand I will attempt to clarify why their arguments are 
less convincing. Specifically, the mechanical perspective of equilibrium approaches, 
in my view, completely fails to explain the natural occurrence of (as in ‘the 
endogenous ability to generate’) novelty and innovations which the economic system 
requires in order to adapt.  Instead, the complex approach whereby discoveries are 
(often painfully) made via trial and error by competing and cooperating forces 
applies to both the mental and market domain. Driven by evolution’s urge to survive 
and improve our life these dynamics built (on) the “deposits of human 
experiences”17 and their associated tools and innovations from which humanity 
progresses and prospers. This is not always straightforward and often, as Keynes 
pointed out, “The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas, but in escaping 
from the old ones”. This will be explained in more detail later, particularly in 
chapters 2 and 6.  
My interpretation of numerical archetypes, i.e. their empirical expression in the form 
of prices, contributes to the debate concerning Jung’s later work. As I will argue in 
chapter 5, Jung’s conclusion that the numerical archetypes form the prime 
archetypes is of seminal importance to lift his later and, in his own words (1976, p. 
309), “more important work” from “its primordial obscurity”. Overall, Jung’s later 
work focuses primarily on translating the therapeutic oriented analytical psychology 
                                           
17 Talking about the archetype Animus, for example, Jung stated that it was the deposit of “ancestral 
experiences of man-and not only that, he is also a creative and procreative being”. 
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into the broader theory of complex psychology.18 Atmanspacher (2006), Giegerich 
(2007), Robertson (1995), Shamdasani (2005), and von Franz (1974) are among 
those who have highlighted or expanded more specifically on Jung’s later work. 
Beyond the number archetypes, Shamdasani points to topics in the lectures Jung 
gave at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology (ETH) which highlights his shift in 
focus: 
These lectures are Jung’s most important series of lectures and the 
primary source for the understanding of his late work. The topics of 
the lectures include a seminal study of the history of psychology, an 
account of the theory and practice of complex psychology with 
particular reference to the theory of complexes, dream analysis, 
psychological types, and the psychology of the unconscious, Jung’s 
most extended case study, studies of the spiritual exercises of 
Ignatius of Loyola, the Yoga sutras of Patanjali, and the symbolism 
of Buddhist meditational practices and medieval alchemy. . . . These 
lectures . . . provide the basis of his work in the 1940s and 1950s. 
(p. 10) 
Both Giegerich and Robertson consider Mysterium Coniunctionis as the culmination 
of Jung’s later work. They, like Atmanspacher, point to the key notion of oppositional 
structure in the (collective) psyche and the resulting dynamics. Specifically: 
the terms separation and synthesis (or union) indicate the nature of 
this oppositional structure, namely that it is not really a “structure” 
at all . . . but rather a movement, a living tension (Giegerich, 2007, 
p. 250) 
In this thesis, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, I clarify and emphasise the numerical 
essence of these dynamics. Starting with Jung’s famous explanation of the 
relationships between the first four integers emerging from zero, the null, I explain 
why the numerical archetypes are the prime (as in irreducible, unhintergehbare) 
drivers in the complexity of mind. In terms of prices and their, often cyclical, 
movement in capital markets, the following graph of the core O (Open), H (High), L 
                                           
18 Among his main inspirations for this attempt is, in my view, his friendship and cooperation with 
Wolfgang Pauli (see Miller, 2009). Specifically, Pauli (in Card & Morariu, 1998, p. A74) recognised 
the importance of number intuition as part of “a more general concept of archetype”. 
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(Low), and C (Close) prices intuitively represents the link to Jung’s ‘original’ 
integers, e.g. the Open (1) emerging from the “unknown” (0, i.e. zero) and the 








By reducing periodic prices, i.e. time series, into these four elementary components 
the fractal nature of price patterns, among others, can be made much clearer. For 
example, one could analyse whether the relative distances between the weekly 
OHLC, in terms of size or duration, mirror those on a monthly scale, e.g. to confirm 
a trend.20 I will discuss price patterns in more detail in chapter 8 where, for 
example, I will interpret Jung’s “binarius” in terms of the most elementary of trends 
with an embedded oppositional, i.e. action-reaction, movement. 
Unfortunately, Jung was not allowed more time to elaborate on his preliminary 
reflections on numbers so a lot of lifting remains to be done. Von Franz in particular 
provided early and more detailed explorations into the psychic nature of numbers in 
                                           
19 To be clear, the sequence between the Open and Close can be different, e.g. time-wise the Low is 
reached before the High. The next cycle, via a new Open, starts from (although not necessarily at 
the same level as) the previous Close, i.e. from “what was concluded, so far”. 
20 Fractals are also a popular topic for technical analysts who will prefer to compare time series that are 
derived from the Fibonacci sequence, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, etc. periods. 
O (1)   
L (3)  
C (4) 
Time 
H (2)   
Price   
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her seminal Number and Time (1974). For all the ground she covered by her work, 
however, she notes that one crucial empirical issue remains unaddressed: 
If we apply these reflections of Jung to number, this would mean 
that number is bound up with the latent material aspect of the 
psyche and with the latent psychic aspect of matter. Up to the 
present time, however, no means of measuring psychic intensities 
numerically has been envisaged, although I believe such a 
possibility exists because of the fact . . . that all emotional, and 
therefore energy-laden, psychic processes evince a striking 
tendency to become rhythmical. (von Franz, 1974, p. 157; emphasis 
mine) 
In this thesis I will argue that her search is over: the capital markets provide the 
means to measure psychic intensities numerically and collectively, namely via prices 
which evolve in rhythmical patterns. Price discovery performs the transcendent 
function by merging the physical worth with a psychic value, symbolically expressed 
by a number. A price is the number which reflects the temporary agreement 
between buyers and sellers of a security. Although a buyer and seller, almost by 
definition, disagree on value they both experience this shared moment of submission 
to price. Such a meeting of minds is a psychological event, leading to the physical 
exchange of money for the underlying security. Price discovery is the self-organising 
process in capital markets by which the mental domain of investing (e.g. fiat money) 
is bridged with the physical domain of the real economy (e.g. tangible assets). This 
process occurs on a massive scale, 24/7 across the globe. Although Jung himself 
only once made a specific reference to stock markets (see full quote below), he 
seemed aware of the general importance of economics to the broader society and 
specifically the role of psychology in markets. This becomes apparent, for example, 
in the correspondence with Eugen Böhler, a professor of economics at ETH whom 
Jung befriended (Jung and Böhler, 1996). Among the most significant topics in their 
correspondence are the role of myths in the sciences, e.g. economics, the polarity 
between (rational and emotional) forces, and the importance of individuation in 
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terms of the role of the individual within the collective, e.g. the state. Later Böhler 
expands on some of these in less personal and more economic terms. Particularly 
relevant in light of the extraordinary measures taken by governments and central 
banks since the credit crisis erupted with the Lehman collapse in 2008, and 
especially the debate surrounding inequality, is the following comment:  
Once a certain optimum has been attained, guaranteeing man a 
dignified human existence, any extension of government power 
weakens individual responsibility. If a government were to attempt 
the elimination of all economic inequalities, it would have to 
interfere with the economy to such an extent as to render 
impossible the moral development of the individual . . . The 
individual has even less significance for the state than he has for the 
economy, because affairs of state are exclusively dominated by 
raisons d’état. . . . The influence of the individual ― and thus of 
moral reflection and conscience ― decreases as the power of 
collective interests increases, requiring a strengthening of central 
authority. Life becomes ever more mechanical. (1970, p. 63; 
emphasis mine) 
Other Jungian analysts have also touched on the meaning of complex psychology in 
matters of economics and finance. For example, Hillman (1982) argues that money 
is “a deposit of mythical fantasies” and a “complex”. He also identified economics as 
the only “omnipotent God” that exists today. Samuels (1993) discusses the market 
economy in the broader context of depth psychology and politics. However, both do 
not reflect on the crucial role of capital markets in the modern global economy and 
specifically price discovery as its (self-)organising principle. Then there are 
researchers from other fields who use a Jungian approach in their work on 
economics and finance. Psychological types has been particularly fruitful in that 
regard and Van Tharp (undated), for example, has built a profiling method to help 
traders. In an interview he also expresses the relevance of dreams: 
People tell me [they have dreams] all the time, especially top 
traders. For example, both the mechanical and intuitive super-
traders that we talked about earlier expressed that they have had 
dreams about the market that were amazingly accurate. This 
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phenomenon may even occur more frequently than one might 
imagine―in symbolic form. However, I must admit that although it 
interests me, I have not investigated this area very extensively. (in 
Schwager, 1993, p. 204)   
The sociologist Charles Smith, albeit not in terms of Jung’s typology, identifies 
different types of market participants, i.e. the Fundamentalist, the Insider, the 
Cyclist Chartist, and the Trader. He refers to religion when he makes the distinction 
between “true believers” and other participants: 
The true believers could be called the priests of the market insofar 
as they are spokesmen for the major market “religions”. The 
market, however, is a secular place. True believers consequently are 
more likely to see themselves as prophets than priests; like the 
prophets of old, they see themselves as living among “pagans”. 
Without the pagans, they would not be true believers. (1981, p. 65) 
Finally, Smith hints he is at least aware of Jung when he rounds it off with stating 
that a truly-believing Trader is: 
concerned with the life blood of the market, its essential energy. 
One could almost say that he’s interested in the market’s libido. 
(Ibid)   
Linking insights from finance with those from mind sciences, in particular complex 
psychology, is mutually beneficial for both disciplines. Specifically in terms of 
philosophy, for example, modern science evolved despite fully addressing the mind-
body problem which originated with two of its founders, Descartes and Mersenne. In 
the thesis I argue that this problem cannot be solved without inclusion of its 
collective dimension which is often so vividly demonstrated in markets. Within this 
dimension, researchers from Mackay (1841), via Keynes (1936), to Shiller (1984) 
have emphasised the role of mass psychology in markets. The latter, for example, 
stated that mass psychology may well be the dominant cause of movements in the 
price of the aggregate market (p. 458). 
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Therefore, the relevance of the topic of this thesis rests, first and foremost, on its 
premise: the market’s mind, the manifestation of collective consciousness by capital 
markets. From this premise, the thesis further clarifies the unconscious origin, as 
well as the phenomenal culmination, of price discovery. Based on insights from 
complexity theory I explain why both (have to) escape axiomatic capture. I also 
emphasise the need for a different method of research, inspired by Jung’s active 
imagination (e.g. Chodorow, 1997; von Franz, 1997), to complement traditional 
investment analysis. At the same time, this premise also points to the underlying 
issue of the market’s mind-body problem. As I will argue, this issue is largely 
ignored in finance and no progress will be made, in terms of gaining a better 
understanding of markets, if this problem is not, at the very least, acknowledged. 
With globalisation, trade liberalisation, and financial innovation bringing a growing 
number of investors into the global financial system, more than ever a thorough 
understanding of their collective behaviour is required. Because time and time again, 
in dealing with uncertainty, it is the collective aspect which dominates market moves 
as investors are affected by mass psychology. The collective investor mind-set shifts 
from euphoria to despair, shared emotions drift from greed to fear, while the 
financial markets experience booms and busts. After the Asian currency crisis in 
1996, the blow-up of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 (e.g. 
Lowenstein, 2001), and the dot-com bust in 2000, the recent crisis (generally known 
as the Great Recession or Credit Crunch; e.g. Lewis, 2011)21 is the latest case in 
point where investors lose their minds at the peak of the bubble and their nerves at 
the bottom of the crash. What is striking about these swings in financial wealth and 
                                           




    
 
wellbeing is that they are remarkably similar over time. Financial history may not 
repeat itself exactly, but it clearly rhymes (e.g. Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
Finally, what is undeniable are the ‘real’ impacts of market dynamics on the broader 
society, varying from beneficial global trade and financial innovations to detrimental 
resource depletion and inequality. On that note, I do not want the reader to get the 
wrong impression from what follows. So, to be clear: I do not think markets are 
perfect. But, contrary to consensus, neither do I think that their flaws are inherent. 
Rather, I believe markets have become more imperfect due to the aforementioned 
incorrect ontology that leads to a shaky epistemology which, in turn, spawns 
practices, policies, and regulations that ‘hurt’ markets. In particular, as I will discuss 
in more detail below, the mechanical view of the market is based on finance’s own 
version of physicalism and leads to a treatment of its mind that is deemed unhealthy 
(not only in complex psychology terms.) From a mind-body perspective I would go 
as far as to say that the current misdiagnosis and mistreatment of the market cause 
many of its flaws, like a doctor’s misdiagnosis and mistreatment can cause damage 
to a patient. What we’re dealing with in markets is the economic and collective 
variant of the eternal struggle to bridge the physical with the psychical. This has 
been the case ever since markets formed and can explain the recurring phenomena, 
e.g. of booms and busts, over the ages. Technology, computers and artificial 
intelligence (AI) in modern markets do not change that, for example. They simply 
raise the same questions as they do in the broader discussion within the mind 
sciences, e.g. concerning the mind-body problem. Assuming that “This time it’s 
different” can be very expensive, as the late Sir John Templeton, founder of 
Templeton Investments, has pointed out. What is crucial is that not realising the 
essence of this struggle risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Worse, the 
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trend over the past few decades to an increasingly physical and mechanical 
economic worldview is a move to extremism. Not only does it depart from some 
fundamental human qualities, like emotions and empathy. It also makes a big 
ontological commitment that, at best, is ill founded and, at worst, potentially 
damaging. In the spirit of Sir John, it is a highly leveraged bet that could wipe you 
out. Hopefully it is (or at least becomes) clear that this perspective on the paradigm, 
addressing the true nature of markets as embedded in human nature (the good and 
the bad), is beyond discussions concerning capitalism versus communism, or 
Keynesian versus Austrian economics, or conservatism versus socialism, for 
example. Still, I accept that some will find this focus too limited or even wrong. 
1.3 OVERVIEW LITERATURE 
 
Apart from complex psychology, other mind sciences like philosophy, evolutionary 
psychology and neuroscience provide many insights for this study, particularly 
concerning the ontological and epistemological aspects of the consciousness debate. 
For an introductory overview of this debate see Blackmore (2005). Arguments from 
physicalism (e.g. Dennett, 1998; Kim, 2005), phenomenology (e.g. Husserl, 1887), 
dual naturalism (e.g. Chalmers, 1996), reflexive monism (e.g. Velmans, 2008) in 
particular have helped to sharpen my philosophical arguments concerning the nature 
of the market’s mind, for example in terms of the market’s mind-body problem. Buss 
(1999) has provided an excellent, albeit technical, overview of evolutionary 
psychology. On that note, I am particularly fond of the writings of evolutionary 
psychologists Tooby and Cosmides because they have attempted early on (1994) to 
highlight its relevance for economics.  
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Numerous researchers have argued (implicitly or explicitly) that consciousness in 
general has indeed a collective dimension. Plato, Durkheim and Nietzsche22, while 
representing different view-points, argued in several of their writings for the 
collective aspect of consciousness, with Le Bon and Jung pointing to its unconscious 
origin. Contemporary researchers (e.g. Hut and Shepard, 1996; Surowiecki, 2004; 
Mathiesen, 2005) have followed up with similar arguments, as have neuroscientists 
(e.g. Edelman and Tononi, 2000). Mirror neurons play an important role in terms of 
the cerebral underpinnings of intersubjectivity and other manifestations of shared 
consciousness. Sources include Rizzolatti et al. (1996), and Gallese et al. (2007). 
Various topics like imitation (among the earliest sources being Tarde, 1903) are 
closely related to the dynamics involved. 
More intriguingly, researchers in finance have hinted at the phenomenon of 
collective market mentality (e.g. Smith, 1981; Soros, 1987; Knorr Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2000). In particular, Sornette (2003) refers explicitly to the “emergence 
of consciousness” in capital markets. Shermer (2008) discusses the evolution of the 
“market’s mind” and refers to its “archaic” origins. Apart from these references I 
argue that the premise of the market’s mind is implied in any discussion on whether 
the market is rational or not (e.g. Rubinstein, 2001), let alone whether Mr. Market 
suffers from bipolar disorder (Cheung, 2010). 
Although it is a fairly young discipline compared to some of the other sciences, 
finance has a rich history. For a non-technical overview see Bernstein (1992 and 
1998). More technically oriented readers should refer to Rubinstein (2006). Those 
interested specifically in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) should read Fama 
                                           
22 Nietzsche’s observation that “Insanity in individuals is something rare - but in groups, parties, nations 
and epochs, it is the rule” (Beyond Good and Evil, 1886, Aphorism 156) is, for example, very 
appropriate in light of “market madness”. 
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(1970), a seminal paper by one of its founders, and will find that Beechey et al. 
(2000) provide an excellent short survey. Behavioural finance has become a serious 
complementary (as well as challenging) branch to standard (or modern) finance. 
There are two main streams in behavioural finance. The first stream basically argues 
that heuristics (i.e. intuition) is detrimental to decision making. The other argues 
that heuristics are evolved psychological skills which can benefit decision making. 
Kahneman is advocate of the first stream and has collected its main insights into a 
seminal work (2011). Gigerenzer (2007) is the main supporter of the second stream 
and is, in his own words, Kahneman’s harshest critic.23 A source particularly aimed 
at practitioners is Montier (2007). Another branch relevant for this research is 
economic sociology and for an overview see Knorr Cetina and Preda (2005). Finally, 
although economics and finance are considered nested disciplines, I will not discuss 
the former in great detail here. Nevertheless, for a broad but thorough overview in 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) tradition see Samuelson (1985), and for 
a critical assessment (also, by the way, of behavioural finance), see Frydman and 
Goldberg (2007). In addition, the emphasis on freedom of markets to set prices, i.e. 
to allow price discovery, makes the Austrian School of economics (e.g. Hayek, 1945, 
1967, 1974; Mises, 1949) close in spirit to this thesis. 
Returning to the topic of this thesis, despite many attempts to explain the repetitive 
patterns (e.g. momentum) in collective behaviour of investors, finance has been 
unable to provide a comprehensive hypothesis as to the underlying causes for this. 
Many others have criticised modern finance, varying from attacking the EMH (e.g. 
                                           




    
 
Haugen, 1995; Taleb, 2001; Derman, 2011)24, showing the limitations of the REH 
(e.g. Spear, 1989), to dismissing behavioural finance (e.g. Lucas, 2001)25. My 
criticism of modern finance in general and behavioural finance in particular is aimed 
at their exclusive focus on the cognitive dimension of human behaviour and the 
resulting dependence on analysis in terms of research method to understand 
markets. This study will, instead, argue that investing, first and foremost, is an 
experience. For example, the phenomenological or experiential dimension of what it 
‘feels like’ to be in markets is crucial in exactly those situations when investors 
collectively lose their minds, and subsequently their nerves. And the related sense of 
a shift in sentiment for a crowded trade relies on intuition. On that note, in 
psychology in general and behavioural finance in particular, a distinction is made 
between the mind’s “System 1” and “System 2”. Both contain mental capabilities 
that often compete but also cooperate for the mind’s attention. Personally I do not 
subscribe to the strict distinction that is generally applied but rather see the two 
systems as closely interacting within the broader complex adaptive (and reflexive) 
system we call mind. Still, this framework helps to clarify the various mental 
functions and how they compete/cooperate. 
Below is an overview of some of the psychological functionality involved in both 
systems26: 
  
                                           
24 Both Taleb and Derman are serious ‘quants’ but criticise the dominant practise of dogmatically applying 
mathematical models to markets which, they argue, are unpredictable and (very much in the spirit 
of Hayek) of which we have incomplete knowledge. 
25 Lucas points out that stream one implies that investors systematically disregard information in their 
forecasting errors, something that makes this the “wrong theory”. 
26   See Kahneman (2011), as well as Epstein (1994). 
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Unconscious, experiential system 1 Conscious, rational system 2 
- Unconscious reasoning 
- Holistic assessment 
- Judgments based on intuition 
- Processes information quickly 
- Hypothetical reasoning 
- Large capacity 
- Prominent in animals and humans 
- Unrelated to working memory 
- Operates effortlessly and automatically 
- Unintentional thinking 
- Influenced by experiences/emotions/ 
memories 
- Prominent since human origins (innate) 
- Includes recognition, perception, 
orientation 
 
- Conscious reasoning 
- Analytic assessment 
- Judgments based on critical examination 
- Processes information slowly 
- Logical reasoning 
- Small capacity 
- Prominent only in humans 
- Related to working memory 
- Operates with effort and control 
- Intentional thinking 
- Influenced by facts/ logic/ 
evidence 
- Developed over time 




A problem with all current investment approaches is their overreliance on (cognitive) 
analysis which supports the mind’s System 2 capabilities. They largely ignore the 
fact that our consciousness is completed (in terms of how experiences are conveyed) 
by mental dynamics which (have to) escape axiomatic capture. I argue that in order 
for the economy’s innovations and the related market prices to remain discoveries it 
is no wonder that the unconscious origin and phenomenal culmination of mental 
discoveries, e.g. intuitive insights, remain hidden from mechanical approaches.  
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To increase our understanding of the market’s mind requires an investment research 
method attuned to these psychological dynamics, particularly considering the 
market’s “big data”. To put it in practical terms, Excel simply won’t do. To 
complement analytical methods we need a systematic approach to support System 1 
capabilities. In terms of where most of these are located in the brain, McGilchrist 
states that “the right hemisphere has no voice” (2011). I thus suggest a research 
method which applies and adjusts Jung’s active imagination for an investment 
setting. By way of an audiovisual representation of market data an appeal is made to 
the mind’s sensational capabilities in general, and intuition in particular, to 
understand the market’s rhythmical numerical dynamics in a non-analytical sense. 
So, in addition to the theoretical hypothesis of numerical archetypes, this practical 
method sets complex psychology apart from other mind sciences in terms of how to 
counter the over-rationalisation promoted by modern finance and its obsession with 
physics. In chapter 10 I will discuss a framework for a proposed experiment where 
this is applied to test various sub-hypotheses. 
The “dismal science” has also failed to recognise the importance of the (collective) 
unconscious affects, e.g. emotions, in price discovery. Recent scholarly studies 
include papers by Bechara and Damasio (2005), and Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2011), 
as well as books (e.g. Damasio, 2000; Gigerenzer, 2007). These affects emerge in 
various forms and Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2004), for example, refer to 
Keynes (1936) who coined them “animal spirits”27. Although Keynes emphasised 
their positive, stimulating effects we should remember that originally animal spirits 
had a more ambiguous meaning: they can guide, but also often haunt the market’s 
mind (e.g. Descartes’ “devils”). And it was Graham (1973), mentor of Warren 
                                           
27 For another modern interpretation see Akerloff and Shiller, 2009. 
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Buffett, who pointed out that, as a result, “Mr Market” seems to suffer euphoria 
(mania) and despair (depression) on a regular basis. Consistent with Graham, this 
thesis will argue that ‘the market’ is indeed an entity, but an entity that is not 
separate from us. Nevertheless, its identity remains largely unknown, and its 
workings hidden, as in Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” (1776; see also Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1994 [full quote in section 6.4]). In complex psychology terms, Mr Market 
is the personification28 of the market, particularly its collective psychic contents, 
including complexes. Mr Market’s personality is primarily expressed and conveyed by 
way of prices. In finance terms price patterns reflect his reaction to (i.e. discounting 
of) news and events, but in complex psychology they could be interpreted as the 
‘dramatization’ of numbers. We can subsequently speculate, for example, to which 
extent manipulation of his price discovery affects Mr Market’s autonomy. Also, 
although Mr Market is gender-neutral (despite his name), certain behavioural 
characteristics or moods could possibly be identified and interpreted as masculine or 
feminine, but this falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis will explain the market’s mind in terms of a collective consciousness 
focused on price discovery. The latter involves insights into the meaning of 
(numerical) symbols, namely prices. Those insights emerge from the interactive 
dynamics between the unconscious, cognitive and phenomenal domains of investors’ 
minds, both at the individual and collective level. The relevance of Jung, who 
popularised the collective unconscious and developed the archetypal hypothesis, 
should be obvious (again, see specifically von Franz [1974] and Robertson [1995]). 
Still, although his theory plays a central role I will not discuss the person Jung, as he 
is not part of the theme of my thesis. Nor will I discuss his scientific or social 
                                           




    
 
contributions. On these topics many others have written volumes, from critical (e.g. 
Noll, 1994), via balanced (e.g. Bair, 2003) to admiring (e.g. Shamdasani, 2003). 
Instead, I will introduce and explain concepts developed by Jung, which I deem 
relevant for finance, and which subsequently I have adapted to specifically fit the 
finance setting. This is perfectly in accordance with the spirit of Jung’s theory: 
the archetypal concept is so fundamental that it is being taken out 
of the hands of Jungians and its implications are being worked out 
by practitioners in other disciplines. This is as it should be, for Jung 
never argued that his psychology was definitive or final. The full 
implications of archetypal theory have yet to be realized. (Stevens, 
2002, p.88) 
As aforementioned this thesis focuses on Jung’s later and, in his own words, “more 
important” work. Arguably, Jung became more of a philosopher/theorist and less of 
a psychologist/therapist during his later years. Consequently, in his later work “he 
simply expresses the abstract notion of the oppositional structure or form of the 
psychic” (Giegerich, 2007, p. 249). Giegerich refers to Jung’s interpretation of the 
dual aspects of mind. 
Jung preferred the term complex psychology rather than analytical psychology. The 
oppositional structure of the mind as well as concepts like complementarity are 
closely associated with complex dynamics (to be discussed in the next section). More 
broadly, chaos and complexity are dealt with by Gleick (1987) and Mitchell (2009). 
Complexity theory applied to economics has been discussed by Arthur et al. (1997) 
and Markose (2005). Finally, topics like Gödel’s theorems (e.g. Penrose, 1994) and 
algorithmic information theory (e.g. Chaitin, 1987) will be discussed because they 




    
 
Finally, Jung’s later work culminated in his conclusion that the numerical archetypes 
form the core or prime archetypes. I link numerical archetypes to its modern variant, 
called number sense, with the main sources being Dehaene (e.g. 1997), and 
Butterworth (1999).29 Apart from the original Greeks, early reflections on the 
philosophy of mathematics and/or mathematical philosophy include Edgeworth 
(1881), Frege (1884) and Russell (1919). Early sources on specifically number 
(intuition) include Danzig (1930), and Hadamard (1945). All provide more 
mathematical details and background to the Jungian reflections by von Franz and 
others on numbers. 
1.4 THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
Some of Jung’s work deals with the mystical aspects of the mind. There are various 
alternative interpretations of this. For example, perennial wisdom, a term first coined 
by Aldous Huxley, signifies the common characteristics of philosophy and the various 
mystical traditions which have provided so many insights into the nature of mind. 
Although one could debate whether these interpretations remain valid in modern 
times, fact is that scientists 
are starting to acknowledge that they might have something to 
learn from ancient contemplative disciplines. Students of 
neuroscience are now reading the teachings of Buddha alongside the 
works of William James; researchers toil up Tibetan mountains to 
interview members of isolated religious communities about their 
perceptions of time and space; and bemused (or perhaps amused) 
monks are regularly invited to meditate with their heads in brain 
scanners. (Carter, 2002, p.277) 
                                           
29 Earlier reflections (not always in agreement) include, for example, Karmiloff-Smith (1995). 
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All this will be dealt with in a broader framework. The conceptual framework for the 
thesis’ approach to analyse the markets’ consciousness is based on complexity 
theory, in particular that of complex, self-organising (or adaptive) systems. As 
aforementioned, the contribution by Jung to clarify the mind as a complex system 
bridging the phenomenal (and spiritual) with the physical was acknowledged, for 
example, by Capra. Complexity theory30 has gained prominence over the past few 
decades at the expense of reductionism exactly because the latter is based on a 
mechanical perspective which is limited in explaining non-linear phenomena like 
novelty, i.e. surprises. Specifically it fails to explain how a complex adaptive system 
endogenously produces the internal surprises (e.g. the mind’s insights) required to 
deal with external ones. Moreover, the overreliance on mechanical, particularly 
quantitative, methods of investing has contributed to some of the issues that have 
characterised the crisis and its aftermath. For all clarity, I am not arguing that there 
are no mechanical processes operating in human mentality. Rather, I am arguing 
that human mentality is not exclusively mechanical and that relying on the 
assumption that they are, with the accompanying faith in economic/financial 
engineering, can lead to unintended consequences.  
In short, this thesis makes references to multiple disciplines, among others, finance, 
biology, mathematics, philosophy, psychology, physics, and sociology. Therefore, 
some basic knowledge of these disciplines as well as familiarity with 
cognitive/consciousness research is helpful in understanding the concepts discussed 
in this thesis. I hope the earlier sections in this chapter have been helpful in that 
respect. Also, I have tried to explain them as much as possible in non-technical 
terms in the remainder of this document. Again, in order to present my thesis in a 
                                           
30 Also known as (dynamic) systems theory. 
49 
 
    
 
proper format, I’ve selected the scientific and philosophical concepts related to mind 
and consciousness which I deem appropriate and most fitting to the financial setting. 
That selection is therefore subjective and far from exhaustive31. I certainly do not 
pretend that my reasoning answers all questions on consciousness in the markets. 
Far from it: consistent with my hypothesis certain questions will always remain 
unanswered. All I can hope for is that it will trigger further discussion and research 
along these lines. 
In terms of finance, the topic of the thesis clearly goes beyond finance’s usual 
boundaries. Whereas modern finance and its EMH view markets mechanically, i.e. 
from a machine perspective, this thesis finds inspiration in sources that deal with 
evolution of mind32. Consequently, this thesis will take the reader beyond the well-
known anomalies described by behavioural finance. It will also surpass other 
publications which focus on the individual investor mind, because it will explore the 
depths of our collective mind, of which the individual mind is only a part and often a 
slave. In any case, the terms in which I describe the financial markets are 
undoubtedly blasphemous for most finance academics, but hopefully more attuned 
to my broader audience.  
Part of my motivation to write this thesis rests on the conviction that the financial 
system has something to teach the sciences, in particular those involved in 
consciousness research. Finance has historically borrowed ideas and concepts from 
the ‘hard’ sciences, in particular physics, but this has resulted in a restrictive 
paradigm, a tunnel vision. Moreover, it never realised it had this treasure trove to 
                                           
31 In fact, what is generally known as “the philosophy of mind” offers a rich source of fascinating insights 
to any investor who’s interested in the essence of consciousness. Again, I had to be selective. 
32 For example, it pays allegiance to but also differs from the Adaptive Market Hypothesis, a convincing 




    
 
offer to other disciplines, in the form of long histories of ‘highly emotionally charged’ 
data on interacting minds. Also, in the spirit of both the critical Freakonomics (Levitt 
and Dubner, 2005), and the praising Freedomnomics (Lott, 2007), I’d like to clarify 
the role of capital markets in modern society, and more specifically convey the 
fascinating world of collective investment psychology. For those readers who like 
psychology, but never cared much about the markets, I let Jung make my point: 
Anyone who wants to know the human psyche will learn next to 
nothing from experimental psychology. He would be better advised 
to abandon exact science, put away his scholar's gown, bid farewell 
to his study, and wander with human heart through the world.  
There in . . . the Stock Exchanges [among other worldly places] . . . 
through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every 
form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than 
text-books a foot thick could give him, and he will know . . . with a 
real knowledge . . . the human soul. (1912, p. 247; emphasis mine) 
I am also motivated to help the individual investor by introducing a new 
methodology of investment research that focuses on the audiovisualisation of market 
data.33 Although reflecting different approaches and emphasis compared to mine, 
other research on this topic includes Nesbitt and Barass (2004), and Bettner et al. 
(2010), as well as references therein.  
Another part of my motivation comes from the need, as I perceive it, to explain the 
financial system to some of its harshest critics. Apart from a roster of politicians, 
among those are members of, what has been labelled as, the anti-capitalist and 
anti-globalisation movement. They view the capital markets as part of the ‘problem’ 
in modern society, in particular as far as inequality, globalisation and climate change 
are concerned. After reading this thesis, they hopefully will realise that capital 
markets are not the easy scapegoat. In a number of non-technical articles 
(syndicated here, for example), I address more specifically some of the issues they 
                                           
33 It is a practical application of what I call Archetypal Valuation (chapter 9). 
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raise and argue that, instead, the financial system is our biggest hope for peace, 
prosperity, and sustainability if allowed proper ‘freedom’. In the words of Markowitz 
(1991), echoing Smith, Hayek, and others: 
My own views are much closer to the gospel according to Adam 
Smith. The invisible hand is clumsy, heartless, and unfair, but it is 
ever so much more deft and impartial than a central planning 
committee. 
At the same time, I hope to clarify my earlier statement that, while the ivory tower 
of EMH is being shot to pieces, the early foundations for an alternative structure are 
being built on shaky grounds. Its architects have been ignoring the underlying cave 
upon which these foundations are being built, i.e. the unconscious. Overall, I provide 
an implicit warning that the crisis, which arguably peaked after the Lehman collapse 
in 2008 but has lingering effects (e.g. dread risk; Haldane, 2015), will be repeated in 
much more serious forms. That is, unless we start to acknowledge the importance 
of, what Greenspan (2008)34 has called the “innate human responses” in 
speculation, and to place these in their proper framework. That framework is the 
collective unconscious which attempts to compensate, via the numerical archetypes, 
human imbalances which, in our global society, are reflected in market excesses. 
With this theoretical framework I hope to answer questions which have steered me 
over the years to write this thesis. They certainly have not been answered 
satisfactorily (or not at all) by mainstream finance: 
 Why are prices consistently the variables which explain best their own 
variance (e.g. momentum; e.g. Elroy Dimson, et al., 2008)? 
                                           
34 In what some consider one of a series of ‘confessions’ of his errors. 
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 Why have capital markets become so dominant over the ‘real’ economy, 
increasingly at a global scale (e.g. “the tail wagging the dog”, the fears of 
both Minsky and Keynes; see, for example, John Bogle, 2008)? 
 Why has economic evaluation encroached so far in modern society, attaching 
monetary value to education, art, the weather, and even life and death (e.g. 
Capra, 2002)? 
 Why have academics behaved irrationally in their field, while insisting on the 
rationality of investors in the market (e.g. Krugman, 2009)? 
 Why have investors not learned, or rather seem to forget quickly what 
they’ve learned, from previous financial crises?35  
 And why do these crises seem to have become worse to the point of financial 
Armageddon? 
In conclusion, throughout this thesis, sometimes in dedicated sections, I will 
emphasise the primacy of numerical archetypes for the investment experience. If 
there is one message this thesis is attempting to bring across it is the following: 
Price discovery bridges the physical real economy with the mental markets 
thereby bringing order to the modern global society. It provides the 
numerical measuring for the collective mind’s intensities, as searched for by 
many Jungians, captured in the earlier words of von Franz. Combined with 
the neuroscientific insights into the assignment by emotions of values to 
situations, this is why I argue that prices embody an emotional charge, and 
                                           
35 E.g. when he was asked what people would learn from the whole financial crisis, investment guru 
Jeremy Grantham said, “In the short term a lot, in the medium term a little, in the long term, 
nothing at all . . .” 
(http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2014/02/grantham-people-dont-learn/ , downloaded 23/06/2014). 
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by themselves possess the potential to trigger instinctive behaviour, 
independent of fundamentals. In other words, to paraphrase von Franz, it is 
not what we can do with prices, but what they do to our consciousness that 
is essential in our understanding of markets. 
Finally, capital markets evolved despite of us, not because of us, guided by a familiar 
but unknown invisible hand. There is a reason why we, now on a massive global 
scale, ended up with ordering our affairs by way of price discovery. True discovery is 
a delicate and often painful process with its own, largely hidden, dynamics. 
Interference, particularly of the ‘politically correct’ kind, not only distorts prices but, 
as Böhler pointed out, weakens individual responsibility. Other forms of 
manipulation, like the recent Libor and Forex rigging scandals or pre-release inside 
information36, have similar detrimental effects.  
1.5 OVERVIEW CHAPTERS  
Again acknowledging that the multi-disciplinary nature of my thesis forces me to be 
selective, which leads to both losses and gains for all categories of readers, the 
remainder of this thesis is divided as follows.  
Chapter 2 will discuss the urge to search for a new paradigm in finance following the 
crisis. The emphasis is on the ontological nature of markets and related issues. 
Chapter 3 will introduce Jung’s concepts of the unconscious in general and 
archetypes in particular. This is followed in chapter 4 by an overview and 
interpretation of consciousness.  Chapter 5 returns to archetypes, but specifically the 
                                           





    
 
numerical archetypes and how this relates to the modern concept of number sense 
as well as to price discovery. These chapters prepare the ground for framing the 
working hypothesis of this thesis in chapter 6 which includes phrasing the market’s 
mind-body problem. Chapter 7 delves into mass psychology by linking Jung’s 
concept of participation mystique to mirror neurons. Chapter 8 provides more detail 
on (the symbolic nature of) prices, their patterns and their discovery. Chapter 9 
introduces a portfolio management perspective on mentality, called Archetypal 
Valuation. It provides a philosophical backdrop for Audio Visual Investment Research 
(AVIR), a new investment research method I am developing. The latter is the topic 
of chapter 10 where I suggest a propositional framework for an experiment which 
could tests some of the sub-hypotheses presented in this thesis. I finish this thesis 
with some concluding remarks in chapter 11.  
The remainder of this document also contain a number of boxed sections, called 
“notes”, that clarify topics from an investor’s, Jungian, or general perspective. 





    
 
CHAPTER 2. FINANCE AND ONTOLOGY37 
 
There is no reason (except a mistaken physical determinism) why mental states and 
physical states should not interact. (The old argument that things so different could not 
interact was based on a theory of causation which has long been superseded.) If we act 
through being influenced by the grasp of an abstract relationship, we initiate physical 
causal chains which have no sufficient physical causal antecedents. We are then ‘first 
movers’, or creators of a physical ‘causal chain’.    
Karl Popper 
 
Psyche cannot be totally different from matter, for how otherwise could it move matter? 
And matter cannot be alien to psyche, for how else could matter produce psyche? Psyche 






Unprecedented times ask for unprecedented thinking. Parallel to recent (and in some 
instances on-going) economic turbulence, which culminated in the crisis, questions 
have again been raised about the underlying theoretical framework, or paradigm, 
with which we view and analyse the economy in general and capital markets in 
particular. Apart from Queen Elisabeth who, in 2009, famously wondered why no 
economist saw the crisis coming, German Chancellor Angela Markel (2009) summed 
up the disappointment with current as well as the need for new thinking: 
                                           




    
 
Moreover, and this is directed at the economic sciences, one must 
honestly confess that the sciences have not sufficiently recognized this 
problem. We often give great credence to prognoses. Yet the prognoses 
that were made did not serve as an early warning of such a crisis. That 
is why research on the mechanisms of the international financial 
markets will certainly have to be intensified. 
The term paradigm was popularised by Kuhn (1962) who described the process in 
the advances of the sciences by way of paradigm-shifts, non-linear and radical 
departures from previously held belief-systems to new worldviews. Many agree that 
finance is experiencing a similar shift, with some in academia arguing that it is about 
time. For example, the London School of Economics, in cooperation with other 
institutions, formed the Future of Finance Group. Their findings were published in a 
report called “The Future of Finance; And the Theory That Underpins It”. George 
Soros has even gone so far as to establish the Institute of New Economic Thinking 
(INET) with the aim to “find a new paradigm to rebuild from the ground up.”38 
What is undeniable is that the current dominant paradigm, generally known as 
modern finance, is now being challenged by a number of alternative theories. Prime 
among these is behavioural finance which has identified various anomalies which 
cannot be explained by modern finance. However, we need to go beyond anomalies 
in order to better understand both its shortcomings as well as the requirements for 
an emerging new paradigm. In our search we can find inspiration from Pauli’s view: 
I hope that no one still maintains that theories are deduced by strict 
logical conclusions from laboratory-books . . . Theories are established 
through an understanding inspired by empirical material, an 
understanding which is best construed, following Plato, as an emerging 
correspondence of internal images and external objects and their 
behaviour. The possibility of understanding demonstrates again the 
presence of typical dispositions regulating both inner and outer 
conditions of human beings. (in Atmanspacher and Primas, 2006, p.10; 
emphasis mine) 
                                           
38 I was kindly invited to attend INET’s first three conferences, including the inaugural conference at 
Cambridge University in April 2010. 
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What is required are both a revised ontological premise as well as complementary 
epistemological assumptions. In short, we need to revisit what the true nature of the 
market is, as well as what it means to participate in it. This chapter discusses the 
metaphysical foundations upon which modern finance rests and why these are 
shaky.39 Among others I make the argument that modern finance represses the 
mind-body problem40 of the market which is the primary cause for its shortcomings 
as well as those of its followers in the market. 
2.2 CURRENT PARADIGM: MODERN FINANCE 
 
The framework of modern finance is built around the academic ‘ivory tower’ of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The latter was developed in the 1960’s, based on 
research by early explorers like Louis Bachelier, Alfred Cowles, and Maurice 
Kendall.41 According to the EMH investors are rational in their pursuit to maximise 
wealth. In addition, markets are, to the extent of the accepted strength of the 
hypothesis, efficient in that prices reflect all available information. This basically 
means that investors should not expect to earn abnormal returns (other than by 
chance), i.e. ‘beating the market’ is nearly impossible and there are no ‘free 
lunches’. Fama (1970) makes the following distinction: 
 
                                           
39 To be clear, the term metaphysical refers to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying 
all of a theory’s findings and hypotheses, in this case modern finance. It should therefore not be 
confused with metaphysics in a religious or spiritual sense. 
40 Also known as the mind-matter or mind-brain problem. 
41 For excellent historic overviews of modern finance, see Bernstein (1992), Rubenstein (2006) and 
Ferguson (2009). For a particularly critical view see Fox (2009). 
58 
 
    
 





Public information, historic prices 
Private and public information, historic prices 
 
According to the EMH, price discovery under these circumstances is limited to 
exploiting the discrepancy between the market value, or price, and the intrinsic 
value of a security by alert investors. This discrepancy is only a short-term 
inefficiency because its discovery will trigger trades leading to a close-to-instant re-
pricing which will return the price to its intrinsic value, thus reaching equilibrium. In 
short, the price is almost constantly reflecting the intrinsic value. 
Among the characteristics of modern finance is its reliance on mathematics. This is 
reflected in the three (overlapping) manifestations of modern finance in today’s 
investment world: 
1. Quantitative analysis: involves the application of mathematics in designing 
financial models (e.g. Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM], Black-Scholes 
options model); 
2. Financial engineering: involves the application of mathematics in designing 




    
 
3. Systematic investing: involves the application of mathematics in designing 
the investment process (e.g. mechanical/algorithmic/high-frequency trading, 
risk management). 
But like the Sirens, the aesthetic appeal of mathematical models can be deceiving 
when using them as a compass. As Montier points out: “In finance we seem to have 
a chronic love affair with elegant theories. Our faculties for critical thinking seem to 
have been overcome by the seductive power of mathematical beauty” (2009, p. 6). 
The inconsistency of current practice, and its implicit risk, was highlighted by 
Woolley: 
Most investors accept that markets are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
inefficient and devote themselves to exploiting the opportunities on 
offer. But by a nice irony, they have continued to use tools and adopt 
policies constructed on the assumptions of efficiency. It is a costly 
mistake. (2010, p. 137) 
Investment Note: CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the cornerstone model based on the EMH. 
It provides a framework to describe (expected) risk and return and draws 
conclusions, among others, on the efficiency of portfolios, including the market 
portfolio. 
Although it remains central to the basic mean-variance optimisation of portfolios, it 
exemplifies the erroneous assumptions underlying modern finance and the empirical 
implications which follow from this. Specifically: 
1. The CAPM is not logical, let alone realistic in its assumptions. In particular the 
assumption of being able to borrow limitless is flawed. Specifically, if “investors have 
limited borrowing capacity, then it no longer follows that the market portfolio is 
efficient.” (Markowitz, 2005, p. 17) 
2. The CAPM is not tractable, nor testable. In particular “the market” as a portfolio 
cannot be observed (i.e. Roll’s second critique, 1977). 
3. The CAPM is not empirical because we cannot make any statements due to the 




    
 
Finally, it is generally acknowledged that modern finance has been inspired by the 
natural sciences, in particular physics. That inspiration has been perceived as 
bordering on the obsessive. Soros, referring to Freud, has argued that modern 
finance suffers from a psychological disorder known as “physics envy” (2010, p. 21). 
Preferring Jung’s terminology, I like to call it a “physics complex”42. There are certain 
complications attached to this disorder which I will highlight next by placing modern 
finance in a broader context, namely the underpinnings of modern science itself. 
2.3 MODERN SCIENCE AND ITS PREMISE 
 
Modern science originated roughly in the seventeenth century, exemplified by the 
dualistic philosophy of Descartes and Mersenne. Harman (1994, p. 8) lists the main 
metaphysical assumptions which subsequently became the intrinsic premise of 
modern science: 
 Objectivism: the assumption of an objective world which the observer can 
hold at a distance and study isolated from himself; 
 Positivism: the assumption that the real world is what is physically and 
independently measurable; 
 Reductionism: the assumption that we come to really understand a 
phenomenon through studying the behaviour of its elementary parts. 
                                           
42 In Jungian terms, a complex is a distorted archetypal image, mainly due to repression. As I will argue, 
finance’s complex is caused by the repression of the market’s mind-body problem, particularly its 
phenomenal aspect, thereby not acknowledging the true nature of capital markets nor what it 
means to participate in it, i.e. have skin in the game. 
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The central characteristic of this premise is separateness, in particular the separation 
of observer and observed, subjective from objective, cause from effect and, in the 
broader context of this debate, the psychic from the physical. Apart from other 
‘conflicts’, a theme I will return to later, ultimately this has led to the mind-body 
problem whereby “consciousness became essentially absent from the scientific 
worldview” (Ibid, p. 10).  
According to Harman the above assumptions form an interrelated theoretical 
network from which, among others, expectations can be derived. Consequently: 
When there is an “anomaly”, or a failure of observations to confirm to 
scientific expectations, it means that somewhere in that network there 
is a falsity. But there is no standard logic for discerning just where in 
the theoretical network the falsity lies. Thus in the face of an anomaly 
we must consider revising all elements of the network. . . . In short, 
when experience contradicts science, the science must change, but 
there is no infallible logic for determining exactly what to change in 
one’s theory. Karl Popper’s insistence that theories are never proved, 
but only falsified or not, seemed at one point an important insight; 
however, in today’s science to talk about “verification” or “falsification” 
of theory sounds naïve and simplistic. (Ibid, p. 7)  
Acknowledging this complication we must accept that the adaptation of any theory, 
particularly those in the social sciences, goes beyond the idea that we use some 
‘ideal’ experiment to either verify or falsify particular scientific hypotheses43. Rather 
there are basically two ways in which theories transform. The first way is via 
relatively small anomalies which simply pile up, initially slowly but often turning into 
a cascade. In that case, anomalies act like viruses in that they multiply and start to 
infect the whole structure, whereby a theory’s death, to paraphrase Max Planck, 
                                           
43 If only because an experiment is always part of contemporary human knowledge, in this case 
methodology design, and this already runs the risk of ‘filtering’ anomalies. This echoes the 
argument made by Strong Sociology, the largely Edinburgh-based school of thought, which 
proposes that both ‘true’ and ‘false’ scientific theories should be treated the same way. Both are 
caused by social factors or conditions, such as cultural context and self-interest. According to this 
school, all human knowledge, as something that exists in the human cognition, must contain some 
social components in its formation process. 
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“advances one virus at the time”. The second way, closer in spirit to Kuhn, is more 
radical and is caused by those anomalies which are so surreal that they defy 
‘reality’: they become reality checks of ontological commitments. In that case, the 
implication is that: 
even our epistemological convictions about how we acquire knowledge, 
and about the nature of explanation, justification, and confirmation, are 
subject to revision and correction. (Ibid, p. 7)  
This has actually already occurred to some extent in the mind sciences. According to 
Roger Sperry, who received the Nobel prize in medicine for his research on split-
brains, a cognitive revolution started in the 1970’s involving a turnabout in the 
conception and treatment of the conscious mind which “has vastly transformed 
previous scientific descriptions of ourselves and the world” (Sperry, 1994, p. 99).44 
The resulting shift away from the blank slate approach of behaviourism has recently 
accelerated with findings in fields like neuroscience (e.g. emotions45, Damasio, 1994; 
mirror neurons, Gallese, 2001; re-entry loop, Edelman and Tononi, 2000), 
consciousness studies (e.g. “the hard problem”, Chalmers, 1995; phenomenal 
consciousness, Ned Block, 1995; Blackmore, 2005), and (evolutionary) psychology 
(e.g. gut feelings, Gigerenzer, 2007; instincts, Tooby and Cosmides, 2005). 
Specifically, the common thread of these findings is an interaction between 
innateness and development of psychological functions, particularly emotions, 
suggesting the complementarity of nature and nurture. Crucially, the influence of the 
unconscious is acknowledged (e.g. Mlodinow, 2012). The particular implications for 
                                           
44 As an aside, the irony of the simultaneous emergence of modern finance and behavioural finance (i.e. 
Kahneman & Tversky’s “Heuristics and Biases” program) around the same time should not escape 
the reader. 
45 Emotions involve mostly the feelings associated with experiences, compared to thoughts. The literature 




    
 
finance as a theory, as well as prices as its unit of research, are captured by the 
words of Pauli, stating that if: 
all understanding is a long-drawn-out process initiated by processes 
in the unconscious long before the content of consciousness can be 
rationally formulated, it has directed attention again to the 
preconscious, archaic level of cognition. On this level the place of 
clear concepts is taken by images with strong emotional content, 
not thought out but beheld, as it were, while being painted. 
Inasmuch as these images are an “expression of a dimly suspected 
but still unknown state of affairs”, they can also be termed symbolic, 
in accordance with the definition of the symbol proposed by C. G. 
Jung. (1948, p. 2; emphasis mine) 
The archetypal hypothesis can help us, for example, to specify Greenspan’s “missing 
explanatory variable” in finance, namely “the innate human responses that result in 
swings between euphoria and fear that repeat themselves generation after 
generation with little evidence of a learning curve” (2008). 
In fairness, the strict interpretation of the aforementioned assumptions started to be 
challenged much earlier by the findings in quantum physics (e.g. Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle), followed by the implications from complexity (e.g. chaos) 
theory. The effect quantum physics had on Einstein, for example, underlines the 
experiential impact of this kind of reality check: 
It was as if the ground had been pulled from under one, with no firm 
foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which one could have built. 
Why does this sound so familiar to investors, particularly those relying on modern 
finance for explanations for the market’s behaviour surrounding the Lehman 
collapse, for example? 




    
 
I would argue that the turmoil in the capital markets, at the time of the Lehman 
collapse, qualifies for such a reality check in finance. Although this is often difficult to 
grasp for non-investment professionals, we came very close to a financial 
Armageddon. It would have meant, to borrow a line from the rock band REM, the 
end of the world as we know it46. In addition to this reality check, anomalies, 
identified by behavioural finance, had already been piling up for modern finance for 
longer. It is vulnerable to behavioural criticism because modern finance has not 
joined Sperry’s cognitive revolution. Specifically, its premise embeds the reductionist 
assumption that price discovery, enacted by trading, can be separated from 
supplementary developments in markets, in particular mood shifts. In other words, it 
assumes that equilibrium is an independent mechanical process driven by the steady 
state of rationality. This insistence by modern finance on separation is quite broad 
(e.g. the market from its participants, theory from practice, and rationality from 
emotions) and is at the core of its own identity crisis, as well as that of the market. 
Side Note 
Following Tarnas (1991; quoted in Harman, 1994), let me clarify this via the double 
bind concept of anthropologist Gregory Bateson as applied to Benjamin Graham’s 
schizophrenic Mr Market. I will analyse this by interpreting the relationship between 
a typical investor and Mr Market according to mainstream finance along Bateson’s 
criteria: 
Dependency: the investor’s relationship to the market is one of economic survival, 
thereby making it critical for her to assess the nature of the market accurately, i.e. 
she needs to be engaged, or at least be aware; 
Communication: finance theory prescribes how the market communicates, and its 
models suggest how information should be interpreted. However, the investor’s mind 
                                           
46 Should the financial system collapse, all financial transactions would cease, as would eventually the 
exchanges of goods. For example, ATMs would not provide cash anymore, shelves in supermarkets 
would become empty, and electricity would be shut down. An orderly society would revert to chaos, 
a new reality, a new world. In a BBC interview, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling 
describes how close the UK came to this 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8914000/8914062.stm). More recently former US 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson also admitted as much as far as the world overall is concerned. 
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receives mixed messages: contradictory or incompatible information about the 
situation in the market as experienced. In particular, its interiority by way of inner 
qualitative sensations is incoherent with the prescribed scientific impressions (e.g. 
model readings) of the market as its exteriority. Specifically, the mixed messages 
consist of the following: 
- Modern finance (i.e. EMH): The market is efficient, so the price communicates 
nothing but rational behaviour. Irrational exuberance does not exist (because 
collectively we are all rational); 
- Behavioural finance: The market is anomalous, so the price communicates 
systematic non-rational heuristics and biases, particularly emotions. Irrational 
exuberance exists (we all suffer from emotions, particularly collectively). 
The messages are inconsistent, except for one thing: they suggest that there is no 
place for one’s sensations. Specifically, emotions are irrelevant, respectively bad. 
Epistemology: the investor's mind cannot achieve direct understanding of the 
market. Specifically, the investor cannot experience the price in a meaningful way, 
i.e. price sensations/qualia are considered epiphenomenal; 
Existentially: the investor collective cannot desert nor can they contradict (read: 
beat) the market.  
It becomes clear that, in Bateson’s terms, the victim and the perpetrator are one 
and the same. Mr Market is a schizophrenic because we collectively create the 
separation of identities in one mind. Like the post-Copernican dilemma of being a 
peripheral and insignificant inhabitant of a vast cosmos, modern finance suggests 
that the average investor is a disposable agent in a global economic machine. Like 
the post-Cartesian dilemma of being a conscious personal subject confronting an 
impersonal universe, modern finance suggests that the average investor is a rational 
individual confronting the efficient market, a mindless but superior composite 
investor. These dilemmas are compounded by the post-Kantian dilemma of there 
being no possible means by which the investor can know the market in its complete 
essence, i.e. Roll’s second critique (1977). Finally, like the post-Kahneman dilemma 
behavioural finance suggests that the usual (evolved) medium with which we build a 
relationship and understand another being, or even a collective group of beings, 
namely System 1 (e.g. emotions), should be switched off. 
It seems Mr Market’s “double-headedness”, parallel to the advance of practices 
based on mechanistic interpretations of markets (e.g. financial engineering, high-
frequency trading, monetary policies) has become particularly pronounced over the 
10 years up to 2010, for example as reflected in the rolling annual returns (weekly 




    
 
 
Arguably separateness continues to linger and is, to some extent, appropriate for the 
natural sciences47, but it simply is not applicable to studying markets. Consequently 
it causes incomplete and inconsistent knowledge in finance.  
Soros (1994), perhaps inspired by Popper’s reflections on this problem in the 
aforementioned quote48, has always insisted on the inseparability of economic facts 
and thinking agents: 
Thinking participants cannot act on the basis of knowledge. 
Knowledge presupposes facts which occur independently of the 
statements which refer to them; but being a participant implies that 
one’s decisions influence the outcome. Therefore, the situation 
participants have to deal with does not consist of facts 
independently given but facts which will be shaped by the decision 
of the participants.  
Soros’ hypothesis, called reflexivity, basically states that the capital markets and the 
real economy mutually influence each other. It is a form of self-reference leading to 
downward causality. Specifically, prices affect fundamentals which, via adjustments 
                                           
47 Something along the lines of “The laws of nature to which objects are subjected do not depend on 
human behaviour”. 
48 Popper was Soros’ mentor. 
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in agents’ expectations, affect prices49. This feedback loop can, under certain 
conditions, cause capital markets to reach extreme disequilibrium, contrary to the 
equilibrium assumed in modern finance. Compared to particularly the EMH, Soros 
argues that capital markets cannot correctly discount (i.e. predict) the future 
because they are shaping it. Smithers agrees: 
Asset prices have an important impact on the real economy, and 
one which has often been denied, partly because they have no place 
in the neo-classical model and partly because asset prices cannot 
become overvalued according to the EMH. But, once their 
importance is accepted, it explains why economic forecasts are not 
just fallible but must be so. (2011, p. 3) 
 
Jungian note 
In Jungian symbolism, reflexivity is represented by the Ourobouros, the serpent 
which is eating its own tail:  
 
It symbolises self-generation by way of the ultimate form of “creative destruction”. 
It also captures renewal by re-entry. Biologist Francisco Varela, for example, 
adopted it as a symbol for re-entry in his calculus of self-reference. In all its 
interpretations the image of the Ouroboros is a dynamic one. 
 
                                           
49 In an interview, James Montier  echoes Soros’ argument more bluntly: “The very process is sort of a 
demonstration of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle; you cannot observe without influencing. 
These guys have forgotten that their own actions matter. It’s poker, not roulette, that we’re playing 
here. The behavior of others, their actions, have an impact on the outcomes.” (Welling@Weeden, 
Vol. 10, May 2008, p. 7) 
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In his own terms, Soros is echoing his mentor’s quoted interpretation of downward 
causation of consciousness of which the collective invasiveness is the most crucial 
aspect. Although capital markets are exemplary of this in empirical terms, it applies 
more broadly:  
Mental forces direct and govern the inner impulse traffic . . . the 
causal potency of an idea, or an ideal, becomes just as real as that 
of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve impulse. Ideas cause ideas and help 
evolve new ideas. They interact with each other and with other 
mental forces in the same brain, in neighboring brains, and, thanks 
to global communication, in far distant, foreign brains. And they also 
interact with the external surroundings to produce in toto a bustwise 
advance in evolution that is far beyond anything to hit the 
evolutionary scene yet, including the emergence of the living cell. 
(Sperry, 1965, p. 82) 
There are many related variations of such causality. The more complex interaction 
between bottom-up and top-down causation is termed circular causality (e.g. Kelso, 
1995) or the macro-micro feedback loop in complexity theory. This type of causality 
is also recognised in ethology, the root of evolutionary psychology, and is called 
niche construction.50 Still, in turn, it is the dynamics of prices that could contribute 
to new thinking in the mind sciences on this topic. 
Reflexivity itself has a rich history in the social sciences. Among its modern variants 
is performativity, a principle described within economic sociology. Performativity, 
according to Michel Callon, is the process whereby finance and its models are 
actualised: they not only describe the markets, but shape them at the same time. 
Callon uses the term “economics at large” to describe the collective efforts by agents 
and academics in understanding, analysing, and equipping the markets.  He speaks 
in that light of the embedded nature of economies in economics: 
                                           
50 Niche construction is the feedback process whereby a population modifies its environment to its own 
benefit, but then adapts to this modified environment, leading to follow-up modifications. The result 
is a reflexive co-evolution of the population and its environment. 
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there is not on the one hand a reality (concrete markets) and, on 
the other, discourses, analyses that account for this objective reality 
in a way that is true, or scientific, to a greater or lesser degree. The 
economy is a world that includes economics as one of its 
components in its own right. (2005, p.8) 
More importantly from an archetypal point-of-view, Callon observes a certain 
innateness of reflexivity in economics: 
The economy obviously existed before economics became a formal 
academic discipline, but this does not mean that we went from a 
state of non-reflexivity, monopolized by a small number of academic 
researchers. Any concrete economy is reflexive; the only change is 
in the social organization of reflexivity. (Ibid) 
The assumption of separation between modern finance (as observer) and the market 
(as the observed) is basically untenable. Arguably this already starts to blur when 
finance academics participate in the markets, say by co-managing a hedge fund 
(e.g. LTCM) or simply by investing via their pensions51. It becomes problematic if 
their models start to shape the objects they are supposed to only describe 
“objectively”52. And it is tragically defeated if the founders themselves no longer 
believe in the realism, purpose and applicability of their models. In the words of 
Markowitz (2005, p. 29): “My own conclusion is that it is time to move on.” 
This puts a finger on the raw nerve of finance. Causality is central to modern science 
but has always been difficult to determine within the financial system. The traditional 
search is to find fundamental causes for the mental reactions, reflected in price 
moves, in capital markets. But the real economy, in terms of fundamental news, is 
not the source for its driving forces.53 Anecdotally, in October 2000 the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis held a conference on the great depressions across the 
                                           
51 According to Gigerenzer (2007) Markowitz uses the 1/N rule to equally allocate his cash across assets in 
his personal portfolio.  
52 See MacKenzie (2005) who, from a performativity perspective, analyses the effect of the theory of 
options and of similar derivatives upon the market for such derivatives. He notes, for example, how 
the Black-Scholes model only started to show the implied volatility skew after the crash of 1987. 
53 See, for example, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1989. 
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globe during the 20th century with the aim to find causes for economic depressions. 
That goal was not achieved, despite dozens of research papers. In an evaluative 
review of the conference, the editor of the Minneapolis Fed’s Quarterly Review 
concludes “economists are, indeed, storytellers.” Actually, Jung would say, 
economists re-enact and maintain myths just like all storytellers across time. Until 
the myth gets shattered, that is.  
Investment Note 
In an interview with John Cassidy of The New Yorker (January 13, 2010), Eugene 
Fama, one of the founders of the EMH for which he recently received the Nobel Prize, 
showed how confusing (the order of) cause and effect can be for modern finance. To 
the first question on how he thought the EMH had fared during the crisis, he replied 
(emphasis mine): 
“I think it did quite well in this episode. Stock prices typically decline prior to and in 
a state of recession. This was a particularly severe recession. Prices started to 
decline in advance of when people recognized that it was a recession and then 
continued to decline. There was nothing unusual about that. That was exactly what 
you would expect if markets were efficient.” 
However, to one of the later questions, namely whether the start of the credit crisis 
predated the recession, Fama replied: 
“I don’t think so. How could it? People don’t walk away from their homes unless they 
can’t make the payments. That’s an indication that we are in a recession.” 
Finally, to the next follow-up question of whether the recession predated August 
2007, when the subprime bond market froze up, Fama answers: 
“Yeah. It had to, to be showing up among people who had mortgages. Nobody who’s 
doing mortgage research—we have lots of them here—disagrees with that.” 
For the record, the S&P500 did not peak until much later, namely October 11, 2007 
at 1576.09. 
 
Fortunately, from the above the first contours of an alternative ontological premise 
start to emerge. As I will show in chapter 6 it can be centred on the common 
denominator of the main academic factions and contains the complementarity 
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principle. Surprisingly, it allows finance to view causality and deal with current 
anomalies in a new way.  
But first, following the earlier explanation of the relevance of Jung for this debate, in 
the next chapter I will introduce Jung’s concept of archetypes.  
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CHAPTER 3.  ARCHETYPES 
 
Endless repetition has engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images 
filled with content, but at first only as forms without content, representing only the possibility of a certain 
type of perception and action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given archetype, that 
archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears, which, like an instinctual drive gains its way 
against all reason and will. 
Carl Jung 
 
Hidden behind those images, never or rarely knowable by us, there are indeed numerous processes that 
guide the generation and deployment of those images in space and time. Those processes utilize rules 
and strategies embodied in dispositional representations. They are essential for our thinking but are not 
the content of our thoughts. . . . Dispositional representations exist in potential state, subject to 






There are two concepts in complex psychology which are primarily of interest for this 
thesis, namely the collective unconscious and the archetypes. They are introduced in 
this chapter. Other Jungian concepts are derived from these and will be discussed in 
later chapters (e.g. participation mystique). 
For reasons that will become clear I make a distinction between traditional 
archetypes and the numerical archetypes. In the following, I will always specify 
numerical archetypes as such whereas I will refer to the traditional archetypes 
simply as archetypes. My interpretation will be further explained, applied, and 
expanded upon in the remainder of this thesis. 
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My discussion, including selection of supportive quotes, is based on the extent that 
these concepts are of relevance for this thesis. In particular, it is biased towards 
chapter 5, where I will argue the primacy of numerical archetypes. 
3.2 ARCHETYPES INTRO 
 
For those readers who expect a clear-cut definition of archetypes I quote James 
Hillman, developer of archetypal psychology, an off-shoot of complex psychology:  
The curious difficulty of explaining just what archetypes are 
suggests something specific to them. That is, they tend to be 
metaphors rather than things . . . We can’t seem to point to one or 
to touch one, and rather speak of what they are like. Archetypes 
throw us into an imaginative discourse. In fact, it is precisely as 
metaphors that Jung . . . writes of them, insisting on their 
undefinability . . . All ways of speaking of archetypes are 
translations from one metaphor to another. (1975, p.xiii) 
This sentiment of undefinability is echoed elsewhere:  
Ultimately, you cannot define an archetype, any more than you can 
define meaning. You can only experience it. In this sense, the 
theory of archetypes is rather like Newton’s theory of gravity. You 
cannot see gravity. You can only infer it from observed phenomena, 
like apples falling from a tree. (Stevens, 2002, p. 76) 
Still, there exists a large collection of definitions which has caused great confusion as 
to the meaning and purpose of the archetypal hypothesis. Inevitably, it led to 
misinterpretations, this to Jung’s own frustration: 
the concept of the archetype has given rise to the greatest 
misunderstandings and—if one may judge by the adverse 
criticisms—must be presumed to be very difficult to comprehend . . . 
My critics, with but few exceptions, usually do not take the trouble 
to read over what I have to say on the subject, but impute to me, 
among other things, the opinion that the archetype is an inherited 
representation. Prejudices seem to be more convenient than seeking 
the truth. (In Jacobi, 1959, p. x) 
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With this in mind, let’s review what Jung himself did have to say about archetypes54. 
I therefore will use not only an above average number of quotes in the next section 
but also a highly selective sample. It will help to formulate my own interpretation of 
archetypes (see particularly Appendix) which is nevertheless as close to Jung’s 
intentions as possible, whereby I have applied a filter to make it also consistent with 
recent insights from the mind sciences. More importantly this selection will 
eventually enable me to clarify my interpretation of numerical archetypes as 
subliminally operating mandates across interacting minds (e.g. crowds).  
3.3 JUNG’S ARCHETYPES 
 
First, Jung compares the functioning of the archetypes with those of the bodily 
organs, and calls archetypes “organs of the prerational psyche” (CW11, para. 845). 
Next, Jung explains that, combined, archetypes form “a second psychic system of a 
collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals” 
(CW9, para. 90). 
More specifically, archetypes make up the deepest layer of the unconscious that we 
all share. Called the collective unconscious it should be distinguished from the 
personal unconscious which is, instead, made up by complexes. The archetypes find 
expression in symbolic manifestations of shared meaning, including myths, legends, 
motifs, and themes that are common to all humanity across time. As symbolising 
mandates, the archetypes influence human experience in similar fashion, regardless 
of the individual’s background. As I’ll explain later, they form common factors that 
                                           
54 Admittedly, Jung’s own views on archetypes, aka primordial images, changed over the years. 
Nevertheless, their key principles remained broadly the same. 
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‘meaningfully’ explain variations in human behaviour, including emotional 
expressions, across individuals and across time.  
In the following description Jung clarifies that an archetype has no existence in 
consciousness but instead embeds a possibility of representation in consciousness. 
This is important in light of the “archetypal expectation” and “psychic probability” I 
will discuss later. He further emphasises that these possibilities should not be 
confused with their eventual realisations. Finally, he uses a metaphor to suggest that 
the symbolic representation, or archetypal image, emerges from smaller elements, 
as is true for complexity in general: 
It is necessary to point out . . . that archetypes are not determined 
as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then 
only to a limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its 
content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled 
out with the material of conscious experience. Its form, however . . . 
might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, 
as it were, performs the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, 
although it has no material existence on its own. This first appears 
according to the specific way in which the ions and molecules 
aggregate. The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, 
nothing but a . . . possibility of representation which is given a 
priori. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the 
forms. (CW9i; para. 155; emphasis mine) 
Elsewhere, to underline this last point: 
It would be a mistake to regard them as inherited ideas, as they are 
merely conditions for the forming of representations in general, just 
as the instincts are the dynamic conditions for various forms of 
behavior. (CW3, para. 550) 
The unconscious shows acts of creation because it acts autonomously via the 
archetypes, thereby facilitating the mind’s crucial ability to endogenously generate 
novelty. Specifically, archetypes operate outside the reach of conscious will while 
reaching for conscious content. They:  
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possess a certain autonomy and specific energy which enables them 
to attract, out of the conscious mind, those contents which are best 
suited to themselves. (CW5, para. 344) 
Those contents become the cloak with which they ‘reveal’ themselves symbolically. 
Jung called these symbolic patterns archetypal images. Although Jung suggested 
(CW9i, para. 152) that such images reflect both the typical behaviour and the typical 
situation in which that behaviour is expressed, I will make a distinction between 
archetypal image and archetypal situation. 
Crucially from a complexity point-of-view (as I’ll discuss later) Jung argues that the 
archetypal image is reflexive, or self-referential, in its symbolism:  
[It] might suitably be described as the instinct’s perception of itself 
or as the self-portrait of the instinct. (CW8, para. 277) 
Among the purposes of this ‘shaping of consciousness’ is the symbolic message 
contained in the resulting archetypal image which embeds an element of 
prognostication: 
it is only our consciousness that does not yet know; the unconscious 
seems already informed, and to have come to a conclusion that is 
expressed in the [archetypal image]. In fact, the unconscious seems 
to be able to examine and to draw conclusions from facts, much as 
consciousness does. It can even use certain facts, and anticipate 
their possible results, just because we are not conscious of them. 
(1964, p. 66) 
The subliminal recognition (in the sense of ‘realisation’) of this image in a 
physiological and biological sense simultaneously gives rise to the emotional 
response, an instinctual pattern or fantasy structure (CW14, para. 602) that fits the 
image in a symbolic way. This is crucial for the archetypal workings, first, because it 
underlines the fact that archetypes can only be experienced. Jung emphasises that 
archetypes emerge as 
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at the same time, both images and emotions. One can speak of an 
archetype only when these two aspects are simultaneous. When 
there is merely the image, then there is simply a word picture of 
little consequence. But by being charged with emotion, the image 
gains numinosity (or psychic energy); it becomes dynamic, and 
consequences of some kind must flow from it. (1964, p.87; 
emphasis mine) 
This last sentence underlines the second crucial point, namely the mental efficacy of 
archetypes through their images which Jung confirms elsewhere: 
They not only occur in highly emotional conditions, but very often 
seem to be their cause. (CW3, para. 550) 
As a conclusion, the collective unconscious as the “second psychic” domain is 
autonomous and objective, with archetypes as “determining influences” leading to 
shared collective experiences: 
[It] is not subject to the caprices of our will. If, then, those qualities 
of elusiveness, superficiality, shadowiness, and indeed of futility 
attach to anything psychic, this is primarily true of the subjective 
psychic, i.e., the contents of consciousness, but not of the objective 
psychic, the unconscious, which is an a priory conditioning factor of 
consciousness and its contents. From the unconscious there 
emanate determining influences which independently of tradition 
guarantee in every single individual a similarity and even a 
sameness of experience, and also of the way it is represented 
imaginatively. (CW9i; para. 118, emphasis mine) 
It is, again, interesting to compare this description with the words of Damasio: 
The neural pattern attributed to a certain object is constructed 
according to the menu of correspondences by selecting and assembling 
the appropriate tokens. We are so biologically similar among ourselves, 
however, that we construct similar neural patterns of the same thing. It 
should not be surprising that similar images arise out of those similar 
neural patterns. (2004, p. 200) 
 




    
 
By referring to “pre-existent forms” Jung made the distinction between: 
1. The archetype-per-se, or archetype-as-such (in German “das Archetyp an sich”), 
also referred to as (confusingly) the “primordial image” or the “dominant”. I call 
it the archetype-itself.  In the following, when I use the term archetype I mean 
the archetype-itself, unless specified differently.  
2. The archetypal image, or symbolic content, which emerges in consciousness. 
Key in this distinction is that the archetype cannot be represented:  
One must constantly bear in mind that what we mean by 
“archetype” is in itself irrepresentable, but that it has effects which 
enable us to visualize it, namely the archetypal images. (CW8, para. 
417) 
To put it more bluntly in terms of the archetypal experience: anything that remains 
unconscious is part of the archetype, everything else is part of the archetypal image, 
and elements (e.g. repressed memories) occasionally cross this border. There clearly 
is intense interaction, from feedback by consciousness to compensation by the 
unconscious. However, we have no ‘idea’ what happens to the feedback from 
consciousness to the unconscious, except that the latter continues its affective 
influence. 
Although there remains a risk in using programming terminology to metaphorically 
describe the functioning of the mind, it may be helpful to some readers to clarify the 
aforementioned term “mandate” along these lines within a Jungian context. The 
distinction between the unconscious, archetypes and archetypal images is 
comparable to that between a black box, subroutines and functions. The black box is 
a program which internal workings are achieved via subroutines which remain 
hidden (our mandates). These subroutines operate rather independently ‘behind the 
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scenes’ in that they trigger or ‘call’ other (higher level) subroutines or functions but 
stay themselves within the black box. Specifically, subroutines do not return any 
value with the external environment. A function on the other hand is often called by 
a subroutine and returns a value. Like a function which enables a program to ‘step’ 
outside by revealing itself via a value, the archetypal image is the symbolic result of 
the cognitive function which the archetype called and with which the unconscious 
reveals itself symbolically. 
Another way to explain the archetype as a mandate in terms of self-referencing 
instructions55 is to use Mandelbrot’s fractal, a well-known mathematical iteration, as 
a metaphor. The fractal is particularly suited in light of its relevance in finance. 
Mandelbrot’s basic iteration (called the Mandelbrot set) is as follows:  . 
The mathematical iteration stands for the archetype: it is an instruction with fixed 
variables originating from the unconscious56 (i.e. zero), for a pattern (in this case a 
fractal) to form from conscious inputs. The archetypal image is this fractal pattern. 
Moreover, the instruction also embeds the neuronal pathway that generates the 
emotional charge which makes the quality or meaning of the pattern come alive, 
e.g. the beauty of the fractal. Although the particular shape and pathway depend on 
the (selected) inputs, its essence remains invariable. Finally, any consciously derived 
fractal, whether it be formed on a computer screen, or on paper, or mentally 
visualised, is  by definition triggered by conscious inputs and can only reflect the 
                                           
55 In terms of complex psychology, my interpretation is motivated, among others, by Jung’s insistence on 
their autonomous, determining influence, as well as the affective consequence of this influence. 
Other interpretations of an archetype, like a “template” from which the archetypal image emerges 
in consciousness, are too passive in my modest opinion. Also, any strict reference to algorithm is 
simply too deterministic and lacks the creative aspect of the mind. In terms of finance, the idea of a 
mandate fits the investment setting in which I will eventually place the archetypal hypothesis. 
56 Appropriate in this context. However, formally zero stands for the unus mundus, see section 5.2. 
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archetypal image, the symbolic meaning57. Or, in Plato’s terms, the consciously 
derived fractal can only be an approximate expression of the “truth”, i.e. the ideal 
fractal. 
In terms of the debate between innateness and development (or emergence) of 
archetypes (see also chapter 5), I would put the argument in terms of distinct 
distributions in outcomes, keeping with the spirit of Jung’s “probability”: 
1. A subroutine that is innate would show no distribution in outcomes, i.e. the 
outcomes are predetermined and fixed. 
2. A subroutine that is biased would show a skewed distribution in outcomes, 
i.e. the outcomes show a certain tendency. 
3. A subroutine that is random would show a normal or Gaussian distribution in 
outcomes, i.e. the outcomes are by chance. 
I would argue that numerical archetypes, which find expression in numbers which 
are irreducible beyond their own “fixed” qualities, fall under category 1. It is in the 
interaction between numerical archetypes that any emergence originates and leads 
to the dynamics of pattern formation, including those involving the archetypes. The 
latter, on the other hand, fall under the second, biased kind. To continue with the 
fractal metaphor, their distribution falls under the power law category. 
Finally, a distinction needs to be made between an innate ability and that of the 
facility. In other words, the innateness of an ability does not necessarily extend to 
the underlying structures which facilitate this. Taking number sense as an 
example58, the innate ability to recognise numerical patterns does not necessarily 
                                           
57 To be clear, even the stated equation itself is part of the symbolic representation of the archetype, as it 
is a consciously derived/perceived equation. It is again an “as if”. 
58 See also section 5.3 
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mean that the algorithms involved are innate. This relates, for example, to the 
ongoing debate concerning the differences between the various computational 
models of the mind (e.g. Hogenson, 2013). 
3.5 THE DYNAMICS OF ARCHETYPES 
 
Jung always emphasised the dynamics of the archetypal workings, in particular their 
interrelatedness and co-influences, which make their individual identification via 
images difficult and separation impossible. Von Franz describes the archetypes as a 
field of connected psychic roots forming the collective unconscious and she 
highlights the particular resemblance with numbers when they are regarded 
qualitatively (1974; pp. 144-147). Moreover, in reference to the similarities with (or 
mirroring of) physical complex systems, she states:  
In a fashion similar to certain arrangements in the material realm, 
groupings in the archetypal sphere that become defective 
spontaneously and actively take on new forms. The presence of 
existing structures facilitates the formation of similar 
complementary or identical representations. The fact that complex 
structures display a tendency to selectively influence one another, in 
the formation of similar structures, can also easily be demonstrated. 
(ibid; p. 146)  
Following Von Franz’ comment on overlapping and numbers, and ahead of more 
detailed discussions on the primacy of numerical archetypes, these archetypal 
dynamics can be expressed further in numerical terms. Specifically, correlation 
between two entities, as it approaches 1, reflects the strength of a shared identity: 
the two entities become one. Autocorrelation, on the other hand, reflects the 
strength of the self-identity. Applied to archetypal dynamics, correlation refers to the 
cross relationships between archetypal images, whereby close resemblance between 
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images indicates a high level of correlation, e.g. similar instincts. Autocorrelation on 
the other hand refers to the relationship between an archetypal image and its 
source, the archetype, whereby the numinosity (or affect) of the archetypal image 
across individuals reflects the level of autocorrelation. In other words, if an 
archetypal image only resonates with a few individuals (let alone one) it reflects a 
low level of autocorrelation. Specifically, the ‘ideal’ autocorrelation of 1 is never 
achieved and is in fact often much lower in cases of personal complexes, i.e. the 
archetypal image gets distorted in the personal unconscious by too much personal 
‘noise’. 
In the final analysis, Jung states: 
Contents of an archetypal character are manifestations of processes 
of the collective unconscious. Hence they do not refer to anything 
that is or has been conscious, but to something essentially 
unconscious. In the last analysis, therefore, it is impossible to say 
what they refer to. Every interpretation necessarily remains an ‘as-
if’. The ultimate core of meaning may be circumscribed, but not 
described. (CW9, part 1; para. 265) 
Is there really that much difference between Jung’s view on the primacy of 
numerical archetypes and their ‘as-if’ descriptions compared to modern 
interpretations of instincts guided by subliminal mathematical operations? Read, for 
example, the following description of the instinctual catching of a ball by Richard 
Dawkins: 
When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, he 
behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in 
predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may neither know nor care 
what a differential equation is, but this does not affect his skill with 
the ball. At some subconscious level, something functionally 





    
 
3.6 THE ARCHETYPAL HYPOTHESIS IS UNIVERSAL 
 
Jung’s archetypal hypothesis is universal in that it is a recurring theme which has 
been suggested in similar forms across time. There are thus various overlaps 
between Jung’s archetypes and concepts of inherent patterns from other mind 
philosophies, varying from Greek to Chinese thought. Plato’s ideals is an obvious 
example of the first category, the I Ching represents the second. In the words of 
Pauli: 
With reference to Plato’s philosophy, I would like to suggest that the 
process of understanding nature be interpreted as a correspondence 
of preexistent inner images in the human psyche with outer objects 
and their behavior. . . . The sought-for bridge between sense 
perception and ideas or concepts seems to be conditioned by 
regulating factors. (Aufsetze; in Von Franz, 1974, p. 36) 
The concept of an archetypal mental structure is also reminiscent of Kant’s 
postulation that humans have inherent mental categories and structures through 
which experiences of reality are filtered. Kant’s central thesis is that what we can 
know is never the thing in itself (i.e. “Das Ding an sich”), but always the thing as 
represented. The looping nature of this representation was captured well by 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson, commenting on Korzybski’s “The map is not the 
territory”: 
We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the 
territory? Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a 
measuring stick and made representations which were then put on 
paper. What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in 
the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as 
you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an 
infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all . . . Always, 
the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental 
world is only maps of maps, ad infinitum. (1972, p. 454) 
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It is clear that the central theme of both Plato and Kant, namely the convergence of 
an inner and outer reality which occurs by means of inherent mental structures, is 
akin to Jung’s archetypes. What is unique about Jung’s theory is that the archetypal 
image, as symbolic representation of the archetype, is a fourth addition to Kant’s 
three original “innate ideas” (i.e. space, time, and causality.) In other words, the 
archetypal hypothesis provides not only the archetype which is similar to the meta-
concept of “innate idea” itself, but also suggest the archetypal image as an 
explanation of the internal representation, the conceptualisation of the archetype in 
consciousness. More importantly, Jung’s realisation that the numerical archetype is 
the prime archetype can be justified in Kantian terms if we recognise that numbers 
form the only symbols with which Kant’s 4 categories can be uniformly expressed: 
quantity, quality, relation and modality. 
3.7 ARCHETYPES AS PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATIONS 
 
Jung considered the biological manifestation of the archetype the most important 
scientific aspect. Specifically, he used instincts as examples of “inherited modes” of 
biological functioning, each expressing a universal “pattern of behaviour” and 
emphasised that: 
This aspect of the archetype, the purely biological one, is the proper 
concern of scientific psychology. (CW18, para. 1228) 
Human experiences over time have influenced our understanding of the archetypes. 
They manifest themselves in thematic images, like symbols, myths and concepts, 
which have captured eventful past experiences and, in a self-reflexive way, recall 
similar emotional responses by way of deeply felt recognitions of meaning. It is not 
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just metaphors we use to describe archetypes (see Hillman’s quote earlier), but the 
archetypes themselves also project metaphors to communicate “This situation is like 
that, it is as-if . . . “. In Kantian terms, this process is a priori, that is to say at its 
(numerical) source it is innate and not based, nor depend on, personal experiences. 
Jung used the following explanation: 
When we examine these images more closely, we find that they give 
form to countless typical experiences of our ancestors. They are, so 
to speak, the psychic residua of innumerable experiences of the 
same type. They present a picture of the psychic life in the average 
. . . In each of these images there is a little piece of human 
psychology and human fate, a remnant of the joys and sorrows that 
have been repeated countless times in our ancestral history, and on 
the average ever follow the same course. (CW15, para. 81; 
emphasis mine) 
Others used similar terms, like the biologist Jacques Monod: “Everything comes from 
experience, yet not from actual experience, reiterated by each individual with each 
generation, but instead from experience accumulated by the entire ancestry of the 
species in the course of its evolution.” (Monod, 1997, p. 112; emphasis mine). It is 
important at this point to make the distinction between physical survival and mental 
survival. Whereas natural selection resulted in the formation of the physical 
component of survival (i.e. the human genome), the formation of a mental 
component has always been questioned. Still, as McDowell speculates: 
Not until the year 2000, when the sequence of the human genome 
was completed, was it known that a human has only about 32,000 
genes. Estimates had been significantly higher. This small number 
focuses attention on complexity: how does the human complexity 
arise from so few genes? Part of the answer must lie in archetypes. 
(2001, p. 5) 
Part of my answer is that archetypes help bridge the physical with the mental: 
survival and the meaning of survival. How then should we view the formation of this 
mental component in the context of evolution? Clearly evolutionary psychology 
provides some guidance. In particular, its concept of adaptive behaviour suggests 
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that there is an external expression to the internal evolutionary process of genetic 
survival and reproduction. Adaptive behaviour is behaviour that tended to promote 
the net lifetime reproduction of the individual or the individual’s genetic relatives. 
Specifically,  
By promoting the replication of genes that built them, circuits that—
systematically and over many generations—cause adaptive behavior 
become incorporated into a species neural design. In contrast, 
behavior that undermines the reproduction of the individual or his or 
her genetic relatives removes the circuits causing those behaviors 
from the species. Such behavior is maladaptive. (Tooby and 
Cosmides, 2005, p.21) 
Apart from evolutionary psychology, people like Damasio, LeDoux, Panksepp, and 
others have shown that emotions play a coordinating role in our mental lives. 
Whereas emotions make us feel life, thoughts make us reflect on it. In terms of life-
threatening events, it has been the emotions of the survivors59 that have served a 
purpose, as well as provided a meaning. First, in terms of physical survival, 
emotions serve a purpose in that they indirectly (i.e. via behaviour) contributed to 
the formation of the genes. These, in turn, led to the current neural wiring in our 
body, including the structure of our brain, which enables us to recognise patterns 
within our environment. Second, in terms of mental survival, emotions provide 
meaning in that they contributed to the formation of myths (cultural expression), 
knowledge (scientific expression), art (creative expression), and other forms of 
shared meaning. Tooby and Cosmides talk about “emotion programs” and point out 
that: 
By coordinating the mental contents of individuals in the same 
situation (because both intuitively know that, e.g., the loss of your 
mother is, as a default, experienced as a sad and painful event), 
these programs also facilitate communication and culture learning, 
                                           
59 Survivors include  those who faced death and survived themselves, or those who (from a safe distance) 
observed the death of others and learned from those traumatic experiences. One could link this to 
(evolved) empathy and intersubjectivity while, again, it is difficult to separate nature and nurture.  
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both of which depend on a shared frame of reference. (ibid, p. 60, 
emphasis mine) 
In other words, they found expression via mental imagery of these experiences, 
specifically via symbols with a common meaning. Jung argued that expressions 
surrounding death and similar highly charged emotional events revealed 
characteristics of an objective reality, and are of a uniform nature. That is to say, 
over time as well as across populations, and with certain gradations, multiple human 
beings experienced similar encounters with the outside world: archetypal situations. 
These ‘thematic’ experiences are symbolically expressed in archetypal images, which 
(re-)emerge in consciousness from the underlying neuronal firing patterns, once 
they are triggered by inputs from such archetypal encounters. For survival purposes 
it is the unconscious, as a complex adaptive selection ability, that selects which 
compensating inputs enter consciousness. This, in my view, is what Jung means by 
autonomous archetypes in terms of “attracting contents which are best suited to 
themselves.”  
Side Note 
A number of neuroscientists have speculated that unconscious “mechanisms” can 
actually influence the creation of the neural wiring, thereby shaping the neuronal 
firing patterns which can lead to various neuropsychiatric symptoms. Brain scans can 
help to unravel these. Recently, for example, scientists at King’s College London and 
the University of Melbourne have found, using brain scans, that psychological stress 
may be to blame for unexplained physical symptoms, including paralysis and 
seizures (Gale, 2014). This growing research focuses on the questions raised, for 
example, by Edelman: 
“Is it possible that such active but functionally insulated thalamocortical circuits may 
underlie certain aspects of the psychological unconscious—aspects that, as Sigmund 
Freud pointed out, share many of the hallmarks of the “mental”—except that they do 
not make it into consciousness? Can such circuits be created by mechanisms of 
repression? May such active thalamocortical islands be capable of triggering their 
own basal ganglion routines, thereby accounting for slips of the tongue, action slips, 
and the like? Clearly much work needs to be done to clarify these issues . . .” (2007; 
p. 190; emphasis mine) 
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For all clarity, these “mechanisms of repression” are archetypal, according to 
complex psychology. 
 
In short, those experiences which dealt with survival in situations of life or death not 
only became the most emotionally charged but, by definition, also survived in the 
survivors:  
Once we see a couple of bears eat our relatives, the whole species 
gets a bad reputation. Then . . . when we spot a huge shaggy 
animal with large, sharpe incisors, we don’t hang around gathering 
more data; we act on our automatic hunch that it is dangerous and 
move away from it. (Mlodinow, 2012, p. 146) 
Via natural selection they survived as adaptations: 
 Physically in the form of common genes and, by extension, a common neural 
circuitry; 
 Mentally in the form of content, be it images or instincts (i.e. Edelman’s 
“action slips”) formed by recurring neuronal firing patterns (i.e. Edelman’s 
“routines”) with archetypes as their mandates (i.e. Edelman’s “mechanisms”). 
As aforementioned, Jung realised this biological aspect of archetypes, and how the 
interaction between external forces of the environment and the internal ‘life force’ of 
survival via adaptation impacted both the brain and the archetype. Accordingly, he 
saw the archetype as a psychic expression of the physiological and anatomical 
disposition (CW6, 1971, para.748). 
The term “psychoid” was used by Jung and Pauli to capture the bridging purpose of 
archetypes between matter and mind, the external and the internal. Here Jung 
describes the psyche in terms of layers, implicitly suggesting some hierarchy in the 
archetypes and thus the need for numerical ordering: 
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The deeper layers of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as 
they retreat farther into the darkness. “Lower down”, that is to say 
as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become 
increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished 
in the body’s materiality, i.e. in chemical substances. The body’s 
carbon is simply carbon. Hence, “at bottom” the psyche is simply 
“world”. (CW9i; para. 271)    
Pauli believed that this psychoid aspect of the archetype formed indeed a bridge 
between matter and mind and that it was a major contribution to our understanding 
of nature’s laws: 
It seems to me one has to postulate a cosmic order of nature—
outside of our arbitrariness—to which the outer material objects are 
subjected as are the inner images . . . The organizing and regulating 
has to be posited beyond the differentiation of physical and 
psychical . . . I am all for it to call this ‘organizing and regulating’ 
‘archetypes.’ It would then be inadmissible to define these as 
psychic contents. Rather, the above-mentioned inner pictures 
(dominants of the collective unconscious, see Jung) are the psychic 
manifestations of the archetypes, but which would have to produce 
and condition all nature laws belonging to the world of matter. The 
nature laws of matter would then be the physical manifestation of 
the archetypes. (1948, letter to Markus Fierz; in von Meyenn, 1993, 
pp. 496–497, via Atmanspacher, 2012) 
The biological link, by extension, also means that just like organisms with the same 
genotype don’t look or act the same way, because appearance and behaviour are 
modified by developmental conditions, archetypes do not manifest themselves in 
exactly the same shape. This is what Jung means with “The ultimate core of 
meaning may be circumscribed, but not described”, as well as with “possibility of 
representation”. Although they share the same underlying meaning, archetypal 
expressions (e.g. myths, art) differ in their appearances across cultures, individuals, 
and time. Therefore, apart from the biological conditioning, modern complex 
psychology also emphasises the social conditioning of archetypal images. In short, 
archetypal images embed nature and nurture, reflecting both the phylogenetic and 
the ontogenetic psyche. I have more to say about this in chapters 7 where I relate 
archetypes to mirror neurons and the intersubjective dynamics of crowds. 
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3.8 ARCHETYPES ARE INHERENT, NOT INHERITED 
 
In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin (1859) used the term archetype as “the 
ancient progenitor” for “an existing general pattern” (p. 416). Although some have 
argued that Jung was not sufficiently familiar with Darwin’s theory and confused the 
interpretation of archetypes by inappropriately referring to the term “inherited”, he 
clearly dismissed the assumption that archetypes are inherited ideas or images:  
Of course this term [archetype] is not meant to denote an inherited 
idea, but rather an inherited mode of functioning, corresponding to 
the inborn way in which the chick emerges from the egg, the bird 
builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the motor ganglion of 
the caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas. In other 
words, it is a ‘pattern of behavior.’ This aspect of the archetype, the 
purely biological one, is the proper concern of scientific psychology. 
(CW 18; para. 1228) 
And elsewhere: 
It is not . . . a question of inherited ideas but of inherited 
possibilities of ideas. (CW 9i, par. 136) 
As Stevens (2002) points out, instead of inherited the archetypes are inherent.  
3.9 ARCHETYPES EMBED PROBABILITIES 
 
The tension between the mental forces that simultaneously cooperate and compete 
within the mind as a complex adaptive system (see chapter 1.4) builds the 
emotional charge. Eventually it is the trigger for, what I called earlier, the gut feeling 
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response to an archetypal situation. Such an instinctive response or “pattern of 
[instinctual] behaviour” is latent with a certain probability attached to its ultimate 
expression. Jung calls this the “psychic probability”, but I prefer to use the term 
“archetypal probability” as well as the related term “archetypal expectation”. Clearly, 
archetypal probability is different from statistical probability. 
First, archetypal probability is the likelihood of an instinctive response which is 
conditioned by the distributions of the collective experiences of humanity over time. 
These distributions evolved in what evolutionary psychology calls the Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptiveness  (EEA). In other words, it does not simply involve events 
but rather the human experiences of those events (and their subsequent evolved 
adaptations.) Those ‘physical’ events only had meaning because they ultimately 
gave rise to an accompanying ‘phenomenal’ experience. A description (statistically or 
otherwise) of those events is incomplete for their understanding if it leaves out this 
phenomenal aspect.  
Second, to formalise this a bit more by using statistical terminology60, the archetypal 
expectation is the unbiased archetypal estimator (e.g. b2) of the archetype (β2). In 
other words, if we would be able to draw many samples from the aforementioned 
populations of human experiences, framed in archetypal images, the average 
archetypal image would approximate the archetypal expectation. The quote from 
Damasio at the beginning of this chapter refers to disposition. Karl Popper used the 
same term in his interpretation of expectation which I believe is very relevant for my 
archetypal version because Popper confirms the unconscious pre-condition which, 
when “unfulfilled” by conscious reality, can lead to tension (i.e. “disappointment”): 
                                           
60 Albeit ignoring technical issues, like normality of the distributions, etc. 
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We may characterise an expectation as a disposition to react, or as 
a preparation for a reaction, which is adapted to [or which 
anticipates] a state of the environment yet to come about. This 
characterization seems to be more adequate than one that describes 
an expectation in terms of states of consciousness; for we become 
conscious of many of our expectations only when they are 
disappointed, owing to their being unfulfilled. (1979, p. 344; 
emphasis mine)   
Third, the probability of that particular response emerging (i.e. an archetypal image 
which perfectly matches the archetypal expectation) is due to, but also dependent 
on, the dynamics of the mind61 as it engages with its environment, most crucially its 
interaction with other minds. This involves a subliminal and intersubjective 
evaluation process which I relate to another concept of Jung called “participation 
mystique” (see chapter 7). The crucial aspect of archetypal probability is the 
unquantifiable element of uncertainty implied by the fact that it involves the 
unconscious in its dealings with the unknown. It is the archetype’s subliminal 
mandate which releases the response, i.e. triggers the neuronal firing pattern 
underlying the instinct, to a ‘recognised’ external pattern. How fitting (i.e. rational) 
this response is depends on whether the archetypal expectation is met. In cases of a 
complex, for example, whereby personal biases (e.g. repression) have distorted the 
archetypal image, the response can be neurotic. In general, the closer the 
archetypal image symbolises the unknown, the stronger the instinctive reaction 
(Popper’s disappointment) because the unknown is furthest from “what can be 
expected”. In other words, the response becomes more primordial (and irrational in 
the Jungian sense) when the external pattern cannot meet the expectations of the 
higher level archetypes (i.e. complexes). This makes prediction of situations which 
are shaped and influenced by the collective interaction of masses so difficult: what 
drives emotions most, and ultimately can lead to contagion and thus their 
                                           
61 Again, basically self-organization within the context of a CAS. 
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convergence, is the universal recognition of an abstract archetypal pattern which 
emerges (i.e. as something distinguishable) from the unknown. Often that shared 
recognition is only reached at levels close to the most primordial instincts, involving 
the most basic ‘objective’ symbols, i.e. numbers.  
As an aside, this makes the metaphor of the black swan so appropriate: it is a 
confrontation with, specifically by realisation of, the unknown which, again, is totally 
unexpected. Beyond the statistical characteristics of this phenomenon, the emotional 
reaction to something which is unknown, in this case to the point of ‘this swan 
cannot be real’, has been shaped by centuries of similar encounters by other 
humans62. In terms of expectations, whereas the statistical (rational) surprise is only 
in the colour (i.e. black vs. white), the archetypal (irrational) surprise is in the 
confrontation with the whole ‘black beast’. The point is that, similar to valuation of 
assets in markets, the emotional reaction which prevails is the one valued as the 
most common denominator, i.e. a regression to the mean.  
An archetypal expectation is met when the archetypal image reflects an unbiased 
symbolic meaning and in that sense is correctly recognised in terms of an 
appropriate emotional response. Ultimately, all archetypal workings aim at 
rebalancing emotions, i.e. to collapse the personal or crowd complexes which have 
distorted expectations. In practise this means that the lack, or (conscious/repressed) 
avoidance, of feeling alternative emotions does not mean they will not occur. On the 
contrary. The tension, or emotional charge, building up in this one-sided process 
increases the archetypal probability. To link this to Taleb’s book titled “Fooled by 
Randomness”, this is similar to the growing probability of actually drawing, without 
                                           
62 No doubt, the fact that the swan had a black colour, whereas the expectation had been white, must 
have increased the assessment that something was wrong, e.g. “This is an evil swan”. 
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replacement, a black ball from an urn of 999 red balls and one black ball while one is 
still drawing red balls: over time the full universe of events will occur, with the 
unlikely event becoming more likely, while more “shocking” in affect. 
The archetypal image as a response pattern becomes part of consciousness, itself a 
complex property of the complex system we call mind. In a complex system, the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts exactly because those parts are often 
opposing, or bipolar, thus adding the dynamic tension to their individual existence 
which is the breeding ground for new discoveries. This tension is required for the 
system’s unique properties to emerge as autonomous acts of creation. In this case, 
as we will see, the multi-levelled dynamics between the archetypes in the 
unconscious reflexively affect our consciousness via multiple archetypal images 
which ‘describe’ the scenes of emotional expressions as the mind’s acts of creation. 
A few more comments on Jung’s concept of a personal complex. It refers to the 
clustering of personal experiences around an archetypal expectation which distorts 
this unbiased archetypal image. The resulting divergence by the personal archetypal 
image reflects the size of the complex. For all clarity, the initial ‘veil’ is inherent and 
necessary: the archetype, being the originator of the mind’s novelty generating 
process, reveals its image in consciousness (where it is experienced in the 
phenomenal sense) but remains itself invisible.63 So, although the archetype 
represents an unconscious objective reality, via its image it 
behaves at the same time like a subjective one—in other words like 
a consciousness. Hence the reality underlying the unconscious 
                                           
63 As I will regularly argue, in order for the mind to remain effective, e.g. not become predictable, stay 
creative, etc., both the unconscious origin and the phenomenal culmination of insights (which are its 
internal surprises that allow it to adapt to external ones) will have to escape any axiomatic/ 
mechanical capture. In other words, it is no wonder (and better for humanity) that these fringes of 
the mind remain the most elusive. 
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effects includes the observing subject and is therefore constituted in 
a way we cannot conceive. (CW 8, para. 230) 
Furthermore, Jung viewed complexes as “living units of the psyche” (CW9i, para. 
210). Sandner and Beebe state that each complex carries 
a splinter consciousness of its own, a degree of intentionality, and 
the capability of pursuing a goal. They are like real personalities in 
that they contain images, feelings, and qualities, and if they engulf 
the ego, they determine behavior as well. (1995, p. 302) 
Stated in portfolio management terms, like discretion can tilt a portfolio away from 
the default mandate (e.g. the strategic allocation), personal experiences can tilt the 
subjective archetypal image away from the objective one, sometimes to the point 
that a rebalance is required. For those more comfortable with modern neuroscience, 
the creation of the personal complexes can be explained by using Edelman’s theory 
of reentry. Among his preconditions for primary consciousness to emerge is the 
mechanism to re-categorise on the basis of innate non-conscious categories. The 
early phase of his reentry loop consist of personal experiences being mapped onto 
these default categories, thereby reshaping them. This reshaping, in my 
interpretation, is similar to the formation of complexes.  
Investment Note 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will explain the similarities between the archetypal 
hypothesis and some of the dominant models in finance. Taking my cue from Jung’s 
statement on archetypes as unconscious “factors influencing the conscious situation” 
I will briefly introduce the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, or APT, which I use as a 
metaphor to explain archetypes by comparing them to the market’s risk factors 
(with more details in chapter 9 on Archetypal Valuation). In similar fashion to 
investment portfolios, which are exposed to those common risk factors, or styles, 
archetypes act as the common regressors of our emotions. Another way of saying 
this is that archetypes are the collective and common denominators which divide us 
in a uniform way. At the same time we need to reconcile with the archetypes in 
order to become psychologically whole as individuals, as well as unite with the 
collective human mind. Jung called this “individuation”, a process comparable to 
Maslov’s self-actualisation. It is a central part of my thesis for the following reason: 
individuation is the process of the individual investor to reconcile his consciousness 
with that of the market while, at the same time, understanding its symbolic 
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language as a way of communicating by way of price discovery. This, by the way, 
does not equate to conformity but rather leads to a heightened awareness of 
emotional imbalances in the market and the mental strength to counterbalance, i.e. 
to stick to the trend or become the contrarian.  
Consequently, among the practical differences between Archetypal Valuation and 
traditional investment methods is the treatment of emotions. Whereas the latter 
ignore, or even try to exclude, emotions from the investment process, Archetypal 
Valuation provides a purposeful focus on the emotions of investing. As investors we 
experience the collective unconscious through symbols in the form of prices and 
their patterns, i.e. price dynamics. We encounter these, and discover their meaning, 
via trading and the feelings it invokes, not by repressing those feelings. In short, 
Archetypal Valuation means experiencing the market with AVIR (chapter 10) offering 
a complementary method to balance the current overreliance on analytics. 
The previous sections introduced complex psychology’s main concepts of the 
collective unconscious and the archetypes. In order to lead up to the hypothesis 
(chapter 6) and other key elements of this thesis, the next chapter will first discuss 






    
 
CHAPTER 4. CONSCIOUSNESS, A 
CONVERGENCE PLAY 
 
There is not a single important idea or view that does not possess historical antecedents. 
Ultimately they are all founded on primordial archetypal forms whose concreteness dates 
from a time when consciousness did not think, but only perceived.   
Carl Jung  
CW9i, para. 69 
 
4.1 THE RELEVANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR FINANCE 
 
There are many definitions of consciousness despite (or perhaps because of) the fact 
that it is an elusive phenomenon. The philosopher John Searle, for example, 
provides a useful interpretation: 
“Consciousness” refers to those states of sentience and awareness 
that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and 
continue until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or die or 
otherwise become “unconscious”. (1997, p. 5) 
To complement Searle’s words I like to add the following which views consciousness 
from a research angle, upon which I will expand later. If nothing else, it provides an 





    
 
Interpretation of consciousness 
Consciousness is how information feels like when it is physically simulcasted in the 
body. Simulcasting means, roughly, that the information is shared across the 
nervous system, particularly the brain, both when it arrives from the outside (e.g. 
external “news”, i.e. events) and when it is generated from the inside (e.g. internal 
“news”, i.e. insights). 
A conscious experience is therefore the simultaneous physical and phenomenal 
realisation of that information without necessarily being complete, meaningful, or 
otherwise fully knowledgeable. 
We can study ‘consciousness’ indirectly from a third person perspective, or directly 
experience it from a first (and second person) perspective. The former relates to 
how the mind physically functions and operates, i.e. how the consumption of 
information actually occurs (e.g. firing brain patterns). The latter relates to how the 
mind phenomenally perceives the information, as it is consumed: subjectively in the 
case of personal consciousness, respectively intersubjectively in the case of 
collective consciousness.   
To view the markets in general, and investing in particular, from a consciousness 
perspective is very relevant. Any focus on investor decision-making, for example, 
implicitly refers to investor consciousness because it creates awareness and allows 
thinking and decision-making in the first place. More importantly, this perspective 
highlights the neglected phenomenal dimension of having skin in the game of 
investing64, namely how it feels like to be (part of) the market’s mind. 
Earlier I explained the concept of paradigm in terms of a framework of thinking for 
science, and how paradigms can shift. I also described the premise of modern 
science and mentioned the specific shift in the mind sciences (i.e. Sperry’s 
revolution), where the role of consciousness in shaping science is acknowledged. So 
                                           
64 In the sense of having your own money, e.g. capital or income, directly committed whereby price 
moves have an immediate impact on your wealth. 
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the shift from objective science to epistemic science, of particular relevance in the 
social sciences, implies the central role of consciousness in the scientific description 
of phenomena. Still, the cognitive sciences (under which behavioural finance falls) 
are lagging, according to philosopher Jaegwon Kim: 
the last two decades has seen a phenomenal growth and 
proliferation of research programs and publications on 
consciousness . . . Although consciousness research is thriving, 
much of cognitive science seems still in the grip of what may be 
called methodological epiphenomenalism . . . It is an ironic fact that 
the felt qualities of conscious experience, perhaps the only things 
that ultimately matter to us, are often relegated . . . to the status of 
“secondary qualities,” in the shadowy zone between the real and the 
unreal, or even jettisoned outright as artefacts of confused minds. 
(2005, pp. 10-12) 
The following broadly lists the various points of view taken in the scientific debate on 
consciousness, each with its explanatory limitation: 
 Dualism is the view that there are two metaphysically different kinds of 
phenomena in the universe, the mental and the physical. A distinction is often 
made between (Cartesian) substance dualism and property dualism. The 
former considers the mind to be made up of a different substance than 
matter, whereas the latter considers the mind to be made up of a set of 
different properties. Property dualism argues that these mental properties are 
irreducible to physical properties. Still, the general problem with dualism is 
that it does not explain how the physical and the mental relate and interact, 
which they clearly do. Crucially, the tendency to distinguish the physical from 
the mental originates in the latter, which contributes to making it a hard 
problem.  




    
 
o Materialism (aka physicalism) suggests that only the physical is real. 
Its strong form, called reductionism, argues that we must reduce 
mental states to physical (brain) states. It does not explain the 
interiority of the mind, i.e. the subjective experience of consciousness. 
According to many reductive physicalists this experience is considered 
an illusion. Non-reductive physicalism on the other hand, 
acknowledges the special nature of mental properties which cannot be 
reduced to the physical domain. 
o Idealism is the opposite of materialism. It argues that spirit and mind 
are real and that matter is an illusion. It does not explain the 
experience of matter, e.g. the physical pain and appearance of a 
bruise after hitting one’s head against the hard-wood doorpost. 
o Neutral monism argues that reality is all of one kind but that it is 
neither physical nor material, thus ‘neutral’. As aforementioned Jung 
and Pauli’s dual-aspect version falls under this category. 
 Panpsychism accepts that both matter and mind are real. More specifically, it 
is the view that consciousness is present everywhere in the universe, and 
that it is a natural state in humans, animals, and objects from rocks to 
thermostats. It does not explain how consciousness can emerge in those 
objects which have no nervous system, i.e. it denies the unique role of the 
brain, without which we wouldn’t even be discussing consciousness. In other 




    
 
Despite different views, the focus on consciousness is a common theme among 
various scientific fields in mind research, in particular psychology, quantum physics, 
neurobiology, cognitive studies, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. I view 
consciousness research therefore as the ‘convergence play’ in the sciences, and will 
argue in this chapter that it is one of the main drivers for the current as well as 
future debates on paradigms in economics65. Specifically, I believe this final frontier 
of human mentality is the final frontier of behavioural finance and will have a 
significant impact on the way we invest money in the future. In turn, the peculiar 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity in markets, e.g. the market mood, offers a rich area 
of potential insights to mind researchers, with large amounts of data available. 
Finally, the particular relevance of Jung’s archetypal hypothesis in this context lies in 
the fact that it attempts to bridge mind with matter, particularly by way of the 
psychoid nature of the archetypes, i.e. it offers a psychophysical model. 
4.2 THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
In 1994, a young philosopher named David Chalmers gave a presentation at the 
conference “Toward a Science of Consciousness”66 in Tucson, organised by the 
University of Arizona. It was his debut on this scene and in his presentation 
Chalmers made a clear distinction between, what he called, the “easy problems” of 
consciousness and the “hard problem”. His presentation, subsequently published in a 
                                           
65 As an aside, I believe that underlying this debate is a deep psychological yearning for the qualitative 
(emotional) side of exchanges and trade, in order to restore an unhealthy imbalance, caused by the 
dominant obsession for quantification (rationality). The growing influence of behavioural finance but 
also that of responsible (sustainable) investments, also known as SRI or ESG, is a reflection of this. 
The latter integrates non-financial, e.g. ethical, criteria in investment decisions. 
66 For a recollection of his “appearance” as well as his impact, see Hamerhoff (in Blackmore, 2005). 
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special edition of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, has become seminal and the 
Tucson 1994 conference has since been widely regarded as a landmark event.67  
Although he broadly repeated what others had stated previously, Chalmers excelled 
in clarifying the details concerning the main issue. According to Chalmers, the easy 
problem of consciousness refers to issues like the deliberate control of behaviour, 
the reportability of mental states, and the integration of information by a cognitive 
system. These issues can be functionally explained, i.e. they form the easy problems 
of consciousness. The really hard problem of consciousness, aka the mind-body 
problem, is the problem of experience in terms of conveying a phenomenal state. In 
Chalmers words: 
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-
processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) 
has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. 
This subjective aspect is experience.  
He argues, echoing philosophers over the ages, that the traditional scientific method 
of observation has been unable to explain this phenomenon68. Chalmers’ definition of 
the hard problem of consciousness received a lot of support, but also hard criticism, 
in particular from philosopher Daniel Dennett (1991). Dennett and his supporters 
adhere to consciousness eliminativism: they basically deny the existence of 
consciousness by arguing that it is a mental illusion. Consequently, they believe 
there is no hard problem of consciousness. An intense debate between “Dennett’s A-
team and Chalmers’ B-team” (Blackmore, 2005) has been raging ever since, 
reinvigorating the historic disputes surrounding the mind-body problem.   
                                           
67 In April 2014 I attended the 20th anniversary conference in Tuscon. Speakers, apart from Chalmers, 
included Deepak Chorpra, Daniel Dennett, Christof Koch, Roger Penrose and John Searle. 
68 In Chalmers’ view any theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. 
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I will contribute to this debate by offering my interpretation of the issues it has 
raised in the context of my hypothesis, in particular the “hard problem” of finance. 
As I will argue in more detail in chapter 6, following on from chapter 2, finance has 
generally ignored what it feels like being (in) the market and, consequently, failed to 
explain why it matters. My emphasis on the qualitative aspects of investing, in 
particular the qualia of prices, not only reflects a counterbalance against an 
overemphasis on the quantitative aspects of investing which subscribes to a 
separation between the investor (in particular his emotions) and the market. This 
qualitative overlay (e.g. market moods) is at the core of considering capital markets 
as a collective consciousness. John Searle states: 
The problem of what accounts for the inner qualitative states of 
awareness or sentience called ‘qualia’ is not an aspect of the 
problem of consciousness that we can set on one side; it is the 
problem of consciousness, because every conscious state is a 
qualitative state. (1997, p. 50) 
This eventually leads to my description of the hard problem of finance which I will 
reveal in chapter 6. What is required is a theory of market consciousness to deal 
with this and related problems. In that light, Chalmers for example, provides a 
useful framework for what he calls the psychophysical principles that should go into 
any theory of consciousness. However, Chalmers focuses only on individual 
consciousness69. Instead, as aforementioned, various researchers70 while 
                                           
69 In private correspondence on my proposition of the market’s mind-body problem, Chalmers responds: 
“I'm inclined to think that this problem is analogous to one of the easy problems of consciousness 
rather than the hard problem, as it is a problem about the performance of objective functions.  But 
of course you might well think that experience plays a causal role in the explanation of these 
functions, in which case a full solution to the easy problems may require a solution to the hard 
problem along the way.” Actually, my general argument goes further: the reason that the hard 
problem is so difficult is because any explanation of what accounts for qualia should apply to the 
qualities of intersubjective experiences too. Consequently, the problem of the hard problem is that 
such qualities cannot be isolated as they are intrinsically, even intimately linked to ‘other minds’. 
Concretely: in markets my mood is influenced by the market’s mood to the point that I not only 
need to consider it in my trading but that I am often overwhelmed by it. This is thus not simply “a 
problem about the performance of objective functions”. 
70 Including Jung, Nietzsche and Durkheim. 
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representing different view-points, argued for the collective aspect of consciousness. 
More recently, Edelman and Tononi argue: 
we emphatically do not identify consciousness in its full range as 
arising solely in the brain, since we believe that higher brain 
functions require interactions both with the world and with other 
persons. (2000, p. xii; emphasis mine) 
Hut and Shepard explain further that: 
intersubjectivity cannot be seen as a simple superposition of subjective 
and objective properties. Rather, acknowledging consciousness in others 
as being on par with our own, we see a world around us, filled with 
physical objects as well as conscious experience of humans . . . The fact 
that we can and do interact with others is an aspect of conscious 
experience that is at least as important to us as the possibility that we 
humans have of reflecting upon our own existence. (1995, p. 15) 
It argues explicitly for a second-person epistemology regarding consciousness and 
states. This means that for me to have an intersubjective experience requires your 
conscious engagement (rather than, say, just your physical presence). The dynamics 
of our interaction renders the experience, e.g. I enjoy sex/this meal/this game/etc. 
with you. In other words, I am aware that my experience is coloured by your 
experience (and know that this is vice versa), even though I do not intimately know 
“your colours”.    
Below I will therefore expand upon Chalmers’ principles by detailing the 
intersubjective aspects of investor consciousness; in other words how personal 
investor consciousness is irreducibly embedded and entangled in the collective 
consciousness of the market.  
Whereas intersubjectivity is excluded, for example, in two of the main theories of 
mental states, the theory-theory and the simulation theory, it is central in my 
account of the market mind. As aforementioned, the relevance of consciousness for 
markets works in reverse as well: markets are relevant for the broader theory of 
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consciousness. I thus believe (and hope) that my reflections will provide a useful 
contribution to advance the debate between Dennett’s A-team and Chalmers’ B-
team. 
But before I describe this framework as applied to the financial system, I would like 
to explain in the next section some of my own reflections on consciousness in 
general, and the primacy of the numerical archetypes in particular (even though a 
detailed discussion of the numerical archetype will be postponed until chapter 5). In 
general, the connection to Jung’s insistence on the fact that archetypes can only be 
experienced71 is not coincidental. The irreducibility of consciousness, i.e. the 
completeness of experience, involves unconscious processes. In the words of Pauli 
(1948, p.5; see also Pauli and Jung, 1955), they give rise to “the archaic point of 
view, which also strives to express the emotions and feeling-toned values of the soul 
with its symbolic images.” In other words, it is the archaic perspective of 
consciousness by way of archetypal images which adds facts over and above the 
scientific point of view. Pauli concludes: 
There is an initial proposal to recognize the significance of the 
scientific stage of knowledge for the development of scientific ideas 
by supplementing the investigation of this scientific knowledge 
[Erkenntnis nach aussen] with an investigation directed inward 
[Erkenntnis nach innen]. The former process is devoted to adapting 
our knowledge to external objects; the latter should bring to light 
the archetypal images used in the creation of our scientific concepts. 
Only by combining both these directions of research may complete 
understanding be obtained. (Ibid) 
 
4.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AND NUMERICAL ARCHETYPES 
                                           
71 This is an even more pronounced aspect in archetypal psychology (e.g. Hillman), which views 
archetypes as phenomenal. 
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In this section I need to briefly discuss the implicit requirement of enumeration for 
any consciousness to emerge. In the next chapter I will explain in more detail why 
this makes the numerical archetypes the prime archetypes: they enable (ego) 
consciousness to emerge from the unconscious. More specifically, they facilitate, for 
example, Fichte’s pre-reflective self-awareness. Fichte (1795) argued that 
consciousness must be “familiar” with itself at a primordial rudimentary level before 
it can self-reflect. My basic interpretation of the binary origin of numerical 
archetypes is to paraphrase Jung (see full quote below): “Before me there was zero 
(nothing), I am one, the other makes us two”. Only then can consciousness reflect 
on “What is one?”, “What is one compared to two?”, and other thoughts.  
For now, this form of distinction subsequently determines the level of consciousness. 
With identification comes discrimination, a more advanced form of distinction. 
Edelman (1992) has called this “self-nonself discrimination”, a notion later extended 
by Damasio (1999). A system can reach a level of higher consciousness, for 
example, if it is able to identify itself, i.e. self-refer. Rolls, reflecting on the nature of 
human consciousness72, considers it to be: 
the state which arises in a system that can think about (or reflect 
on) its own (or other people’s) thoughts, that is in a system capable 
of . . . higher order thoughts . . . On this account, a mental state is 
non-introspectively (i.e. non-reflectively) conscious if one has a 
roughly simultaneous thought that one is in that mental state. 
Following from this, introspective consciousness (or reflexive 
consciousness, or self-consciousness) is the attentive, deliberately 
focused consciousness of one’s mental states. (2008, p. 144)   
Regardless of the level of consciousness, the numerical archetypes seem to form the 
primary unconscious source(code) for symbols to emerge in the initial stage of 
                                           
72 And referring to Chalmers and others with similar views. 
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consciousness, preceding verbal language, for example. We find evidence of this in 
symbolic expressions by our earliest ancestors as well as young children, and even 
animals like the great apes. Those expressions include art, fibres, and tools. They 
signal the emergence of consciousness facilitated by the presence of rudimentary 
numerical thinking: 
To pick up a rock, examine it, and then make it correspond to the 
class of Acheulian fist hatchets is to engage in abstract thinking in 
sets . . . To create a fibre matrix of strands and knots for baskets 
and skirts, such as we see on the reverse side of the statuette called 
the Goddess of Lespugue, is to begin to think in numbers and 
recurring patterns. (Thompson, 2007, p. 102) 
Carruthers and Worthington conclude that “The flame of mathematical intuition is 
within children” (2006, p. 236), and first drawings by young children have a striking 
similarity to the early cave paintings by Palaeolithic humans. Their drawings reflect 









    
 
 
Nancy Aiken (in The Biological Origin of Art, 1998) broadened the similarity further 
by showing such patterns also occur across cultures. She argues that humans have 
always had the capacity to understand such imagery: 
 
The link to similar patterns in markets, e.g. waves, cycles, is easily recognised. Of 
particular relevance for chapter 10 is that Aiken73 argued that “Art is a bridge 
between unconscious and conscious thought”, echoing (but probably unaware of) 
Jung’s practise of active imagination.  
In any case, the pre-requirement consist of the unconscious non-conceptual ability 
to enumerate, scale, and transform before symbols, art, and by extension 
consciousness, can emerge: 
  
                                           
73 At a symposium, Art-Body-Mind: An Integration, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, Nov. 2-5, 2000. 
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The mind can: ... because the numerical archetypes enable: 
Differentiate Enumeration = to individuate situations, objects, etc. 
via numbers. 
Assess Scaling = to locate and constrain these in space and 
time along a number line (e.g. in the extreme 
leading to polarity). 
Integrate Transforming = to combine/parse (e.g. add, deduct) 
numbers into a new number whose level is 
benchmarked against an internal threshold, for 
example to mark a trigger. 
 
How can this emergence of consciousness, in humans or any other cognitive system, 
be interpreted in terms of knowledge? In the initial stage when, in Jung’s words, the 
mind “did not think but only perceived” the system was only aware of binary 
symbols. Before consciousness there was nothing (the number 0). Identification 
meant consciousness (1, e.g. “I”) emerged from nothing (0, e.g. “the unconscious”) 
and subsequently distinguished it from the “other” (generating 2, e.g. “the outside 
world”).74 Jung provided the following description: 
one is not a number at all; the first number is two. Two is the first 
number because, with it, separation 75  and multiplication begin, 
which alone make counting possible. With the appearance of the 
                                           
74 I also like to think of the one and the two from the perspective of the inhale-exhale dynamic, 
particularly in view of the Binarius (see chapter 8). 
75 Jung’s separation is not meant in the physical sense, but rather in terms of discrimination. 
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number two, another appears alongside the one, a happening which 
is so striking that in many languages “the other” and “the second” 
are expressed by the same word . . . The “other” can have a 
“sinister” significance—or one feels it at least, as something opposite 
and alien . . . Two implies a one which is different and distinct from 
the “numberless” One. In other words, as soon as the number two 
appears, a unit is produced out of the original unity, and this unit is 
none other than the same unity split into two and turned into a 
“number”. The “One” and the “Other” form an opposition, but there 
is no opposition between one and two, for these are simple numbers 
which are distinguished only by their arithmetical value and nothing 
else. The “One”, however, seeks to hold to its one-and-alone 
existence, while the “Other” ever strives to be another opposed to 
the One. The One will not let go of the Other because, if it did, it 
would lose its character; and the Other pushes itself away from the 
One in order to exist at all. Thus there arises a tension of opposites 
between the One and the Other. (Von Franz, 1974, p. 97) 
The tension of opposites, the “interplay of Yin and Yang” (Jung, 1955, p. 49), is at 
the core of the dynamics generated by competition and cooperation in complex 
adaptive systems, including markets (see also Schotanus, submitted). The relevance 
of this in the context of consciousness in the capital markets arises from the fact 
that, in principle, “One” and the “Other” stand for the individual investor, 
respectively his counterparty in the (intended/executed) trade, and vice versa. 
However, the distinctions blur as identification of any individual “other” is usually 
impossible in today’s markets: the other becomes the composite investor (i.e. the 
market)76. As a consequence investors’ respective consciousness becomes 
submerged into that of the market which is the “inter” of intersubjectivity. This 
signifies the second person perspective of the relationships involved, and we need to 
make clear that it is different from the third person perspective. Specifically, the 
third person perspective is that of the ‘absent observer’, unaware of the intrinsic 
qualities experienced by (those that make up) the market mind.  
                                           
76 They could also stand for any of the other opposing parties one recognises in markets like buyer/seller, 
bulls/bears, long/shorts, etc. (who ultimately produce the opposing forces of demand/supply).  
However, the crucial aspect is that any individual investor is aware of being (part of) “One” in 
relationship with the “Other”. 
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Throughout this thesis, for example in section 4.6 below, I will expand on this, 
specifically by describing how prices capture co-cognition (at the conscious level), as 
well as participation mystique, (the “automatic unconscious induction” to use 
Gallese’s terms [2005]) among investors. These are two complementary aspects of 
the overall market mentality that complete its ‘state’ and the embedded 
informational content of prices cannot be mined purely by analysis.  
In summary, there are three steps in the emergence of consciousness for which the 
numerical archetypes provide the subliminal evaluation template: 
 Differentiation (or distinction), which requires enumeration; 
 Assessment, which requires scaling; 
 Integration, which requires transformation.  
If the archetypal hypothesis, by way of the numerical archetypes, offers a 
psychophysical model to bridge the material (i.e. real) with the mental (i.e. 
imagined), it is important to formalise this in a more robust framework that I will 
present in chapter 6.  
Next, it is helpful to discuss two of the popular concepts in consciousness research, 
namely supervenience (philosophy) and complementarity (physics) in the context of 
investor phenomenology. 
4.4 SUPERVENIENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
Supervenience is a conditional-relationship concept with a rich history. It offers an 
analytical framework to tackle complex topics, like consciousness. 
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Based on various interpretations77 a set of properties A supervenes upon another set 
of properties B if, and only if, any two objects which share all properties of B also 
share all properties of A. Another way to say this is that A-properties supervene on 




There are various implications and extensions if this relationship holds: 
▪ The B properties are called the base and the A properties the supervenient 
properties. 
▪ Two objects which are B indistinguishable are also A indistinguishable. 
▪ Two objects which are A different are also B different. 
▪ The A properties do not explain anything above and beyond what the B 
properties already explain. 
▪ There are further distinctions between global and local supervenience, as well as 
implications for epiphenomenalism, reductionism, etc. For example, psychological 
properties can be supervenient on physical properties without being reducible to 
them. 
Among the researchers which applied this concept to the mind sciences are Davidson 
(1970), Kim (1993, 2011), and Chalmers (1996). The question which is central in 
                                           
77 E.g. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chalmers (1996), Kim (2011). 
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this regard is whether consciousness is supervenient on the physical body. Again, 
this should not be confused with reduction: if mental properties supervene on 
physical properties it does not automatically follow that they can be reduced to 
physical properties. Others (e.g. Searle [1995], Dretske [1998]) use the analogy 
with money to explain supervenience (as well as intrinsic/extrinsic properties and 
other philosophical issues) in order to show how it relates to behaviour. 
We can apply supervenience to EMH, for example. EMH considers price to be the B 
property of assets and value to be the A property. Consequently, the difference in 
the value between gold and silver, for example, is equal to the difference in their 
price. Also, according to the EMH the values of gold and silver do not explain 
anything above and beyond what their prices already explain. Another example is 
the no-arbitrage argument: Asset A supervenes on the underlying Asset B, because 
the pay-off for Asset B (reflected in its price) can be replicated without extra costs 
via Asset A (reflected in the price of A which equals the price of B).  
But the relevance of supervenience to finance goes further. Most experts in the mind 
sciences hold that economic properties supervene on physical properties78. Instead, I 
argue that this is doubtful because it certainly does not extend to capital markets 
with which the economy is intrinsically linked. Specifically, price qualia are the 
qualitative characteristics of market states that are shared between participants in 
that market. This differentiates them from the traditional highly subjective qualia 
from isolated instances of experience in the individual’s interiority. Moreover, those 
proponents who accept non-supervenience of consciousness in general also have to 
accept the non-supervenience of the market’s mind.  
                                           
78 If two worlds are exactly the same physically, they are the same economically. 
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First, similar to the distinctions within an archetypal situation (in particular between 
the archetype and its image), we need to clarify the initial conditions in a situation of 
supervenience. Let’s do a thought experiment of a laboratory test to determine what 
green feels like.79 The reason I place it here is, as I will show, the link to 
experiencing (changing) coloured prices on screens and monitors by millions of 
investors. 
As part of this test a monitor has a screen which is grey in its initial state. Next, a 
green flash appears on the screen which is observed by a subject who, in turn, is 
studied by a researcher. We are particularly interested in the following elements of 
this test: 
1. Physical object: screen (i.e. area of pixels) 
a. property: colour 
b. characteristic: green 
2. Human 1: subject 
a. property: senses 
b. characteristic: greenness  
3. Human 2: researcher 
a. property: senses 
b. characteristic: greenish   
Let’s discuss this in more detail, while limiting it to the main aspects: 
                                           
79 The experience of colours is among the most frequently used topics in the mind sciences, particularly in 
the context of qualia. 
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- The subject is instructed to focus on the screen’s colour. In other words, 
the green colour is the only characteristic we are interested in, even 
though it forms part of a host of other characteristics, derived from 
various properties, e.g. the screen’s shape.  
- The characteristic green is static and not influenced by the other elements 
of the test, e.g. the subject cannot turn green into red. (For comparison 
with the more common “tomato” example: the subject cannot change the 
colour of the red tomato she’s observing). 
- The characteristic greenness is the subject’s perception of the screen’s 
green in the form of an experience.  
- The characteristic greenish is the researcher’s perception of the subject’s 
greenness in the form of an observation of the subject’s brain80.  
In the test, the subject’s perception physically consists of neuronal patterns 
triggered by the senses which underlie the experience. The experience of green 
(called greenness) is the reality (of green) as known to the subject, not the reality 
(of green) as such. The subject can say: “I know what green feels like”. 
In turn, the researcher studies the physical processes, i.e. neuronal patterns, of the 
subject while the latter is experiencing green. The researcher produces a description 
of his observation which details the physical state of experiencing green. This 
description (called greenish) is the reality (of green) as known by the researcher, 
                                           
80 The researcher does not observe the green flash himself. Also, we could make this more complicated by 
expanding this to another “experience” of the observation, but this would take the discussion into 
unnecessary complications which detract from the main points. 
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not the reality of green as such, nor the reality as known by the subject81. The 
researcher can say: “I know what green does to the subject’s brain.” 
Although the subject is obviously exposed to the physical processes, because they 
are embodied, greenish does not encompass greenness. On the other hand, the 
subject’s greenness does not provide information about the physical processes 
underlying the experience, like the researcher’s greenish does82. In short, we end up 
with a knowledge ‘gap’.  
In order to resolve this, let’s expand from ‘binary knowledge’ to show how 
knowledge can be shared or conveyed as information. First, we need to make a 
distinction between physical and phenomenal facts. Physical facts are derived 
from/provided by physical objects in our environment, as well as our bodies. They 
can be studied from a third person (external) perspective and verification is 
according to the physical sciences, like physics, chemistry and biology. The resulting 
knowledge is descriptive, like “greenish”, and can be shared as information. 
Phenomenal facts are derived from/provided by experiences. At the individual level, 
they can only be studied from a first person (internal) perspective, with verification 
via reflection. The resulting knowledge is experiential, like “greenness”, and cannot 
be shared as information. The difference in (type of) knowledge forms part of the 
debate of the supervenience of consciousness. Specifically it follows what 
philosophers call “The Knowledge Argument” which (according to the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy) “aims to establish that conscious experience involves 
non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone who has complete 
physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about 
                                           
81 Although the researcher can himself be familiar with experiencing green, e.g. empathy, this is not the 
issue here. 
82 Except “after the fact” by way of interpreting the description of the researcher. 
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how it feels to have the experiences of that being.” Nevertheless, there are 
situations where the characteristic itself not only contains knowledge in the form of 
information. It also reflects the composite of multiple experiences, i.e. experiences 
at the collective level. In other words, it reflects intersubjectivity which is the only 
manifestation of experiences where they are shared. In short, these are the various 
distinctions: physical/phenomenal, descriptive/experiential knowledge83, and 
internal/external observer.  
Next, in order to place this in the context of consciousness, let me introduce 
Penrose’s (1995) hierarchy of elements in consciousness, whereby I’ve added two 
levels, because I believe they are implied. These levels refer to the content part of 
consciousness, namely memories in general, and knowledge in this particular case: 
  
                                           
83 Experiential knowledge includes tacit knowledge. 
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1. Intelligence requires understanding 








It makes sense for investors to make a distinction between information and 
knowledge. Let’s ignore for the moment private information which can be profitably 
used by investors (albeit illegally if it is inside information). Clearly most investor 
insights occur through thorough analysis of new public information, or revisions of 
existing public data. I call these analytical insights. Once an analytical insight is 
                                           
84 Penrose distinguishes this “passive” aspect of consciousness from the active aspect, free will. There are 
various comments about free will elsewhere in this thesis. 
Knowledge can be shared: 
- Descriptive knowledge: information (3rd person) 




    
 
shared (with your colleagues in the investment team, for example), it becomes 
testable public knowledge. If the investor keeps the insight to herself, it remains 
private knowledge. Similarly, there are two ways for an intuitive investment insight, 
which emerges from the unconscious, to progress into price discovery. In both 
instances the intuitive insight is transformed into an analytical insight. First, the 
insight is turned into an investment strategy but kept private by the investor, in 
order for it not to lose its profitability85. The second way is for the investor to create 
a logical ‘rational’ confabulation in order to communicate it as a ‘sensible’ story to 
others.  
As aforementioned at the very least the early state of awareness of one’s being 
includes distinction, the recognition of “the other”, i.e. the outside world. 
Consciousness thus implies an awareness of one’s “1 on x” relationship with one’s 
surroundings, with survival as its core motivation. The interactions with one’s 
surroundings ultimately lead to cognition, the build-up of knowledge86, which can be 
and mostly has to be shared87 among humans (a phenomenon also observed among 
higher primates.) Knowledge largely makes up the ‘content’ part of consciousness 
and is exemplary for the reflexive and epistemological nature of consciousness, at 
least for humans: as we learn, and gain knowledge, we reflect on the nature of our 
consciousness, from which we learn more, gain further knowledge, and  . . . the loop 
continues. 
As a consequence, from a content perspective it is fair to say that we are not only 
more conscious than the apes, but also more conscious than our forefathers 
(although clearly this does not imply that we are the wiser.) This is reflected in our 
body of knowledge. Our awareness of our being, in relation to its surroundings, 
increased due to our search for knowledge. Many others have explored this and the 
collective dimension of knowledge, for example, has been called extelligence by 
                                           
85 Still, advocates of EMH will argue that eventually other investors (i.e. the market) will have figured out 
this insight and the profitability will be arbitraged away. 
86 Cognition is derived from the Latin cognoscere, "to know". 
87 For example, to meet the standards of science or simply to survive. 
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mathematician Steward and biologist Cohen (1997), and memes by biologist Richard 
Dawkins (1976). 
The key conclusion is that both descriptive knowledge and experiential knowledge 
capture a mental state, but that each captures a different but complementary aspect 
of this state: the physical/quantitative aspect, respectively the 
phenomenal/qualitative. Basically, this is the argument used by proponents against 
supervenience of consciousness: consciousness is irreducible to the underlying 
physical processes, and the phenomenal aspect adds something to our 
understanding above and beyond the physical. 
The knowledge ‘gap’ lies on the right side of Penrose’s figure above: our current 
scientific methods cannot confer the “feels like” quality of a subjective experience. 
But what about shared experiences? In my view, this area has been overlooked 
which has as much to do with ignored methods as it has to do with ignoring the 
“feeling content” of shared experiences. Say we agree that: 
1. We have an inclination for empathy, whether or not induced unconsciously, 
e.g. via mirror neurons; 
2. We can employ contemplative methods which appeal to our non-analytical 
capabilities of understanding; 
Then it follows that the availability of verifiable empirical data which reflect shared 
experiences in an “objective” format, i.e. numbers, may help us to further our 
understanding of consciousness and thus enhance the debate. Enter price data.  
But before I discuss this in the chapter 6 (and 8), let’s return to the earlier thought 
experiment. A more advanced variation would be to switch the colour of the screen 
dynamically between red, orange, and green to see the difference in feelings across 
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the experienced, i.e. introduce qualia dynamics. What remains is that there is only a 
one-way relation between the characteristic of the colour and that of the senses, 
namely from the former to the latter.  The set-up in which we are interested would 
be something like this: 
1. Physical object: screen (reference: traffic light) 
a. property: colour 
b. characteristic: green, yellow, red 
2. Human 1: subject 
a. property: senses 
b. characteristic: greenness, yellowness, redness  
3. Human 2: researcher 
a. property: senses 
b. characteristic: greenish, yellowish, reddish 
The reader is invited to think about this set-up, but basically the same discussion on 
the single colour green applies to this multi-colour set-up. The final stage of this 
thought experiment is to imagine the investor’s reality of observing (e.g. Bloomberg) 
screens whereby the impact of changing colours on those screens immediately relate 
to her existing ‘real’ wealth, again in capital and/or income terms. Specifically, in 
experimental terms, the ‘subject’ knows that the colours reflect an increase, no 
change, respectively decrease in her ‘state of’ wealth. Extending the set-up by 
having the screen reflect changing numbers and colours, thereby completing the 
reality for investors, justifies using the term ‘price qualia’. Moreover, the fact that 
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the coloured numbers on the screens are influenced, in real-time, by the collective 
consciousness (e.g. mood) of those that observe them justifies using the term 
intersubjectivity to describe shared market states. 
Jungian note 
What is the relevance of supervenience to archetypes? Earlier I described the 
emergence of an archetypal image in consciousness from an archetypal situation, 
simpliciter the encounter with “the other”, i.e. the external world88. The constellation 
of the latter, in terms of a physical pattern, combines with the invoked neuronal 
pattern within the human body to form a physical state. Although they interact, they 
are two separate but complementary physical aspects of the archetype. But the 
archetype does not supervene on the purely physical state, because it is 
experienced. That is to say an archetype reveals itself in consciousness by way of its 
affective image: symbolic meaning is attached to (physical) information. Jung calls 
this attachment “emotional charge”, whereas Damasio calls it the “somatic mark”. In 
Jung’s terms, the archetypes “attract, out of the conscious mind, those contents 
which are best suited to themselves.” To an external observer of this situation, 
however, the cerebral state of the subject is indirectly observed as a perceptual 
image. The knowledge, in terms of being in this situation, is experiential to the 
subject but remains descriptive to the external observer (assuming he can focus 
exclusively on the perceptual image). Both images not only differ in their knowledge 
content, but also only ‘seemingly’ represent a physical reality, i.e. only ‘as if’. Again, 
the archetype remains elusive. 
Additionally, we can also view knowledge from the following angle. First, there is the 
distinction between ‘known’ knowledge which is available in consciousness and the 
‘unknown’ knowledge, some of which occasionally emerges from the unconscious, 
either as (repressed) memories or discovered new insights. Second, and related, we 
need to distinguish between scientific wisdom, or rational knowledge, and perennial 
wisdom, or absolute knowledge. Rational knowledge is gained by way of analysis. 
Analysis is an active form of investigation in the sense that it is a ‘quest for 
knowledge’ with a mental effort to gain knowledge. The process of analysis is linear, 
one piece of the puzzle at the time. By definition, scientific wisdom is also shared, in 
order for it to be verifiable by others. The latter can use the same method, analysis, 
to that end. Perennial wisdom on the other hand is almost the opposite. It is based 
on subjective experiences in the form of intuitions which have often been described 
as occurring in a higher state of consciousness (e.g. Harman and Rheingold, 1984). 
Moreover, intuition is received via meditation or (unconscious) reflection. These are 
the passive forms of investigation in the sense that they are more like a ‘request for 
knowledge’, a mental wish to be bestowed a gift of knowledge. The arrival of such a 
gift is then as a complete package, i.e. each piece of the puzzle falls into place in a 
parallel fashion. The passive nature of this ‘opening up’ or ‘letting go’ does not make 
it easier to achieve. In fact, the reward from this request lies in the realisation of the 
ability itself to intuit, to see the whole picture at once. In the words of David Bohm, 
                                           
88 Which is the distinction with which consciousness, i.e. enumeration, starts. 
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this “ability to perceive or think differently is more important than the knowledge 
gained.” Finally, sharing intuitions has always been problematic. This is due, mostly, 
to the difficulty of explaining the novel and often transcendent meaning of such 
insights. 
 Next, I will discuss further the collective aspect of consciousness. 
4.5 THE COLLECTIVE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, 
than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, 
as it were, one single mind and one single body. 
Spinoza 
 
John Searle makes a key observation in the modern debate on consciousness: 
The natural sciences typically deal with those features of nature that 
are intrinsic or observer-independent in the sense that their 
existence does not depend on what anybody thinks. Examples of 
such features are mass, photosynthesis, electric charge, and 
mitosis. The social sciences often deal with features that are 
observer-dependent or observer-relative in the sense that their 
existence depends on how humans treat them, use them, or 
otherwise think of them. Examples of such features are money, 
property and marriage. A bit of paper, for example, is only money 
relative to the fact that people think that it is money. The fact that 
this object consists of cellulose fibers is observer-independent; the 
fact that it is a twenty-dollar bill is observer-relative. . . . My present 
state of consciousness is intrinsic in this sense: I am conscious 
regardless of what anybody else thinks. (1997, p. 15) 
Although this emphasises the reality of consciousness as an experience, there is an 
important aspect of such a state that needs further consideration: its isolation, i.e. 
whether the experience is shared at some level or otherwise is influenced by others. 
Specifically, following up on Searle’s argument: I may be conscious but what I’m 
conscious of can certainly be influenced by what others think. Crucially, I am 
receiving continuous confirmation of my conscious state by (interacting with) other 
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humans. In fact, there are indications that group processes greatly contributed to 
the evolved human ability to be self-aware (e.g. individuality).89 Moreover, the 
‘problem of other minds’ can only be truly ‘solved’ by way of humans interacting, 
e.g. exchanging, which goes beyond inferences from simply observing their 
behaviour. Vice versa, I would risk losing my sense of consciousness without such 
interaction. 90 In short, what has largely been missing in the debate on the nature of 
consciousness is its collective dimension. Elsewhere Searle acknowledges this as 
much: 
I am convinced that the category of “other people” plays a special role in 
the structure of our conscious experiences, a role unlike that of objects and 
states of affairs . . . But I do not yet know how to demonstrate these 
claims, nor how to analyze [it]. (1992, p. 127) 
Capital markets offer a rich source for research in that respect. The reason why I use 
the thought experiment is that no market exists without at least one human buyer 
and one human seller.91 Ahead of the “voting” quote by Keeton and Gould which I 
use in chapter 5 to argue the primacy of numerical archetypes for consciousness, 
Benjamin Graham, Mark Rubinstein92 and others have referred to the market as a 
voting device that continuously interrogates millions of voters about their attitudes 
and then summarises the results of the poll in the form of market prices. Since other 
investors typically have information that any individual investor will not have, this 
                                           
89 See, for example, Donald (1991). 
90 To clarify this further, very much in the spirit of Jung’s “one” and the “other”, let’s do another thought 
experiment. Imagine you’ve stranded on a remote uninhabited island (think Thom Hanks in Cast 
Away). After some time, without any contact with any conscious being, how would you know 
whether you’re conscious? In line with Searle’s earlier comment, how can you make the distinction 
between being awake or sleeping, for example? It is only in your dreams that you may be conscious 
of other people (i.e. who appear in them), but they cannot confirm that you are conscious, if only 
because they are not themselves consciously there. Moreover, you’re generally not aware it is a 
dream. Overall, I am inclined to think that there has to be the possibility, i.e. by ‘objective’ others, 
to falsify the hypothesis of “I am conscious”, and that this thus requires the presence of conscious 
others. However, I admit that I have not thought this through sufficiently yet to discuss this in more 
detail here. 
91 For those who point to electronic markets: that includes humans who code the algorithms that do the 
buying and selling. 
92 One of my professors at UC Berkeley and a supporter of the EMH. 
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aggregation may incorporate better-informed subjective beliefs into the prices than 
any individual investor could determine on their own. 
In particular, I argue that capital markets demonstrate intersubjectivity empirically 
at a massive scale. Intersubjectivity has a conscious and an unconscious aspect. At 
the conscious level, the strength of intersubjectivity depends on the extent of joint 
attention. Joint attention refers to the instance when two or more individuals are 
aware that they are paying attention to the same object or event. In the case of 
modern capital markets this consists of, at least, a buyer and a seller who gaze at a 
price on the screen ahead of any trade. At the unconscious level, the strength of 
intersubjectivity depends on the extent of participation mystique, or intentional 
attunement to use Gallese’s term: “an automatic unconscious ‘induction’ in each 
participant of what the other is feeling.” I will discuss participation mystique in more 
detail in chapter 7.  
Intersubjectivity is present in capital markets as long as prices are live, i.e. markets 
are open and/or securities are traded.93 Although they may not be aware of each 
other as individuals, nor of the shared affect of prices and their patterns, investors 
are aware that, ultimately, they are paying attention to the same prices. In other 
words, by simultaneously observing prices, which reflect their collective behaviour, 
they are (aware they are) observing each other. The implication of this, in terms of 
an intersubjective reflexive loop of mind reading, was captured, for example, by 
Keynes in his famous analogy of the beauty contest: 
It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one’s 
judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average 
opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third 
degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
                                           
93 Increasingly this means continuously, i.e. 24x7. 
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average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are 
some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. 
(1936, p. 156) 
Earlier we saw that symbol transformation plays a crucial role in planning whereby 
the individual reflects on (1) past experiences, and (2) other minds (and their 
reflections). This symbolism also allows information to be shared and communicated. 
In fact it is the shared experiences which receive the most recognised symbols, 
namely those with a common understanding. In any case, at the personal (internal) 
level, as well as the shared collective level, symbolism always involves multiple 
minds, and includes experiences gained by previous generations which ultimately 
have shaped the common physical neural circuitry. In Edelman and Tononi’s words, 
conscious thought is a set of relations with a meaning that goes beyond 
just energy and matter . . . The action of your brain, and all its 
mechanisms, bottom to top, atoms to behavior, results in a mind that can 
be concerned with processes of meaning. While generating such immaterial 
relationships that are recognised by it and other minds, this mind is 
completely based in and dependent on the physical processes that occur in 
its own workings, in those of other minds, and in the events involved in 
communication. . . . But obviously there is a realm created by the physical 
order of the brain, the body, and the social world in which meaning is 
consciously made. That meaning is essential both to our description of the 
world and to our scientific understanding of it. (2000, p. 219) 
In chapter 6 I will round up my case by arguing more formally how markets comply 
with a specific set of criteria required for collective subjectivity and explain why they 
are so unique in that respect. 
But first, in chapter 5, I will discuss the complexity in (complex) psychology through 





    
 
CHAPTER 5.  COMPLEXITY IN 






More than 50 years ago, Jung expressed some impatience when he stated that “my 
later and more important work (as it seems to me) is still untouched in its primordial 
obscurity” (1951-1961 (1976, p. 309)). Since then Atmanspacher (2006), Giegerich 
(2007), Robertson (1995), von Franz (1974) and others have highlighted this 
distinction and expanded on Jung’s later work. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to contribute to the task of raising Jung’s later work 
from its primordial obscurity by focusing particularly on the numerical archetypes. In 
this chapter I attempt to achieve this by way of a three-pronged approach: 
1. By placing complex psychology in the framework of complexity theory. 
2. By linking numerical archetypes to modern neuroscientific insights in number 
sense, also known as the number module.95 
                                           
94 Elements of this chapter appeared earlier in Schotanus (2013). 
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3. By explaining the empirical relevance of numerical archetypes in price 
discovery, the self-organizing principle in the capital markets that allocate 
resources in modern society. 
To support my thesis I include insights, first, from other mind sciences (apart from 
complex psychology). With regard to philosophy, various comments by Jung (e.g. 
“object of experience” in von Franz, 1974, p. 121; “phenomenal world”, CW14, para. 
667) highlight the relevance of (contemporary) philosophy to complex psychology, in 
particular regarding the mental efficacy of archetypes (e.g. “consequences of some 
kind”, 1964, p. 87; “seem to be their cause”, CW 3, para. 550). I use the insights 
from the ongoing debates on consciousness and the mind-body problem to clarify 
the issues involved in exploring the nature of archetypes. Among the philosophical 
concepts I use is the aforementioned quale (multiple: qualia) which refers to the 
intimately qualitative characteristic of an experience including its duration. It means, 
for example, that my distinction between cognitive and psychoanalytical versions of 
the unconscious is less strict than some readers perhaps would like it to be.96  
Second, I include insights from finance which offers an appropriate way of thinking 
about Jung’s “psychic economy” (CW 7, para. 332) and its capital. It also leads to a 
particular view on the collective unconscious. Jung, in a letter to Pauli (Cazenave, 
1984, p. 253), described the collective unconscious as a “space in which an infinity 
of observers observe the same object.” Acknowledging the collective unconscious 
experience of a crowd under the spell of participation mystique  I argue that the 
objects of the crowd’s attention have, by definition, a deeper shared (or objective) 
                                                                                                                             
95 Although I will only discuss number sense, as Charles Card kindly pointed out to me there are a number 
of related areas of mathematical cognition that are also relevant, including set-based quantification, 
parallel individuation/object tracking systems and mental rotation. 
96 For support for such an integrative view see Epstein, 1994; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Gallese et al., 
2007; Mlodinow, 2012. 
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meaning if they involve less subjective symbols, i.e. numbers. The link between the 
crowd-size and the ‘common denomination’ (i.e. power) of a symbol was expressed, 
for example, by Robertson (1995, p. 149): “If the problem . . . engages most of 
humanity over a large period of time, then the emotional energy is correspondingly 
greater, as is the pressure, and as is the eventual symbol that emerges.” This 
obviously applies to the capital markets where large crowds discover emotionally 
highly charged prices. In chapter 7 I relate participation mystique involving numbers 
to recent neurological insights, in particular the discovery of mirror neurons and the 
accompanying unconscious induction (e.g. Gallese et al., 2007). Moreover, to answer 
Cambray, capital markets arguably are a sea of synchronicity and exhibit “emergent 
processes . . . in focused group activities” (2009, p. 92) which organise the collective 
market mind. 
The remaining sections of this paper will deal with the following topics. First, I will 
introduce the link between complex psychology, complexity theory and numerical 
archetypes. Subsequently, I will summarise number sense and equate it to 
numerical archetypes. This is followed by explaining the experience of numbers by 
way of price discovery in the capital markets, before I offer my conclusions. 
5.2 COMPLEX PSYCHOLOGY: FROM THERAPY TO THEORY 
 
Jung’s later work can be characterised as a general, more abstract interpretation of 
the psyche pushing along the way concepts like the unconscious and the archetypes 
toward a theory rather than a therapy. Jung preferred to use the term complex 
psychology to identify his theory of psychology, “signalling a shift in emphasis from 
practical analysis to general psychology” (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 14). Jung wrote 
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“Complex psychology means the psychology of ‘complexities’, i.e. of complex 
psychical systems in contradistinction from relatively elementary factors.” (Ibid; 
emphasis mine). Specifically note that Jung refers to complexities, rather than 
complexes. Also, earlier attempts link Jung’s thinking to chaos theory97, a sub-
branche of complexity theory. They include Van Eenwyk (1991), Saunders and Skar 
(2001), MacLennan (2007), Hogenson (2007), and Cambray (2009). Finally, the 
Gödel-Turing framework is a key element in the computational strains of complexity 
theory, like Algorithmic Information Theory (see section 8.3, but also Markose, 
2003). In my attempts to link Jung and Gödel I have made the implicit link to this 
element of complexity theory explicit. Combined these points provide sufficient 
ammunition to argue overall that the “complex” in complex psychology is closely 
related to the “complex” in complexity theory. 
Still, although the traditional Jungian term of complex is not used in this context, 
certain dynamics of Jungian complexes approach characteristics associated with 
complexity, like emergence. Specifically, the interaction of complexes at the micro 
level gives rise to the endogenous behaviour of complexes at the macro level. For 
example, personal complexes interact between individuals, but also with cultural 
complexes (e.g. Singer and Kimbles, 2004). That is to say, the complexes of the 
individuals mutually influence each other, as these individuals interact, but also 
influence and are influenced by the complexes of the group they are part of. The 
nature of that influence, in a composite sense, is thus clearly ‘complex’ with multiple 
feedback loops. Moreover, cultural complexes particularly concern conflict between 
groups. For example, competition for natural resources within the global economy 
has often been associated with such conflicts, so cultural complexes could apply to 
                                           
97 Jung implicitly referred to the famous butterfly-effect when he stated (CW9i, para. 408): “That the 
greatest effects come from the smallest causes”. 
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groups of economic agents. But these are just my early reflections and more 
research is required.  
Accepting Jung’s preference for the term complex psychology in this manner, I will 
argue in this section that complexity theory in general, and the Gödel-Turing98 
framework in particular, offer a robust platform of analysis for a more abstract 
interpretation of his concepts which can contribute to our understanding of the 
human mind, both at the individual and collective level, as a complex adaptive 
system (CAS). 
Like complexity theory, complex psychology focuses on the unique characteristics 
which emerge from the dynamics of systems, in this case psychical systems or 
minds. Examples of archetypal dynamics include differentiation/integration, 
enantiodromia, and participation mystique. Crucially, the numerical ‘coordinate’ (or 
scale) dimensions in which complex dynamics appear (e.g. in space-time: length, 
breadth, width, and duration) are important (philosophical) considerations when 
problems of complexity in general are analysed. 
What makes complexity theory attractive for both complex psychology and finance is 
the formal acknowledgement and treatment of ‘elusive’ macroscopic properties 
involved in the ordering of a complex system. In an overview, Markose (2005, p. 
F161) points out that: 
In all variants of complex systems theory it is held that macroscopic 
properties cannot be formally or analytically deduced from the 
properties of its parts. Methodologically, it is precisely this that 
distinguishes the sciences of complex systems from the bulk of 
traditional science which relies on deductive formalistic and 
analytical methods. 
                                           
98 Also known as the Gödel-Turing-Post framework (e.g. Markose, 2005); sometimes Church is also 
added, e.g. Church-Turing. 
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Progress has been made along various lines. Specifically, whereas the original result 
of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem was the proof that mathematics was larger than 
logic, its principles have since been applied elsewhere. In finance, for example, 
Spear (1989) showed the non-computability of fixed point mappings that represent 
equilibria in markets, challenging the assumptions of modern finance. As Markose 
points out, Gödel-Turing’s broader relevance is that, to paraphrase Hayek, in the 
absence of the implied limits on computation there is in principle no reason why all 
observed price patterns and other economic forms (e.g. innovations) cannot be 
achieved by a central command. 
Although this matter is not settled and divergent views remain, what has become 
clear in the field of complexity theory over the last few years99 is, first, that the sine 
qua non of a complex adaptive system is not the non-linearity or chaos it exhibits 
but its endogenous ability to internally produce innovations (or novelty) to deal with 
external surprises. This lies at the core of the system’s self-organisation: to realise 
order in the face of chaos. Second, that the dynamics involve both competition (e.g. 
the Red Queen principle100) and cooperation (e.g. alliances), ultimately realising a 
unity of opposites.101 Following Jung I have consequently chosen the term 
conjunction to capture this, reflecting that the very opposing of its elements is a 
strengthening merging at the systemic level. So, our conjunction requires an 
oppositional (or contrarian) structure. Specifically, the conditions of such opposition, 
combined with the recognition of its existence by each opposing force, can be shown 
                                           
99 My interpretation, but see in particular Markose (2003) and Markose (2005) and the references therein. 
An early economic perspective is by Hayek (1967) and a modern update is by Arthur (2005). For a 
more general view see, for example, Mitchell (2009). Finally, a rich source of research is the Santa 
Fe Institute: http://www.santafe.edu/research/  
100 A metaphor for the ubiquitous ‘arms race’ in complexity. Although some readers may be more familiar 
with Jung quoting the White Queen in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass, the Red Queen 
said to Alice: “Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” 
101 The oppositional structure plays out at multiple levels and does not exclude cooperation if this 
improves competitive strength, i.e. former hostiles unite against a common enemy. 
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to be logically necessary as Kauffman points out: “coevolution of entities which 
interact with and know one another. The laws which govern the emergence of 
knower and known . . . lie at the core of the science of complexity” (1991, p. 1). 
Third, certain properties of this system escape reduction into an axiomatic 
description and its resulting innovations are beyond algorithmic enumeration. This 
comes back to reflexivity. In a system where the analysis of a situation is a function 
of exactly that analysis (e.g. an expectation of its outcome determines that very 
outcome) there is no logical or deductive way to settle this and some form of meta-
mapping is required. As I will discuss shortly, intuition is the mind’s way to 
transcend or break-through this self-referential loop by inviting surprises102, the 
unexpected unknowns. The accompanying experience enriches the analysis with 
meaning, reaching beyond pure logic. Ultimately, in the words of Derman (2009, p. 
5), echoing Kauffman, “intuition is a merging of the understander with the 
understood”. 
So, what is the argument to assume that the mind is a complex adaptive system in 
the first place? In particular what makes up the required oppositional structure and 
how can the mind endogenously generate novelty, the pre-condition for adaptive 
self-organisation? The answer lies in the intrinsic opposition between the 
unconscious and consciousness103 which is played out in archetypal dynamics: 
“Logical analysis is the prerogative of consciousness; we select with reason and 
knowledge. The unconscious, however, seems to be guided by . . . the archetypes” 
(Jung, 1964, p. 67). Jung saw the relationship between the unconscious and 
consciousness in similar terms to those of the complex dynamics between 
                                           
102 These surprises are not by definition immediately positive or optimal: they include mistakes and 
errors. I would also include, for example, fantasy and slips of the tongue. 
103 Here meant in terms of the cognitive and awareness, rather than the experiential/phenomenal. 
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competition and cooperation.104 He also emphasised the autonomy of the 
unconscious and assigned intelligence to it which feeds intuition and even embeds an 
element of prognostication (ibid, p. 66). More recently Gigerenzer starts his 
bestseller Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious with the following 
‘Jungian’ statement: 
We think of intelligence as a deliberate, conscious activity guided by 
the laws of logic. Yet much of our mental life is unconscious, based 
on processes alien to logic: gut feelings, or intuitions. . . . We sense 
that the Dow Jones will go up. . . . Where do these feelings come 
from? (2007, p. 3) 
Consequently, my proposition is, first, that the unconscious and conscious forces can 
be considered as ‘intelligent’ agents105 in terms of the Gödel-Turing framework. In 
fact, Jung even referred to archetypes as agents (CW7, para. 109). Second, the 
opposition between these two subsystems (which is almost universally accepted in 
all dual-system theories of mind) and their mutual recognition at their own 
respective level of this ‘hostility’, i.e. they agree to disagree, are the necessary 
conditions for innovative outcomes to adapt and progress in conjunction. According 
to this view generating novelty is achieved in the form of intuitive insights (e.g. 
Klein, 2013) and imagination which result in a vast array of symbols: “opposites 
never unite at their own level . . . since the symbol derives as much from the 
conscious as from the unconscious, it is able to unite them both, reconciling their 
conceptual polarity through its form and their emotional polarity through its 
numinosity.” (CW9ii, para. 280). In their very opposing hostile agents or “hostile 
elements” (CW14, para. 14) unite in the system’s broader adaptive purpose to 
produce novelty.  The conjunction of the unconscious and consciousness produces 
                                           
104 The unconscious “is not [just] complementary but compensatory. This goes to show that the 
unconscious does not simply act contrary to the conscious mind but modifies it more in the manner 
of an opponent or partner.” (Psychology and Alchemy, para. 26). 
105 To be clear, what I am interested in here is not the substance or form of these agents but their 
strategies: intelligent agents execute strategies (or fulfil mandates). 
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their mental child, the intuitive insight, “the birth of a third and new thing, a son 
who resolves the antagonism of the parents and is himself a ‘united double nature’” 
(ibid, para. 22). 
Specifically, central in complex psychology is the complementarity of opposites (e.g. 
Atmanspacher and Primas, 2006). This is closely associated with concepts in 
complexity theory. The first is the limited case of the Boolean True/False logic of the 
Liar’s Paradox: “This statement is false”.106 In turn, this was part of the mechanics 
Gödel used to prove his Incompleteness Theorem which, for example, Robertson 
(1995) linked to Jung’s archetypal hypothesis. Another is from (algorithmic) 
information theory and concerns the signal-noise dichotomy as captured in the 
symbol which embodies both. There are two important points to highlight in this 
regard. 
First, information is always about something and implicitly dynamic. A signal, in that 
respect, is the intermittent alerting message of a pattern which is ‘in formation’. For 
example, the message to ‘pay attention’ or ‘be aware’ is one of the signals of the 
symbol as it emerges in consciousness. Noise, on the other hand, is the ever-present 
infinite ‘background clutter’ of the unknown, entropy’s perfect disorder if you will. 
Although a symbol contains some information (i.e. its signalling property) its 
meaning is discovered, a process which reflects a large part of uncertainty (i.e. 
chance encounters). In the context of evolution, Damasio (2004) argued that the 
discovery of new things by chance is required before selection can take place. We 
can thus state that a symbol is a signal enriched by noise, in the sense that the 
                                           
106 To be clear, following my arguments for why complex psychology can justifiably be linked to 
complexity theory, I use Atmanspacher and Primas as a reference because they make the link between 
Jung/Pauli’s complementarity and the Boolean type. I simply suggest that the True/False logic of the 
Liar’s Paradox is a limited case. 
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informational tendency, as in ‘probability’, reflexively emerges from indeterminate 
randomness. Nietzsche famously remarked that certainty is what drives one insane. 
Translated in terms of the requirement as a complex adaptive system, the healthy 
mind has to strategically use, almost embrace, indeterminacy to ‘surprise’ itself (i.e. 
with intuitive insights) in order to surprise (hostile) others. In short, inner surprises 
as a quid pro quo to outer surprises. 
Second, although a symbol cannot be fully reduced to a signal we could view the 
signal as the format with which the symbol is realised physically. Specifically, the 
physical properties of the symbol include the bio-electric signal which accompanies 
its emergence in consciousness. This also involves the physical route in terms of 
neural circuitry along which the symbol’s emotional charge will build. I believe this 
‘road-map’ is equivalent to what neuroscientists call “connectivity patterns” which 
contain “latent knowledge” (Dehaene et al, 2006, p. 209). 
Consistent with Jung’s interpretation a symbol is signalling information which content 
is non-exhaustive as far as meaning is concerned because the latter continues to be 
shaped out of (the interaction with) the unknown. This process of discovery while 
the symbol is being shaped is experienced phenomenally and takes place as ‘life at 
the edge of chaos’. It signifies Jung’s “psychic probability” (1955, para. 964) of 
archetypes manifesting tendencies by way of living symbols in an otherwise chaotic, 
seemingly random, environment. This and the selection of contents “best suited to 
themselves” (CW5, para. 232) is echoed in neuroscience, here emphasising the 
complementary economic forces at play: 
The mistake made by many cognitive scientists is to view symbolic 
content as static, timeless entities that are independent of their 
origins. Symbols, like the vortices of the river, may be stable 
structures or patterns that persist for a long time, but they are not 
timeless and unchanging . . . the processes that govern how a 
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pattern is selected from myriad possibilities must be incorporated in 
any set of organizational principles for living things. These processes 
often involve cooperation and competition, and a subtle interplay 
between the two. (Kelso, 1995, pp. 1, 6) 
This setting allows us to explore the special nature of numerical archetypes, the 
topic of the next section which I would like to introduce briefly here. 
Complementarity can manifest itself at various levels. In the mind the 
complementarity between consciousness and the unconscious involves a psychic 
polarity or tension which drives the aforementioned dynamics: 
Thus there emerges a tension of opposites between the One and the 
Other. But every tension of opposites culminates in a release, out of 
which comes the “third”. In the third the tension is resolved and the 
lost unity is restored. . . . There is an unfolding of the One to a 
condition where it can be known―unity becomes recognizable had it 
not been resolved into the polarity of the One and the Other, it 
would have remained fixed in a condition devoid of every quality. 
(Jung, 1938, para. 180; emphasis mine) 
The polarity of consciousness as the “Other” (or “Two”) opposite from the 
unconscious source of “One” generates the novelty as the “third” which sustains the 
mind as a complex adaptive system.107 The Three uniting the One and the Two, in 
the process enriching the former with quality, leads me to my “strange loop” (e.g. 
Hofstadter, 2007) depiction of the archetypal experience as an ‘Ouroboros chain’ of 
three sections108: 
1. Unconscious origin (archetype) 
2. Cognitive embodiment (functional behaviour, e.g. instincts109) 
3. Phenomenal culmination (quale)110 
                                           
107 To be complete: the zero stands for the unus mundus according to my interpretation. 
108 I basically equate the phenomenal (e.g. A-ha) sensation as the culmination of the tension between the 
unconscious and the cognitive. The dynamics between these three “mentalities” is a continuous self-
reflexive (i.e. discovery) process, akin to an Ouroboric loop, that sustains the mind as a CAS. Still, I 
acknowledge that some readers may find this attempt to literalize the first three stages of the 
Axiom of Maria farfetched, or even questionable. 
109 “What we properly call instincts are physiological urges, and are perceived by the senses.” (Jung, 
1955, p. 58). 
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The fringes of an archetypal experience both remain outside (as in “escape”) 
the cognitive domain but meet, like the head and tail of the Ouroboros, in the 
non-computable ‘discovery’ space of meaning.111 
These primordial integers and the dynamics they raise involve numerical principles, 
hinting at the crucial role of numerical archetypes. Pauli (in Card and Morariu, 1998, 
p. A74) recognised the importance of number intuition as part of “a more general 
concept of archetype”: 
it should be understood in such a way that included within it is the 
mathematical primal intuition which expresses itself, among other 
ways, in arithmetic, in the idea of the infinite series of integers, and 
in geometry, in the idea of the continuum. 
It is abundantly clear that Jung thought of numbers as the irreducible symbols of the 
most primordial of archetypes which offer an interface between the unconscious and 
consciousness: 
[If] a group of objects is deprived of every one of its properties or 
characteristics, there still remains, at the end, its number, which 
seems to indicate that number is something irreducible (CW8, para. 
870; emphasis mine). 
Shortly before his death Jung handed the limited writings he had collected to von 
Franz with the suggestion to do more research. From her analyses, as well as those 
by Atmanspacher, Card, Pauli, Robertson, and others we can conclude:  
number is an archetype of order that is in the process of becoming 
conscious. It is the most primitive manifestation or the most 
“seminal” of all manifestations of archetypes or archetypal 
processes. (Von Franz, 1992, p. 37; emphasis mine) 
                                                                                                                             
110 The condition where the archetype becomes known to the extent of its image. Implicit in this 
interpretation is that the archetype “devoid of any quality” remains in the null state, or zero. That is 
to say unknown, not even unconscious. 
111 Arguably, apart from first person qualia the property of consciousness as a shared experience, i.e. 
second person intersubjectivity, also escapes reductionism. See elsewhere in this thesis. 
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In the following section I show that the primacy of numerical archetypes has now 
received substantive neuroscientific support. 
5.3 NUMERICAL ARCHETYPES: AN EARLY NUMBER SENSE 
 
Numerical archetypes are archetypes which symbolise via numbers, e.g. the natural 
integers. They are the prime archetypes because they enumerate, both cardinals 
and ordinals, thereby providing values required for selection, the main dynamic of 
evolution. Applied to the mind, and in terms of archetypal dynamics, numerical 
archetypes facilitate the selection by archetypes of “those contents which are best 
suited to themselves”. In general, numerical archetypes enable the numerical 
operations required for all archetypal dynamics, typical examples being 
differentiation and integration, while bridging the mental with the physical. 
I thus use the plural “numerical archetypes” not because each number requires an 
archetype, but because the numerical operations (e.g. biomolecular computation) 
mandated via archetypes involve multiple numerical archetypes. Their interaction, 
more than the interaction among any other archetypes, underlies the complexity of 
archetypal dynamics. It is striking how this is echoed by modern insights: “In 
nature’s pattern-forming systems, contents aren’t contained anywhere but are only 
revealed by the dynamics. Form and content are thus inextricably connected and 
can’t ever be separated.” (Kelso, 1995, p. 1). 
In that light, numerical archetypes can be viewed as mandates to exchange values 
with, and thus influence, the emerging archetypal situation. Specifically, these 
include the coordinates for archetypal images to emerge in consciousness, i.e. in 
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space time. Numerical archetypes perform the autonomous valuation of, i.e. attach a 
number to, our material state (e.g. wealth) as it relates to our mental state (e.g. 
wellbeing). To make my point in terms of finance I will regularly paraphrase Von 
Franz: “The question is not what we do with prices, but what they do with us.” 
In the dynamics between order and chaos, she further observes (1992, p. 36) that 
“The primary means for ordering something in the chaotic multiplicity of appearance 
is therefore number.” Numerical archetypes reveal, in the most objective shared 
sense of their symbolism (i.e. Jung’s “just-so-ness” of numbers), the hidden order 
underlying chaos. This “sense” in terms of meaning was expressed by von Franz as 
follows: “man possesses an unconscious ‘numerical sense’” (see full quote below). 
This description is remarkably similar to “number sense”, a well-researched 
hypothesis within mathematical cognition which focuses on how the brain gives rise 
to mathematics.112 Neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene, one of its leading experts, 
states that number sense “provides animals and humans alike with a direct intuition 
of what numbers mean” (1997, p.5). Based on a growing amount of convincing proof 
(Dehaene, 1997; Butterworth, 1999; Brannon, 2005; Gilmore et al., 2007; De Cruz, 
2008; and the numerous references therein) there is a broad consensus on this 
ability. Moreover, Sklar et al. (2012), in a series of experiments, reported that 
effortful arithmetic equations can be solved unconsciously. To state the obvious: 
these findings are highly relevant for investing, as a discipline dealing with numbers. 
They also confirm earlier reflections not only by Jung, Pauli, and von Franz, but also 
by Danzig, Hadamard, Husserl, and others: 
Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illumination, a 
manifest sign of . . . unconscious prior work. The role of this 
                                           
112 It’s a term originally popularised by Danzig (1930). However, I do not follow his strict separation 
between number sense and counting and other higher mathematical functions.  
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unconscious work in mathematical invention appears to me 
uncontestable. (Poincaré, n.d.) 
Therefore, the following conclusion seems valid: numerical archetypes are an early 
version of number sense.113 
It is important to make a distinction between numerical archetypes and the other 
archetypes. This applies, among others, to the question whether archetypes are 
innate or emerging ‘modules’ as well as to the (related) question whether archetypes 
are domain-specific or domain-general.114 Based on the aforementioned references 
we must conclude that numerical archetypes are innate and domain specific. In a 
summary Dehaene (2001) provides four lines of evidence suggesting that number 
sense constitutes a domain-specific, biologically determined ability: 
1. The presence of evolutionary precursors of arithmetic in animals (p. 4): “. . . 
evolutionary pressures must have led to the internalization of numerical 
representations in the brain of various animal species.”115  
2. The early emergence of arithmetic competence in infants independently of 
other abilities, including language (p. 5): “ . . . elementary numerical abilities 
that can be demonstrated in animals are almost strictly identical to those that 
have been found in preverbal infants in the first year of life.” 
3. The existence of a homology between the animal, infant, and human adult 
abilities to process numbers (p. 6): “. . . two striking shared characteristics of 
                                           
113 The aforementioned sources provide convincing evidence, arguments, and examples to draw this 
conclusion and I refer to their work for more details. They also provide many additional topics of 
interest, for example the subitisation limit of 4 which offers a fascinating link to Jung’s reflections on 
the quaternio. 
114 See, for example, Goodwyn (2010) and the responses to him by Knox, Merchant, and Hogenson 
(2010). 
115 This fulfils the evolutionary continuity requirement, stated for example by Panksepp and Panksepp 
(2000) in their critique of evolutionary psychology. 
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number processing in humans and animals have been identified: the distance 
and the size effect.” 
4. The existence of a dedicated cerebral substrate via a specialised circuit in the 
inferior parietal lobe (p. 8): “. . . two arguments support the hypothesis that 
the intraparietal cortex of both hemispheres participates in such a circuit. 
First, neuropsychological studies of human patients with brain lesions indicate 
that the internal representation of quantities can be selectively impaired by 
lesions to that area. Second, brain-imaging studies reveal that this region is 
specifically activated during various number processing tasks. . . . The above 
discussion should not be construed as a modern defence of phrenology . . . 
Multiple brain areas contribute to the cerebral processing of numbers.”  
Finally, the following conclusion by Dehaene is particularly relevant for numerical 
archetypes (i.e. “weighing”), respectively for complexity theory in general and 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in particular (i.e. “elementary” vs. “derived 
properties”): 
If one had to look for a “primitive” function in the nervous system, it 
would perhaps be the ability of a nerve cell to recognize an 
elementary “shape” in its inputs by weighing the neural discharges it 
receives from thousands of other units. The recognition of 
approximate shapes is an elementary and immediate property of the 
brain, while logic and calculation are derived properties, accessible 
only to the brain of a single, suitably educated species of primate. 
(1997, p. 234; emphasis mine). 
What these modern insights show is that, more than anything, Jung’s conclusion that 
the numerical archetypes form the prime archetypes is of seminal importance. 
Unfortunately Jung was not allowed more time to expand on his preliminary 
reflections on numbers so a lot of lifting remains to be done. And although von Franz 
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provided more detailed explorations into the psychic nature of numbers she 
remained with one crucial empirical issue: 
If we apply these reflections of Jung to number, this would mean 
that number is bound up with the latent material aspect of the 
psyche and with the latent psychic aspect of matter. Up to the 
present time, however, no means of measuring psychic intensities 
numerically has been envisaged, although I believe such a 
possibility exists because of the fact . . . that all emotional, and 
therefore energy-laden, psychic processes evince a striking 
tendency to become rhythmical. (Von Franz, 1974, p. 157; 
emphasis mine) 
With this thesis I argue that her search is over, a summarised version of which will 
follow in the next section (5.4).  
Equating numerical archetypes to number sense helps to answer other questions as 
well. What makes the archetypal images emerge in consciousness in a meaningful 
way, that is to say a constellation leading to myth formation, dream images, 
mandala drawings, and other narratives of the unconscious? Why this image, and 
why not another? In that respect, we can ask what ability facilitates the selection by 
archetypes of the aforementioned “best suited” contents, the assessment of their 
space-time location within the archetypal situation, the estimates of Jung’s psychic 
“probabilities” and their ranking, etc.?  
At this point allow me to take a brief philosophical detour, guided by contemporary 
philosophers like David Chalmers (e.g. 1996), John Searle (e.g. 1997) and Jaegwon 
Kim (e.g. 2005). In the context of the cognitive domain and causality, to what 
extent can an archetype’s ability to symbolise be functionalised? If we exclude the 
end points of the archetypal experience, the midsection of its chain is the cognitive 
domain which consists of functional links to behaviour. Mental properties and 
processes like belief, perception and memory have been (or in principle can be) 
linked to behaviour in a causal way. For example, the expression of this midsection 
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is in observable instinctive responses. This is crucial because it allows us to search 
for the underlying biophysical mechanisms for this section. In other words, is there a 
mechanism as part of numerical archetypes which is causally responsible for 
transmitting numbers? In philosophical terms, can we identify “realisers” of 
numerical archetypes? According to Dehaene and others there is convincing evidence 
that the inferior parietal lobe in the brain is the main physical realiser of number 
sense and by my extension the numerical archetypes. Thus in that sense the 
numerical archetypes can be physically reduced. However, the end points of the 
archetypal experience of numbers, namely the unconscious origin as well as the 
phenomenal culmination, resist this reduction if only because they have to in order 
for the experience to achieve its adaptive impact. In the Gödel-Turing framework the 
mind computes but not all of its understanding is computable. To the extent that the 
mind computes, its computational algorithms involve mathematics. Like all of 
mathematics, its ultimate foundations (Dehaene, 2001, p.2) “rest on core 
representations that have been internalised in our brains through evolution.” Where 
the mind exceeds computation, that is to say where the mechanical operations do 
not exhaust the understanding of meaning, is in our intuitions of numbers which 
order, among others, those very operations. As Gödel stated: “the solution to certain 
arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending 
arithmetic” (1964, p. 121). Referring to Skolem and Peano’s first-order arithmetic, 
Dehaene (1997, p.240-241) argues that “our best system of axioms fails to capture, 
in a unique way, our intuitions of what numbers are . . . Hence, our brain does not 
rely on axioms.” In short, to innovatively deal with surprises the unconscious and 
phenomenal properties of intuition need to escape reduction into an axiomatic 
system. Like its environment, the mind needs to conceal its surprise element in 
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order not to become predictable. I will repeat this message later as applied to price 
discovery. 
Back from our detour, numerical archetypes facilitate broader archetypal dynamics 
which eventually lead to an ‘ordered’ (or balanced) mind in healthy human beings. 
For example, the transcendent function which Jung used to “identify the process by 
which conscious and unconscious attitudes are compared and integrated” (Knox, 
2004, p. 11) implicitly requires numerical attachments to its operation. To be 
precise, if the transcendent function involves “appraisal and comparison” (ibid) this 
suggests it is a process which is in essence numerical: making a distinction within a 
(limited) set which, in turn, implies counting (e.g. up to two in case of a distinction 
between 1 unconscious and 1 conscious attitude). I would go as far as to suggest 
that it requires benchmarks, triggers, and similar numerical parameters for its 
broader operation, e.g. to keep track of its progress. Another example is the 
realisation of the ego or self-image which includes receiving its coordinates in space-
time, e.g. “Where am I located within the larger whole?” Without repeating other 
philosophical (e.g. Kantian) issues involved in this, it is reasonable to assume that 
we intuit those coordinates for the benefit of our own coordination and that they, 
conceptualised in consciousness, consists of numerical values. Even at the level of 
micro-organisms such awareness involves counting: 
Processing in a bacterium may be thought of as a sort of molecular 
polling: . . . the positive “votes” cast by receptors in response, say, 
to increasing concentrations of a sugar are matched against the 
negative votes produced by increasing concentrations of noxious 
compounds. On the basis of this continuous voting process, the 
bacterium “knows” whether the environment, on the whole, is 
getting better or worse. The results of this analysis appear to be 
communicated by electrical signals to the response centers. (Keeton 
and Gould, 1986, p. 452). 
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Whatever the exact type of “analysis” that leads to the bacterium’s “knowing”, it is 
clear that some rudimentary, non-conceptual form of counting is involved to “cast 
votes”. In other words distinction, appearing at a time when consciousness “did not 
think, but only perceived” (Jung, CW9i, para. 69), leads to counting, the most basic 
numerical operation.116 Elsewhere von Franz links this to the final elementary level of 
quantum physics using the aforementioned “numerical sense”: 
Physicists nowadays sometimes speak of a “protoconsciousness” in 
inorganic matter. I would propose saying that this 
protoconsciousness consists in “knowledge how to count” . . . man 
possesses an unconscious “numerical sense,” and this is probably 
the sense that subatomic particles possess. (1992, p. 256) 
Like many physicists, Pauli was fascinated by the fine structure constant (see Miller, 
2009). Its value (1/137) does not appear to be caused or determined by any (other) 
law of nature. In fact, together with the electron to proton ratio it influences the 
causal powers of all atomic and molecular bodies. It is striking that both are, again, 
ratios. Moreover, on the one hand there are causal processes in the actual world that 
involve these numbers while, on the other hand, there are possible other worlds 
where the causal processes are different because of variation in the values of these 
numbers (Seager, 2014, p. 167). 
In the final analysis numbers, employing Leibnizian terminology, refute the principle 
of sufficient reason because there is no reason (or cause) for their values simpler 
than themselves. This quality confirms the crucial irreducible role of numerical 
archetypes as suspected by Jung. Beginning with intuitive insights, numbers form 
the skeleton of discovered symbols and patterns. As the most basic quality of 
everything, there thus has to be an archetypal underpinning for number. In terms of 
mental efficacy, numerical archetypes, symbolised as numbers: 
                                           
116 See also Robertson (2000). 
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possess a dynamic, active aspect which is especially important to 
keep in mind. It is not what we can do with numbers but what they 
do to our consciousness that is essential (von Franz, 1974, p. 33). 
This ‘luminosity of numerosity’ has also received support by Burr and Ross (2008, p. 
426) who extend the concept of qualia to numbers. 
5.4 PRICE DISCOVERY: NUMERICAL ARCHETYPES IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
 
As suggested by von Franz (1992, p. 57), “Perhaps I should complete this [chapter], 
which has been mainly formulated with the thinking function, with a hint as to what 
this could mean from the standpoint of the feeling experience.” It acts as a taster for 
chapter 8.  
I am not a Jungian (thank God, Jung would say) but an investor (he did suggest to 
visit “Stock Exchanges”). My research is therefore not based on therapy sessions but 
rather on my experience in and with capital markets. Emotions and other 
psychological phenomena have not been revealed to me by patients lying on a couch 
but by my own and others’ participation in markets when we collectively respond 
reflexively to prices. So allow me to express, to paraphrase von Franz, what prices 
do to our consciousness. 
The archetypal experience of investors is called price discovery. It is archetypal 
because it involves today’s survival in the economic jungle while being confronted by 
(the uncertainty of) the unknown, among others triggering instinctive responses. 
Specifically, the numerical archetypes, far from being obscure, play a central role in 
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ordering the financial system which, whether we like it or not, is at the heart of 
modern society. 
From its barter and credit origins, trading is exemplary for human exchanges. A 
trade is the exchange of a number of units of one item for a number of units of 
another item. That ratio is the price and reflects the numerical archetypal essence in 
trading, including the embedded tension from the oppositional forces of supply and 
demand. The archetypal dynamics reach higher levels as prices are compared among 
each other as part of the discovery process. As a reminder, a trade occurs in the 
physical domain (assuming at least one item is a good) as well as the mental domain 
(an agreement on relative worth). Usually, one of the items is money (sometimes 
credit) which facilitates trade more efficiently than barter. (In section 8.2 I will 
discuss ratio from a different but related angle). 
Price discovery is an Ouroboric loop originating in numerical archetypes and 
culminating in price qualia. I argue that capital markets provide von Franz’s “means 
of measuring psychic intensities” at a collective level and that price discovery is 
Pauli’s “symbolic, psychophysical unitary language” spoken at a massive global 
scale. Among others, as symbols prices capture the duality between rational and 
emotional expectations, each providing (often conflicting) utilities. Ultimately prices 
and their patterns117 are the market’s symbolic reflection of constellations of 
numerical archetypes as they bridge the collective investor psyche with the physical 
real economy. They often anticipate (i.e. discount) outer events in the real economy 
which, via confabulation, receive their “bullish” or “bearish” meaning in fundamental 
                                           
117 Among these are so-called technical patterns which have repeated themselves over the history of 
capital markets. They have names like “head and shoulders”, “island reversal”, and “saucer 




    
 
terms118. Although causality in this composite CAS remains elusive, its dynamics can 
lead to the build-up and shattering of investment myths which has been clearly 
shown in the many bubbles and crashes over the past centuries (e.g. Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2011). 
Crucially, numerical archetypes and price qualia both escape scientific description. 
So, in the final analysis I cannot convey to you, the reader, the combined primal 
awe and phenomenal intimacy of experiencing the market as it makes up its mind, 
sometimes violently so: 
I don’t know how to explain it. It’s so wild. If a guy sees it who’s not 
in it, all he could say is, “They should be locked up!” It’s so violent 
when it takes off. It’s violent, the power of the market . . . when it 
starts moving. . . . You’ve got to be in it all the time to know where 
the market is, you’ve got to have a position. (Hassoun, 2005, p. 
107-108; emphasis mine) 
In broader terms, mesmerised by prices the market’s participation mystique is 
expressed in the following words of another anonymous trader: 
You are part of the market, you notice every small shift, you notice 
when the market becomes insecure, you notice when it becomes 
nervous, you notice the strong demand . . . All this (amounts to) a 
feeling . . . When someone feels the market, then they can 
anticipate (it) and can act accordingly. (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 
2000, p. 153; emphasis mine) 
With price discovery ordering the market’s mind, the individual trader’s search for 
‘peace of mind’ is a search for ‘true value’ while engaging the collective market 
psyche. At that level, price discovery is most powerful when it is experienced as an 
intuitive insight, in the immediate moment of a trade ‘aligned with the market’, while 
often going against the crowd. There are suggestions that there may be a way to 
                                           
118 In case the reader has not recognised these already, examples of opposing forces in the market’s mind 




    
 
more directly tune in to this collective consciousness in order to understand the 
symbolic meaning of prices: 
Every market has a rhythm, and our job as traders is to get in sync 
with that rhythm. I’m not really trading when I’m doing those 
trades. There’s trading being done, but I’m not doing it. . . . There’s 
buying and selling going on, but it’s just going through me. It’s like 
my personality and ego are not there. I don’t even get a sense of 
satisfaction on these trades. It’s absolutely that objective . . . There 
is no sense of self at all. There is just an awareness of what will 
happen. The trick is to differentiate between what you want to 
happen and what you know will happen. The intuition knows what 
will happen. In trading . . . whenever there is effort, force, straining, 
struggling, or trying, it’s wrong. You’re out of sync; you’re out of 
harmony with the markets. (Schwager, 1992, p. 412) 
The quality of the experience of such price dynamics extends to its duration, 
something others have called intrinsic time: 
Researchers have traditionally analyzed the responses of traders in 
physical time . . . Such an approach does not adequately reflect the 
subjective experience of time . . . [Instead] intrinsic time weights 
chronological flow according to price action: during highly volatile 
periods time is expanded; during quiet periods, when market 
volatility is low, time is compressed. (Olson, 2004, p. 4) 
It is in that “flow” state that calendar time ceases to exist, as does the separation 
between the trader and the market, a separation of observer and the observed. In 
that moment, the individual trader identifies himself with the market, which most 
traders view as a “greater being” (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2000, p. 149). Other 
comments indicate that being in tune with the market brings clarity and focus. In 
other words, the market is ‘like’ an entity which is doing something to the individual 
who is engaging it. When describing the more painful experiences with the market 
the terms used are quite Freudian: “I got shafted, I got bent over, I got blown up, . . 
. I got stuffed . . . I got hammered, I got killed.” (ibid, p. 156). Similar findings have 
been reported by others (e.g. Zaloom, 2006). 
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When Jung talks about the mind as an ordering faculty to bridge the physical and 
mental worlds, he echoes the words of Hayek (1952, p. 46), one of the few 
economists who reflected on the mind’s workings. With fractal scaling in mind, so 
abundantly observable in nature, it is no coincidence that the collective market mind 
has evolved to become the ordering faculty for the global economy, allocating its 
resources. The market’s states of mind, intersubjectively experienced via prices by 
investors, are often elevated to “hyperexcited states” (von Franz, 1992, p. 27). This 
can be extended to portfolio management, e.g. the risk of obsessed single-
mindedness is comparable to the risk in a concentrated portfolio containing a one-
sided bet (see also chapter 9). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the Gödel-Turing framework and from a Platonic viewpoint Penrose argues 
that the human ability to understand is achieved by some non-computational activity 
(1995, p. 48). 
That activity, I argue, is the discovery of meaning grounded in number intuition of 
which the numerical archetypes are the unconscious source. Numerical archetypes 
are the origin for ordering archetypal dynamics involved in the archetypal 
experience. If patterns, like archetypal images, are ordered themselves they can in 
principle “be grasped by a numerical procedure” (von Franz, 1992, p. 47) which, in 
turn, can be “stored as some sort of numeric algorithm” (Robertson, 1992, p.49). At 
their core, “deprived of every one of its properties or characteristics”, what remains 
is their numerical profile, their constellation according to numerical archetypes, 
which has no reason, nor meaning, simpler than itself. Numbers are implied in 
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understanding the archetypal experience. Intuitive meaning makes discovery a 
seeking rather than a finding process. Every now and then we make quantum leaps 
but often the Red Queen prevails! 
Now that the groundwork has been prepared and the foundation has been laid the 




    
 
CHAPTER 6. HYPOTHESIS 
 
But notwithstanding the advance in physiological knowledge, we do not know more about 
the mind-body problem than the old philosophers who first began to ponder it . . . 
Thoughts and ideas are not phantoms. They are real things. Although intangible and 
immaterial, they are factors in bringing about changes in the realm of tangible and 
material things. 
Ludwig von Mises 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters I indicated how recent events in the capital markets add to 
the pressure to redefine the paradigm of finance. I also explained archetypes and 
the collective unconscious as the main concepts of complex psychology, as well as 
the primacy of numerical archetypes. Finally, I discussed the phenomenon of 
consciousness, both at the individual as well as the collective level. This was all in 
preparation to the formulation of my (working) hypothesis, called the Archetypal 
Market Hypothesis (AMH), which is the topic of this chapter.119 
AMH views the market as an animated entity, closer to being an organism than a 
machine. In that respect, the link between biology and economics is strong.120  This 
was recognised by the biologist Stephen Jay Gould, for example, when he argued 
that Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection “is, in essence, Adam Smith’s 
economics transferred to nature . . . Reproductive success becomes the analogue to 
profit” (2002, p. 122). John Maynard Keynes argued that “the economic problem, 
the struggle of subsistence, always has been the most pressing problem . . . not only 
of the human race, but of the whole of the biological kingdom from the beginnings of 
                                           
119 Elements of this chapter were previously published in Schotanus (2014) and Schotanus (submitted). 
120 There are numerous interpretations of (the links between) economics and evolution. For example, for 
markets as ecosystem, see Lo (2004). For the implications of evolution as computation, see 
Beinhocker (2011). For a Darwinian view on economics, see Hodgson (2002). Last but not least, for 
an example of economic evolution focussing on the human mind, see Loasby (2005). 
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life in its most primitive forms” (1930, p. 361). Competition and cooperation are 
opposing phenomena that feature prominently in economics and are applicable to 
evolution. Survival by the human species, in its search for limited resources, 
benefitted from individual competition encoded in the post-Darwinian “selfish” gene 
(e.g. Dawkins, 2006) as well as from collective cooperation. The latter is not only 
embedded in norms and morals of groups (e.g. Shermer, 2009) but also 
institutionalised in functions (e.g. Searle, 2005). Shermer also argues that human 
exchange via trade preceded political alliances. It is an integral component to 
establishing trust between strangers that lessens the potential volatility that 
naturally exists whenever groups come into contact with one another, especially 
over the allocation of scares resources. As aforementioned, this is particularly the 
case considering that credit, which is only extended if one trusts those who promise 
to pay later, formed part of those earliest trades. From a neuroscientific perspective, 
Kelso (1995) focuses on how competition and cooperation coordinate human 
behaviour. For example, it involves compromises between competing and 
cooperating interests. Johnson (2014) points to the overemphasis in economics of 
competition and argues that reciprocity is a foundation of financial economics. 
Within this evolutionary biological setting, AMH takes a mind-body perspective of 
markets, in particular the postulate of the market’s mind which is the implicit 
premise in any discussion on whether the market is rational or not. Still, its 
implications, in terms of ontology and epistemology, are hardly understood. In 
particular, this chapter defines the market’s version of the mind-body problem and 
labels it as finance’s “hard” problem. Addressing this problem is one of the key 
messages of this thesis. Its denial by modern finance causes this dominant paradigm 
to fail in dealing with reality in general and to produce incomplete investment 
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knowledge in particular. Finally, as part of facing up to this problem, this chapter 
offers a glimpse at a practical approach which may enrich investment research, 
leading up to a proposal for an experiment in chapter 10. 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
Triggered by the recent financial crisis, questions have been asked about the 
underlying theoretical framework or paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), with which we analyse 
economies and capital markets. In light of the systemic characteristics of this crisis, 
which go beyond anomalies, one could argue like Greenspan (2008) that “tweaking 
the models” will not do. In fact, what may be required is revisiting the assumptions 
underlying finance in terms of the implicit ontological and epistemological claims. 
Therefore, in the spirit of Benjamin Graham, I am left to ask “What about the mind 
of Mr Market?” Specifically, I discuss in this chapter the proposition that the market 
manifests a (collective) mind which echoes, for example, Smith (1981), Soros 
(1987; subtitle), Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2000, p. 150), Sornette (2003, p. 
241), and Shermer (2009; p. xiii). This philosophical approach is less fanciful than it 
might seem. Apart from these references it is implied in any discussion on whether 
the market is rational or not (e.g. Rubinstein, 2001), let alone whether Mr Market 
suffers from bipolar disorder (Cheung, 2010). However, there are consequences of 
accepting this as a premise that are often neglected. One beneficial consequence is 
that one avoids the ontological trap of stating that the market is ‘something 
altogether different in nature’. Other consequences, on the other hand, seriously 
question certain investment practices, particularly those that are aimed at repressing 
market induced psychology. Should the market’s fear itself be feared? Do we really 
gain a better understanding of the market’s emotions if we repress our own, for 
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example by outsourcing investment decisions to algorithms? The mind sciences have 
made clear that emotions and other sensations are crucial for our capability to relate 
to ‘other minds’. We can use those insights to focus on the epistemological issues 
facing finance in understanding the market’s mind. Specifically, are existing 
investment analysis methods121 properly suited to study the recurring and often 
contagious market sensations which vary from despair to exuberance? In short, is it 
worth it to put all our resources in gaining analytical investment knowledge at the 
expense of experiential investment knowledge?  
These are the main questions I will address. Among other conclusions, I argue that 
modern finance denies the market’s mind-body or “hard” problem122. This problem is 
particularly difficult for finance because it concerns both theoretical as well as 
practical challenges. The former relate to thorny philosophical issues involved in 
considering the market as a mind, in particular comprehending the intersubjective 
experience which completes its state. Ignoring the experiential dimension of price 
discovery, varying from the individual pain of a loss to the shared sense of panic, is 
the primary cause for the shortcomings of modern finance and, by extension, its 
practicing followers. This leads to the practical challenge of having to use 
unconventional research methods to explore this dimension and uncover its 
patterns. 
The purpose of this chapter is primarily to highlight and explain this problem rather 
than offer an immediate solution. Although paying attention to ‘mind matters’ cannot 
itself offer solutions, it can help define the proper domain of empirical finance. As 
aforementioned, in chapter 10 I will suggest a framework for a proposed experiment 
                                           
121 Regardless of whether they are fundamental, technical or quantitative. 
122 See chapter 4: it is also known as the mind-matter or mind-brain problem, as well as the problem of 
consciousness. The term “hard” problem originates with Chalmers (1995). 
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to test a so-called human perceptual tool. This software is in development and could 
complement existing analytical investment tools. The aim is to enrich investment 
research in the sense of extracting more meaning from market data as 
communicated by Mr Market. 
In the next section I will explain how theories transform and discuss market 
causality, leading up to the proposition of the market as a mind. It is followed by a 
short section introducing a simple framework to think about its body as well. From 
this I state finance’s hard problem. I conclude this chapter with some closing 
remarks. 
6.3 FROM ANOMALIES VIA REALITY CHECKS TO MARKET 
CAUSALITY 
It is generally acknowledged that both economics and finance have been inspired by 
the natural sciences, in particular physics.123 That inspiration has been criticised by 
many, including Hayek (1974) and Soros (2010) who perceived it as bordering on 
the obsessive. Echoing Soros, Lo and Mueller (2010) have also argued that modern 
finance suffers from “physics envy”. As aforementioned, I call it a ‘physics complex’. 
I will point to certain complications involved in this disorder by placing modern 
finance in the broader context of the mind sciences. These have undergone their 
own transformation which, at the very least, nuances pure physicalism.  
Coming back to reality checks (see section 2.3), these have an experiential impact 
similar, for example, to that which quantum effects had on Einstein. In light of 
                                           
123 Preda (2005, p. 152) argues that already from the 1850s “. . . Engineers transfer the vocabulary of 
physics to the valuation of railway securities. They require observation and analysis in this process. 
Sheer luck or emotions are seen as irrelevant.” 
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recent events why does this sound so familiar to investors, particularly those relying 
on modern finance for explanations? I would argue that the turmoil in the capital 
markets surrounding the Lehman collapse in 2008 qualifies for such a reality check 
in finance.124  
More than anomalies these events reveal the true vulnerability of current thinking in 
finance. Despite accepting the relevance of rationality, emotions, heuristics, and 
even animal spirits, it fails to address the existential questions raised by the mind 
sciences, particularly regarding consciousness in which these psychological dynamics 
are embedded. Specifically, with its roots in physicalism modern finance has its own 
form of objectivism: the assumption that price discovery and the creative act of 
trading can be separated from the actual markets, i.e. equilibrium is an independent 
mechanical process operating in the steady state of rationality. Arguably 
separateness continues to linger and is, to some extent, appropriate for the natural 
sciences125 but it simply is not applicable to understanding markets because the 
physical market, e.g. the ‘real’ economy, is intricately linked with the psychology of 
the collective. 
This touches upon one of the main topics in the mind sciences, namely mental 
causation.126 As aforementioned, it simultaneously places a finger on one of the raw 
nerves of finance. Research attempts to identify fundamental causes for mental 
reactions as reflected in price moves in capital markets. But such macro and 
microeconomic fundamentals do not convince as the explanatory source for the 
market’s driving forces. Indeterminacy is always lurking around the corners of the 
financial system. It becomes problematic, for example, if models start to shape the 
                                           
124 See also my article “Lehman’s Lesson”. 
125 Along the lines of “The laws of nature do not depend on human knowledge and behavior.” 
126 Also known as downward causation of consciousness, e.g. Sperry (1965), Popper (1953).  
159 
 
    
 
objects they are supposed to only describe objectively, something economic 
sociology calls performativity.127 
These difficulties lay bare the epistemological, if not ontological, issues involved in 
markets. They demand of finance a premise which, at the very least, reflects an 
acknowledgement of these issues. Perhaps surprisingly, such a premise already 
implicitly exists. 
6.4 THE MARKET’S MIND: A COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
It is perhaps fruitful to find common ground from which to grow new thinking in 
finance. Despite their differences, the main academic factions studying finance128 all 
seem to agree on one thing: capital markets form a complex composite of a large 
number of interacting human minds whose mentality is ultimately reflected in prices 
and their patterns. In terms of thinking, for example, I specifically do not want to 
discuss at this stage whether this is rational or not. Neither do I wish to make the 
distinction between discretionary thinking, expressed in manual buy or sell orders, 
and mechanical thinking, expressed in coded orders via computer algorithms. 
Instead, what is crucial for now is that this agreement ultimately leads to the 
following main proposition:  
CAPITAL MARKETS MANIFEST COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
                                           
127 From the angle of complexity economics, Arthur et al. (1997, p.20) express it as follows: “the 
expectational models investors choose affect the price sequence, so that . . . their . . . very choice 
of models affect their data and so their choices of model.” 
128 Apart from modern finance and behavioural finance we can include, in particular, neuroeconomics, 
econophysics and economic sociology. 
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I call this collective consciousness the ‘market’s mind’, a familiar term used by 
investors.  
Let me specify further the sub-assumptions underlying this statement 
 The investor’s mind is a complex adaptive system at the microscopic level 
(e.g. Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Kelso, 1995; Morowitz and Singer, 1995). It 
results from the interaction of its bodily neural components, primarily the 
physical brain, while simultaneously interacting with its environment, in 
particular other minds in the market. 
 The investor’s mind exists and is experienced as real at the individual level. 
Specifically, the interiority of the investor’s mind, i.e. the subjective 
experience of consciousness, is arguably the most unique among its emerging 
properties. For the individual investor this experience is not an illusion but a 
phenomenal fact with distinct intrinsic quality: it really feels something to 
participate and be invested in the markets. By taking an investment position 
(i.e. long, short, or flat) an investor puts his ‘skin in the game’ and the 
outcome of such a trade matters to him. In the spirit of both James (1890) 
and Nagel (1974), the first person perspective matters because there is 
something it is like to be an investor. 
 But the investor’s mind is not isolated from its environment, in this case 
capital markets which embody millions of investors’ minds, directly or 
indirectly. Their deliberations (e.g. by discussing themes), interactions (e.g. 
by way of trading) and interconnections (e.g. via computers) create a 
composite investor mind, a complex system at the macroscopic level. This 
composite mind evaluates physical events and objects in the real economy, 
and reflexively expresses its mental responses (i.e. valuations) symbolically, 
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namely in prices129 and their patterns. Consequently, it exhibits mental states 
which are expressed via price constellations. These states capture the 
intersubjective essence of the market’s mind: by way of price dynamics they 
are experienced collectively by investors as shared sensations, with varying 
degrees of uniformity in those experiences. This adds the plural first person 
perspective, or rather the second person perspective (e.g. Hut and Shepard, 
1996; de Quincey, 2005), over and above the (singular) first person 
perspective. 
 Moreover, the regular uniformity in the responses themselves, across time 
and locations, suggests both a common primordial source, as well as a shared 
singular culture. In other words, nature and nurture complement each other 
and their influence is broadly the same for all investors. In the words of 
legendary trader Jesse Livermore: “Nowhere does history indulge in 
repetitions so often or so uniformly as in Wall Street. When you read 
contemporary accounts of booms or panics the one thing that strikes you 
most forcibly is how little either stock speculation or stock speculators today 
differ from yesterday. The game does not change and neither does human 
nature.” (Lefèvre, p. 180) 
According to this proposition then, a ‘state of the market’ ultimately includes a 
collective mentality. In particular, prices embed market states, whereby the word 
“state” should not be interpreted as static but rather as a condition that has internal 
dynamics.  Certain characteristics of a market state concern physical processes, like 
transfers, flows, and production, involving physical parts, like buildings, machines 
                                           
129 As well as other (derived) data like volume, open interest, returns, flows, etc. Still, the 80/20 rule 




    
 
and products. Others concern cognitive processes like decision-making, discounting 
and utility maximisation. Although these processes can be analysed they do not 
describe the full market state. There is something in addition: how it is like to be in 
that state for investors as (part of) a collective.  
The mind sciences make a distinction between cognitive and phenomenal properties 
of consciousness.130 Consequently, the literature distinguishes access consciousness 
from phenomenal consciousness. To put the latter in more familiar (albeit simplified) 
terms, the market’s mind also exhibits a mood, a sensation investors collectively 
experience in a qualitative sense, like despair in a market crash or exuberance in a 
bubble. Although a complete perception of the market’s state escapes them, a 
certain feeling for it seems to agree with how investors actually experience it, as 
expressed earlier by an anonymous trader, i.e. “All this amounts to a feeling”.131 
This is one level of complementarity which applies to the market; its processes are 
accompanied by an experience, a feeling shared among participating investors, 
albeit at varying degrees of uniformity. 
Following on from chapters 1 and 4, various researchers have argued (implicitly or 
explicitly) that consciousness in general has indeed a collective dimension. Plato, 
Durkheim and Nietzsche, while representing different view-points, argued for the 
collective aspect of consciousness, with Le Bon and Jung pointing to its unconscious 
origin.132 Contemporary philosophers (e.g. Hut and Shepard, 1996; Mathiesen, 
2005) have followed up with similar arguments as have neuroscientists (e.g. 
                                           
130 Synonymous terms for cognitive are psychological and intentional, whereas sensory is a synonym for 
phenomenal. 
131 Similar findings have been reported, for example, by Schwager (1995), Koppel (1996), and Zaloom 
(2006). 
132 Other sources include Martin (1920) and Freud (1921). 
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Edelman and Tononi, 2000).133 More intriguingly, other researchers in finance have 
hinted at this phenomenon in the market. According to Sornette (2003, p. 241) it 
originates: 
from the fundamental nature of human beings, including our 
gregarious behavior, our greediness, our instinctive psychology 
during panics and crowd behavior and our risk aversion. The global 
behavior of the market . . . is reminiscent of the process of the 
emergence of intelligent behavior at a macroscopic scale that 
individuals at the microscopic scale cannot perceive. This process 
has been discussed in biology . . . in connection with the emergence 
of consciousness. 
As indicated in chapter 4, where I started to build my case, I will now round it up by 
arguing more formally how markets comply with a specific set of criteria required for 
collective consciousness. Moreover, I will explain why capital markets are so unique 
in that respect. 
In order to clarify further why and to what extent capital markets manifest collective 
consciousness I like to apply the framework provided by philosopher Kay Mathiesen 
(2005). She defined three conditions that any account of collective consciousness 
needs to meet. It allows me to promote markets as a strong contender.  
1. Plurality: a collective consciousness “must be composed of a number of 
separate centres of consciousness, which are not directly accessible to each 
other” (p. 237). In the market the multiple conscious subjects consist of 
investors. At the macro level all investors together make up the market. At lower 
levels of aggregation, investors form groups (or crowds, or herds), often 
identified by colourful terms like ‘bulls’, ‘bears’, ‘hedgehogs’, and ‘sheep’. In both 
instances they do not have direct access to each other’s consciousness. In brief, 
investors form each other’s “indeterminate others” (“unbestimmte andere”; 
                                           
133 More popular sources include Rheingold (2002) and Surowiecki (2004).  
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Heidegger, 1979, pp. 261) whose conscious presence is ultimately felt via price 
dynamics.  
2. Awareness: a collective that manifests consciousness “must have collective 
awareness and genuine intentionality” (Mathiesen, 2005, p. 240). The power of 
the market’s mind is to represent an economic state of affairs. Specifically, in the 
market’s mind securities are valued. Although this is the interpretation for the 
philosophical meaning of intentionality, I also want to say something about 
intentionality in the general sense. Collectively investors have the same ultimate 
goal, namely to grow wealth. Or, to put it more bluntly, to make money, i.e. to 
trade profitably. However, since every trade has a buyer and a seller, not all will 
achieve this goal (at least not viewed on a per-trade-per-period basis). Goals or 
wishes can also differ between groups, e.g. bulls (bears) want to see the price 
going up (down). In addition, investors invest in a variety of securities within and 
across markets, as well as over time. Securities being shared objects of attention 
the extent of awareness across these can consequently differ.  Still, and 
importantly, price moves are suggestive for the growth, respectively decline in 
overall wealth as well as the overall broader intentionality of markets in terms of 
resource allocation, e.g. whether there is a preference for (e.g. the safety of) 
gold over (e.g. the industrial usage of) silver. In markets collective awareness 
and intentionality is thus reflected in prices which investors observe, both 
historically and in real time. In brief, although no individual investor is 
completely knowledgeable about the underlying drivers they are all aware of the 
(intentional) state of the market as reflected in these prices. There is also an 
implicit acknowledgement of superior knowledge at the market level as far as 
intentions for the system as a whole is concerned: “You know it’s an invisible 
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hand, the market is always right, it’s a lifeform that has being in its own right. 
You know, in a sort of Gestalt sort of way (…) it has form and meaning . . . a 
greater being.” (Knorr Cetina, 2003, p.12) 
3. Collectivity: “In order for collective consciousness to be genuinely collective, it 
must be something that persons share and that ties them together” (Mathiesen, 
2005, p. 241). Investors share the market state, its complete mentality 
(expectations, emotions, etc.), as reflected in the constellation of its prices. This 
state is a composite state, independent from the mental state of any individual 
investor, although they can correlate depending on (the holdings in) the portfolio 
of the individual investor. The uniformity of feelings is strongest in cases of 
extreme price moves. For example, in March 2009 all investors shared in the 
move towards the symbolic 666 in the S&P500 index which indicated, among 
others, a deteriorating outlook for the US economy. Although the subjective 
feelings varied across investors, again depending on how their portfolios were 
made up, the overarching mood was one of extreme worry because of the 
potential implications of a complete collapse of the financial system. In a 2013 
article, called Lehman’s Lesson, I described it as follows: “Regardless of whether 
you were a bull or a bear, we all became rabbits caught in the headlights of the 
events surrounding [Lehman’s] collapse . . . what came over us was the shared 
sensation of paralysis which accompanied the market seizing up. It was this 
overwhelming experience that impresses how it is like to collectively be in such 
an existential market state as humans.” 
Interestingly, on this last feature of collective consciousness, i.e. collectivity, 
Mathiesen refers to Edmund Husserl and wonders: 
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While Husserl does say that these social subjectivities arise out of 
the ‘intercommerce’ between the individuals, he does not describe 
exactly how the attitudes and activities of individuals mesh to form 
such personal unities. How do the separate individual subjectivities 
coalescence to produce a shared social subjectivity? (p. 243) 
In answering this question she overlooks the hint she herself gives in the quote 
above which leads us to markets: Husserl’s “intercommerce” is very appropriate 
because it consist of trading, the physical execution in an exchange.  Price discovery 
(i.e. “attitudes”) and trading (i.e. “activities”) lead to the composite expression of 
individual mentalities, the “mesh” that forms Mr. Market, the name investors give to 
Mathiesen’s “collective subject” (p. 235). Again, this phenomenon is perhaps best 
captured by repeating the words of the anonymous trader: 
You are part of the market, you notice every small shift, you notice 
when the market becomes insecure, you notice when it becomes 
nervous, you notice the strong demand . . . All this (amounts to) a 
feeling. (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2000, p. 153) 
On that note, previously I argued that the cognitive and physical processes in 
markets can be analysed but that they do not describe the full market state. There is 
something in addition, namely what it is like to be in that state for investors as (part 
of) a collective. Accordingly, a market state, over time and expressed in prices, 
reflects collectively realised information in both the physical and phenomenal sense. 
Specifically, each representative agent reflexively experiences that market state 
intersubjectively through prices. As a refresher, EMH134, for example, states that the 
prices of stocks, bonds, and other securities fully reflect all available information at 
any point in time. In investment parlance, news is almost instantly ‘discounted’ in 
prices, regardless whether it concerns economic, political, or other events. This is 
the result of rational, profit-maximising investors searching for data that informs 
                                           
134 For purists, I take its strongest form, i.e. there are weaker interpretations of EMH. For an early 
exposition, see Fama (1970). 
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their knowledge, expectations, and decisions. This is particularly important in the 
context of philosopher David Chalmers’ statement concerning the mind-body 
problem: 
We can also find information realized in our phenomenology . . . And 
when an experience realizes an information state, the same 
information state is realized in the experience’s physical substrate . . 
. We might even suggest that this double realization is the key to 
the fundamental connection between physical processes and 
conscious experience. We need some sort of construct to make the 
link, and information seems as good a construct as any. (1996, pp. 
284-286) 
So, by considering prices as informational building blocks we can be more specific in 
terms of a potential “construct”. In fact, the practical message of this chapter for 
mind sciences is that capital markets provide insights in the elusive collective 
dimension of human consciousness, backed up by large amounts of empirical data 
waiting to be further explored from this perspective. That is to say, market data has 
so far primarily been analysed by finance researchers from the perspective of the 
market as a physical system, i.e. a machine, using the natural sciences, particularly 
physics, as a template. 
Finally, there may seem to be other candidates for accounts of collective 
consciousness. Perhaps some will argue that the internet in general and social 
networks in particular form more convincing cases. However, compared to markets 
they miss a clear and objective expression of the qualities which make the “psycho”-
part complete in terms of phenomenology. Albeit in varying shades of uniformity, 
those qualities are properties of shared experiences. They should particularly convey 
a shared meaning in the context of survival of the collective subject, i.e. felt qualities 
in an existential sense. The expression should be in a format that is uniformly 
understood, ideally reflecting values which allow scaling of the shared mentality 
concerning the overall state of the collective subject, e.g. from despair to 
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exuberance. As aforementioned, such an expression should also indicate intentions, 
in particular in terms of a commitment to (as in ‘valuing’) a resource in order to 
survive under circumstances which mostly are constrained. So, whereas ‘tweets’ on 
Twitter and ‘updates’ on Facebook remain largely individual expressions of 
emotionally charged events, e.g. ‘I am afraid’, we are instead looking for a collective 
expression which genuinely captures the intersubjective intensity of a feeling, e.g. 
‘we are afraid’, by way of an objective measure. It should not be limited to a 
predefined group but potentially involve the human race while stripped of as much 
individual subjectivity as possible. I hope I have made clear that capital markets by 
way of pricing do meet these requirements which make them unique.  
So if my thesis is correct, i.e. the market is conscious, what does that tell us about it 
that we didn't already know? How far reaches the mind-body perspective, e.g. is the 
market ‘alive’? Although the market does not procreate in the biological sense, it 
does spawn the mental insights which facilitate the creations that support our own 
biological procreation. It achieves this by way of price discovery which is a creative 
process in and of itself involving a collective ‘effort’ by humans, supported by 
physical tools, which extends their individual mentality. It leads, in particular, to a 
valuation of ‘physical’ discoveries (e.g. technological breakthroughs) and resources 
that cannot be computed by individuals and a global order that cannot be organised 
via some central control. Evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides take the 
following perspective on the dynamics of complexity involved: 
There are tight causal and analytic connections between economics, 
psychology, and evolutionary biology . . . natural selection’s invisible 
hand created the structure of the human mind, and the interaction 
of these minds is what generates the invisible hand of economics . . 




    
 
The required creativity in true discovery, i.e. intuitive insights as internal surprises, 
cannot be explained in mechanical terms, e.g. from a machine perspective. This 
applies to both the technical breakthroughs in the real economy as well as the 
valuation of such utilities by the imagining capital markets, e.g. early “angel” 
investors. Moreover, and related, what sets this thesis apart is the realisation that 
the collective mentality of the market, like individual mentality, includes sensations. 
These infuse the experience of a market state in a meaningful qualitative sense and 
particularly impress the collective nature of that state, e.g. ‘the market’s mood may 
not equate to my personal mood but I am sensing it nevertheless when I have skin 
in the game’. In other words, intersubjectivity is an irreducible property of the 
market’s mind. Combined with shared unconscious drivers that are particularly 
attuned to collective settings, this makes the market’s mind more complex than the 
individual minds that compose it.  
Still, this should not prevent us from improving our understanding of the market’s 
mind. In other words, its ontological intersubjective domain can still be explored 
from an individual perspective to find an epistemological explanation. The problem, 
however, is that our capacity to appreciate the ineffable properties, which determine 
the market state in a qualitative sense, does not respond to traditional market 
research methods, i.e. investment analysis. Instead, it relies on those mental 
modules, like intuition, that are considered part of System 1. Not only is System 1 
ignored, if not demonised, by modern finance but there are also currently no 
approaches to systematically train and use these capabilities in order to achieve such 
understanding. Consequently, I am in the process to develop exactly such an 
approach, including software. As aforementioned, chapter 10 will discuss this 
empirical argument in more detail. 
170 
 




6.5 THE MARKET’S BODY  
 
Although the focus of this chapter is on the market’s mind, and at the risk that it 
may raise more questions than it answers, I would nevertheless like to address the 
matter of the market’s body briefly in this section. Earlier I mentioned the physical 
properties of a market state. The embodiment of the market, within the larger 
environment of the real economy, also includes the electronic equipment, varying 
from computers to telephones, which form the networks of information and 
communication that facilitate trade in today’s markets. And last, but not least, it 
consists of the human bodies which physically handle activities involved in trading, 
including pushing keys on a keyboard, signing contracts, etc. Combining mind and 
body, it is not a stretch to suggest that the market can be perceived like an 
animated entity. Many market participants have expressed this in various ways (e.g. 
see earlier quote in 6.4). Knorr Cetina concludes that markets are “epistemic things” 
(Knorr Cetina and Brueger, 2000, p.3) build around flow architecture with computer 
screens as the centrepieces: 
the terminals deliver much more than just windows to physically 
distant counterparties. In fact, they deliver the reality of financial 
markets―the referential whole to which “being in the market” 
refers, the ground on which (participants) step as they make their 
moves, the world which they literally share through their shared 
technologies and systems. . . . (They) visually “collect” and present 
the market to all participants . . . the screen is a building site on 
which a whole economic and epistemological world is erected. It is 
not simply a “medium” for the transmission of pre-reflexive 
interactions. (Knorr Cetina, 2003, pp.11, 13) 
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Those screens display, first and foremost, prices. Prices form the psychophysical 
building blocks of the bridge between the physical and mental domains of the 
market, which ultimately extends into the real economy. As numerical symbols they 
are discovered. Price discovery is the market’s self-organising principle enacted via 
trading. Open, transparent and undistorted price discovery is crucial to achieve the 
market’s version of “healthy homeodynamics" (Rose, 1998, p.17).135  
The following framework to think about this is derived from Capra (1996)136. It lists 
key criteria for any complex “living” system and has been adjusted by me to 
specifically apply to the markets. 
                                           
135 See also Damasio (2000). 
136 In turn, Capra was particularly inspired by Bateson, Maturana, Prigogine, and Varela. 
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1. Purpose of existence: 
the principles which lead 
to the market’s 
homeodynamics. 
Survival under conditions of scarcity, leading to uncertainty.137 
 Allocation of scarce physical resources (quantitative): survival and growth via 
evaluation and exchange of assets, etc. Transfers are facilitated monetarily. 
Uncertainty is quantified, i.e. expressed mechanically thereby aligning it with 
explicate, analytical knowledge, e.g. numerical models.  
 Allocation of scarce mental resources (qualitative): survival and growth via 
evaluation and exchange of emotions, etc. Transfers are facilitated neuronal.138 
Uncertainty is qualified, i.e. expressed symbolically thereby aligning it with 
implicate, experiential knowledge, e.g. numerical archetypes.  
Principles of portfolio management can be applied to both (see chapter 9). Prices form 
the numerical space of discovery bridging these domains, where meaning in the 
market’s mind transcends individual consciousness. 




determines the market’s 
essential characteristics. 
Organisational closure achieved through communications.  
 Interpersonal or collective communication is embodied in post-social 
relationships (Knorr Cetina and Brueger, 2000). Communication takes place via 
the exchange of external information (e.g. analyst reports, government 
statistics, contracts), or the exchange of internal information via the security 
exchanges (e.g. quotes, volume, order flow). 
 Intra- or transpersonal communication is embodied in the relationship with 
one’s Self and with the market.139 Communication takes place via analysis 
(quantitative research) and intuition (qualitative research140). 
                                           
137 Early economic reflections (e.g. Price, 1997) often boil down to the realisation that man, left with scarce physical and mental resources (e.g. 
commodities and knowledge), has, in contrast, to ‘deal with’ the abundant physical worldly challenges, respectively the omniscience of God(s). 
In the Jewish/Christian traditions, this is viewed as a consequence of the original sin (see, for example, Maimonides’ Guide to the Perplexed, 
written in the 12th century.) This ‘dealing’ is infused with uncertainty. Ironically, modern macroeconomics seems to suggest the existence of an 
omniscient and benevolent central planner to achieve the equilibrium it assumes. 
138 See, for example, Kuhnen and Knutson (2005). 
139 See, for example, Steenbarger (2003). 
140 see, for example, Cymbalista (2002-ii). 
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Pattern emerges, among others, from (often simple) rules which frame the 
relationships.141 
3. Structure: the physical 
embodiment of the 
market’s pattern of 
organisation. 
Cohesion through a shared platform. 
 The real economy of networks to produce and exchange physical goods which 
include, for example, transport links. Tools to build, expand, and maintain the 
networks include buildings, trucks and pipes. 
 The market place of flow architecture to produce and exchange securities which 
include, for example, exchanges and trading floors. Tools to build, expand, and 
maintain the structure include telecommunication equipment, computers, and 
their screens. 
 The collective of human bodies, i.e. buyers and sellers, to compete and 
cooperate. Tools to build, expand, and maintain this collective include shared 
bodily and neuronal adaptations, for example mirror neurons142 and number 
sense. 
4. Process: the activity 
involved in the continual 
embodiment of the 
market’s pattern of 
organisation. 
Price discovery (mental activity) and trading (physical activity). 
The market’s ‘life’ process consists of price discovery and trading, a reflexive 
process that organises the market and gives rise to its cognition. In Jungian terms, 
it is a ritual through which the collective investor community interprets and 
interacts with the symbols of the market (i.e. prices), thereby reinforcing its 
values. 
 
                                           
141 See, for example, Hayek (1967) and Kelso (1995). 
142 As aforementioned, mirror neurons (e.g. Gallese et al., 2007) provide a promising explanation for the neuronal dynamics involved particularly in 
financial contagion and herding. 
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These criteria are interdependent. Moreover the dividing lines between the physical 
and the mental within each criterion are blurry. For example, structure is not only 
physical but: 
 in terms of boundary, it is also of a social symbolic nature: trust, beliefs, 
expectations, confidentiality, and so on;  
 in terms of order, it is also of a psychological symbolic nature: stories (e.g. 
investment themes), events, personalities (e.g. gurus), etc. 
This little detour on the market’s body should not distract the reader from my main 
point: unless one denies the existence of individual consciousness the inescapable 
conclusion is that capital markets form a collective consciousness. Its 
intersubjectivity contributes to the market’s (self-organising) dynamics. 
Consequently, the market as a mind-body provides the proper premise for any 
emerging new finance paradigm. It acknowledges the existential questions that need 
to be addressed and helps to diagnose more clearly the psychological disorder of 
modern finance which is the next topic. 
 
6.6 THE HARD PROBLEM FOR FINANCE 
 
At the peak of the financial crisis modern finance was confronted with previously 
unimaginable conundrums and events, among which are the ‘sighting’ of various 
non-white swans. Clearly, these events were not impossible, just not imaginable. But 
what is causing this lack of imagination, i.e. what is modern finance’s blind spot? 
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Broadly speaking, and following my previous arguments, modern finance ignores the 
unconscious origin and phenomenal apex of consciousness in the market. The 
consequence is a complex due to its denial of what I call the market’s mind-body 
problem. Although originated by Descartes, William James was one of the first to 
define the mind-body problem in general terms:  
That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is 
the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort the 
consciousness and of what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, 
aware of mere qualities, involve the mystery as much as thoughts, 
aware of complex systems, involve it. (1890, p. 647) 
It consists of two sub-problems: mental causation and the nature of consciousness. 
Both need to be understood with the issue of ‘other minds’ in mind. 
Specifically, the market’s mind-body problem, which (following Chalmers, 1995) is 
the hard problem for finance, can be highlighted in two ways. First, it concerns 
answering the following question: 
Why do the quantities involved in physical processes give rise to the 
qualities of the market, i.e. mood, that complete its state? 
In other words, the physical and cognitive processes in the market are accompanied 
by an experience (e.g. exuberance/despair) which, combined, form its state. So, 
why does an understanding of a market state require the inclusion of the experience 
to which the physical and cognitive processes of that state give rise? Somehow 
leaving this experience out, by focusing exclusively on explaining the processes, 
does not sufficiently convey the market state. Intellectually analysing and describing 
these processes does not extend to knowing market states, in particular when the 
market ‘goes mental’ and you have ‘skin in the game’. Moreover, what does it mean 
if physically equal market conditions (e.g. the S&P500 at 666), while implying the 
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same (cognitive) expectation, differ by way of the accompanying experiences? Any 
answer to this question needs to explain, among others, what the relationship is 
between the shared unconscious, cognitive, and phenomenal properties of the 
market, ultimately reflected in prices. On that note, and second, the hard problem 
concerns the following explanatory gap: 
The inability to explain the growing convergence of individual investor 
mentality into a shared uniform experience, an emotionally charged single-
mindedness, which occurs during booms (e.g. euphoria) and busts (e.g. 
despair) and ultimately leads to their reversals. 
Modern finance does not acknowledge this problem, let alone deal with it. Neither 
does behavioural finance, which suffers from the same issue as the broader cognitive 
science of which it is part (see 4.1 for earlier quote from Kim). 
Applied to finance, prices are not only the mediators but the actual conductors of the 
shared ‘felt qualities’ of market states, i.e. investors experience the market primarily 
via prices. However, the dominant theories consider the experience of prices as not 
integral to an understanding of the phenomenon of a market state. Specifically, 
modern finance explains the market in terms of computational mechanisms 
employing analytical research methods. To some extent this is natural, as markets 
involve a whirr of information processing. As aforementioned, it can explain 
processes like production, supply, leverage, discounting, etc. But these explanations 
are in terms of functional correlates to prices assuming the steady mental state of 
rationality. Existing attempts to capture sentiment or mood are lacking because they 
are based on a mechanical interpretation of the phenomena involved, which limits 
their knowledge content. For example, analytical indicators like put/call ratio, bull-
bear spread and the ‘fear gauge’ VIX supposedly represent sentiment, but these fail 
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to convey its characteristic quality of internality, namely the sensation of what it 
‘feels like’. 
 
In both cases simplified methods aimed at functional explanations are applied to 
deal with finance’s problems. However, imagine a crowd listening to a concert, or a 
crowd watching their burning apartment block, or another crowd attending a funeral. 
Just like a functional explanation of the sound of a piano, the yellowness of fire, 
respectively the hurt of death does not do justice to their appreciation in those 
settings, neither does a functional explanation of the price dynamics that culminate 
in the S&P500 at 666. As aforementioned, a technical term for this appreciation is 
quale (multiple: qualia), e.g. the quale of yellow.143 Price qualia refer to the 
phenomenal aspects of the market’s mind which prices transmit. Through prices 
investors collectively experience the raw feels of market states.144 Specifically, over 
and above reflecting information about the market’s physical and cognitive 
processes, prices impress the distinctive intersubjective character of the market’s 
mental states, generally identified as moods. The following description by 
neuroscientist Dehaene of the phenomenal experience of numbers could have been 
written about committed investors in their relationship to prices whereby the market 
is: 
a landscape of numbers . . . within which (they) can move freely. 
These people claim to experience numbers in a phenomenal way, 
often within a spatial setting, and they claim that numbers and their 
properties immediately pop to mind. Furthermore, many claim to 
experience strong pleasure associated with this - some go as far as 
to prefer the company of numbers to that of other fellow humans! 
(1997-ii, p.14) 
                                           
143 There is extensive literature available on qualia as the qualitative characters of conscious experience 
(e.g. Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983; Chalmers, 1996). As aforementioned, research by Burr and Ross 
(2008) extends the concept of qualia to numbers. The majority of philosophers and other mind 
researchers accept their existence but critics include, for example, Dennett (1988). 
144 While Soros’ famous back pains are an example of bodily sensations at the individual level (see, for 
example, Cymbalista, 2002-ii). 
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The quality of the experience of price dynamics includes its duration (called intrinsic 
time, e.g. Derman (2002); Olsen (2004)) as well as its uniformity (e.g. the ‘shared 
comfort’ of the crowd). Price qualia overlay investors’ cognitive participation in the 
market and complete the latter’s state. Their inclusion is crucial in order to answer 
questions that, according to Bechara and Damasio, existing (behavioural) theories 
have failed to address:  
why do states of optimism lead to different choices than states of 
pessimism? Why when the market is crashing everyone rushes to 
sell, and when it is growing, everyone rushes to buy? (2005, p. 362) 
To paraphrase James, it is the “radical empirical” shared participation of investors in 
the market that makes the market’s mind reflexive. This experience has been vividly 
worded in the literature by numerous traders and investors (e.g. see earlier quote in 
5.4). ‘Being in the market’s mind but not of it’ seems to capture the struggle of the 
contrarian within the crowd (e.g. Martin, 2005) in that respect.  
Market consciousness, as a composite of individual investor consciousness, 
originates in the collective unconscious and culminates in phenomenal 
consciousness. Whereas the former involves the survival instincts for dealing with 
the unknown, the latter involves qualia which convey the intimacy of experiencing. 
Even at the individual level neither instincts nor qualia are reducible to psycho-
neural or functional mechanisms. In markets these dynamics play out 
intersubjectively which only adds to their cognitive elusiveness. Still, they are 
involved in understanding the state of the market beyond analysis and logic. Any 
exclusion of phenomenal consciousness, for example, results in a form of 
phenomenal absence (Sartre, 2004, p. 180). This leads to a lack of knowledge 
comparable to that suggested by former Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe 
when he criticised an economist as being “a man who knows 364 ways of making 
love, but doesn’t know any women” (Flanders, 2006). 
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The physics complex extends beyond finance theory into investing itself. Specifically, 
current practice seems to promote the repression of evolved psychological 
adaptations because the emotional outputs they generate are deemed ‘inappropriate’ 
for modern economic times. Instead, highly quantitative models are applied which 
generate mechanical outputs, believed to capture these times in an objective 
fashion.145 But along the way we seem to have forgotten that the investor doesn’t 
live in a mechanical world. He lives in a symbolic world, the world of prices and the 
myths that surround them. Hayek realised this when, implying price, he stated that 
the market communicates “In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol” (1945, p. 
547). Although prices have a signalling property this ‘intermittent message’ does not 
exhaust their meaning. In the spirit of Knightian uncertainty, symbols are “the best 
possible expression at the moment for a fact as yet unknown” (Jung, 1921, 
para.817). What is involved in the discovery of these symbols, particularly in a 
collective setting, was profoundly expressed by physicist Wolfgang Pauli in the 
earlier quote in 2.3. 
As numerical symbols, prices contain intuitive meaning: prices and their patterns 
convey a number sense of the market’s state. Compared to the numbers used in the 
natural sciences, prices are neither innocent experimental trials nor verifiable 
characteristics of inanimate objects. They are produced by the collective psychology 
of economic survival and receive the qualitative valuation, Jung’s “emotional 
charge”, from the archetypal dynamics involved in that struggle. Accordingly, prices 
are Jung’s “living symbols”: they are born of and respond to human engagement. It 
is the transition from observation (building models, i.e. forecasting) to participation 
                                           
145 Predatory high-frequency trading and the May 2010 Flash Crash are examples of how extreme these 
developments have become. In chapter 8 I use AIT to critically discuss the current mechanical 
approaches to markets in a Gödel-Turing framework. Overall, I have my doubts on whether artificial 
intelligence (e.g. representative agent models) can offer solutions to finance’s hard problem. See 
also, for example, Penrose (1995) and Dehaene (1997-i). 
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(applying models, i.e. buying/selling), the execution into actions to use Mises’ terms, 
which makes the uncertainty involved reach beyond that of physics’ Heisenberg 
Principle.  
To conclude, proper understanding of market states requires inclusion of price 
affects. As Damasio reminds us, “Emotions and feelings have no crystal ball to see 
the future. Deployed in the right context however, they become harbingers of what 
may be good or bad in the near or distant future” (2004, p. 147).146 Consequently, it 
is no wonder that: 
the quality of decision making suffers when affective inputs are 
suppressed by having decision makers think systematically about 




How did it feel when Lehman collapsed? In markets, efficiency may be at the heart 
of the matter but experience is at the heart of the mind. To better understand the 
market’s mind one has to reflect on its qualitative affects, the shared sensations of 
its shifting states. The current dominant finance paradigm does not face up to this 
issue and thus sustains the market’s mind-body problem. Or, in the words of Soros 
(1994), “Applied to events which have thinking participants, it provides a distorted 
picture of reality.” As this extends to practical applications and processes which 
                                           
146 On the role of emotions in trading see, for example, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011). 
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impact the market and beyond, this hard problem has become a worrying 
complex.147 
From the outset I stated that this chapter would be about highlighting this problem 
rather than about solving it. Still, having done so by raising the question above, 
finance can now start dealing with it. The mind sciences can guide us in our search 
while gaining insights from our rich source of ‘mind-matter’ data: 
The general problem of the relation between psyche and physis, 
between inside and outside, can hardly be regarded as solved . . . 
Yet, perhaps, modern science has brought us closer to a more 
satisfying conception of this relationship, as it has established the 
notion of complementarity . . . It would be most satisfactory if 
physis and psyche could be conceived as complementary aspects of 
the same reality. (Pauli, 1952, p. 164)148 
Finally, I expect any new paradigm that acknowledges consciousness and accepts 
the unconscious origin as well as phenomenal culmination of price discovery to 
rebalance our investment research efforts by compensating the current overreliance 
on mechanical finance and analytical methods. 
In the next chapter I will discuss in more detail mass psychology and herd instinct in 
the context of my hypothesis, with a special focus on the link between participation 
mystique and mirror neurons.  
 
  
                                           
147 In light of the delicate symbolic nature of price discovery we can rightfully ask, for example, “When 
does manipulating the market’s mind lead to harmful damage?” Stretching the mind-body 
perspective, other issues I have not raised here include, for example, the market’s awareness of the 
impact of its behavior in terms of ethics, sustainability, etc. On inequality, for example, see my 
article here: http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/patrick-schotanus/economic-equality-
conscience. 
148 I use the translation by Atmanspacher and Primas (2006). 
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CHAPTER 7. HERD INSTINCT: PARTICIPATION 
MYSTIQUE AND MIRROR NEURONS 
 
This is the . . . Collective. Prepare to be assimilated. We will add your biological and 
technological distinctives to our own. You will adapt to service us. Resistance is futile. 





In this chapter I will discuss the implications of my hypothesis for the phenomena of 
crowds and herding. I thereby make the following distinctions: 
1) Between crowd psychology and contrarian psychology. Specifically at the 
unconscious level, I will argue that Jung’s participation mystique promotes 
herding behaviour whereas its counterforce, individuation, promotes 
contrarian behaviour.  
2) Between unconscious participation mystique and conscious participation 
confabulation. Whereas the former instigates an unconscious induction 
among the crowd, the latter rationalises, i.e. justifies, participation in it.  
Mirror neurons play an important neurobiological role in this respect. Whereas in 
section 3 below I describe the link between mirror neurons and participation 
mystique, in section 4 the latter is discussed in the context of markets. However, 
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first I will explain my use of the terms crowd and herding in the context of this 
thesis. 
7.2 CROWDS AND HERDING 
 
The term crowd is used to describe a dominant group of investors who collectively 
are buying into or are selling out of a theme, which is physically captured in a 
security and symbolically in a numerical price, accompanied by a narrative (i.e. 
myth). We recognise crowd behaviour, for example, in terms of ‘a crowded trade’ 
where a large number of investors initially pile into an asset, to only subsequently 
abandon it en masse. A crowd, therefore, is not equal to the collective investor 
community, i.e. the market, but rather represents a (large) subsection. I will focus 
on the psychological aspects of crowds, in particular their emerging composite 
profile. In that respect I use the term crowd as intended by, for example, Le Bon 
whose view echoes the spirit of emergence of complexity: 
an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different 
from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and 
ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same 
direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind 
is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined 
characteristics. The gathering has thus become . . . a psychological 
crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the 
mental unity of crowds. (2006, p. 23; emphasis mine) 
Le Bon’s “law” can be interpreted in Jungian terms. Central is the collective 
unconscious which influence, via commonly shared or archetypal characteristics, 
individual minds and leads to their convergence. In Le Bon’s words, these 
unconscious “forces” overwhelm the individual conscious personalities in a crowd: 
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Our conscious acts are the outcome of an unconscious substratum 
created in the mind in the main by hereditary influences. This 
substratum consists of the innumerable common characteristics 
handed down from generation to generation . . . It is precisely these 
general qualities of character, governed by forces of which we are 
unconscious, . . . that in crowds become common property . . . The 
heterogeneous is swamped by the homogeneous, and the 
unconscious qualities obtain the upper hand.  (Ibid, pp. 32-33)   
In line with the overall negative bias of Le Bon, as well as Jung, towards crowds, I 
argue that crowds in markets, reflected in crowded trades, can become a threat to 
the survival of the overall investor community, i.e. the markets themselves. Prices 
can act as the Pied Piper, mesmerising crowds to march to the same music back into 
the caves. This is particularly the case where price discovery is hampered by 
artificial interference, lack of transparency, etc. The reason is that these prevent the 
market’s natural self-correcting mechanisms from operating. Earlier we read that 
artificial interference in markets (e.g. subsidies, quantitative easing, manipulation, 
intervention, etc.) distorts price discovery. Specifically, financial repression involves 
primarily the promotion of ‘politically correct’ prices at the costs of repressing 
‘psychologically correct’ ones, if only because the latter are deemed as ‘too painful’ 
for the constituency.149 From a Jungian perspective we can view a crowd which 
sustains a ‘financial repression’ trade as being engaged in “Shadow” price projection 
rather than “Self” price discovery: “Political agitation in all countries is full of such 
projections” (Jung, 1964, p. 181).  
In turn, such price projection can lead to herding. Herding is the convergence of 
individual behaviours into a common behaviour, specifically applied to buying and 
selling. In extreme cases, herding reflects group neurosis, a central characteristic of 
                                           
149 For a good summary see Reinhart et al. (2011). 
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which is an over-reliance on the quantitative meaning of prices.150 In such a state 
the qualitative assessment of uncertainty in price discovery is ignored under the 
belief of quantifiable risk, i.e. prices are considered to be signals derived from a 
known or estimable distribution instead of symbols emerging from the unknown. 
Clearly, and worryingly, herding can threaten the species as a whole if natural 
corrective forces are inhibited. It is in this context that we should see systemic risk: 
in the extreme, crowded trades threaten the financial system, particularly if the 
market is not allowed to ‘unwind them’ via its natural correcting mechanisms, i.e. 
the conscious and unconscious forces which, often violently, counterbalance and 
achieve homeostasis for the market’s mind.151 
In the next sections I will explain this in more detail, beginning with participation 
mystique. 
7.3 PARTICIPATION MYSTIQUE AND MNS 
 
The unconscious, by way of the archetypes, enables the mind to symbolically deal 
with the uncertainty of the unknown, i.e. to imagine. For our purposes, and in 
extremis, imagination runs along a scale, from insights to obsessions, which 
correlates with the number of people involved in the exercise. Imagination starts 
with insights among one or a small number of individuals. These ‘contrarians’ think 
                                           
150 To refresh, the quantitative meaning of prices involves their cognitive properties which are 
quantifiable, i.e. via (objective) functions, based on the premise of the market as a physical 
mechanical system. The qualitative meaning of prices, on the other hand, involves their 
phenomenal properties which can only be experienced as qualia based on the premise of the market 
as a mental conscious system. Their archetypal meaning, via numerical archetypes, bridges the 
two. An archetypal experience consists of an ouroboros “strange loop”: it originates in the 
unconscious (tail), is realised in cognition (body), and culminates (as in ‘is consumed’), in the 
phenomenal domain (head). 
151 See, for example, Stevens (1990, p. 47) for a detailed discussion on psyche and homeostasis. 
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out-of-the-box in the sense that they perceive things the majority do not (yet) 
perceive. It is in the unconscious where such novelty and innovations endogenously 
originate for the mind, a necessary requirement for any complex adaptive system to 
be creative and flourish. Insightful ‘surprises’, aka Eureka moments, occur most 
frequently in contrarian thinkers whose intuitive attunement to the meaning of 
symbols provides an early warning system of their ‘writing on the wall’. From there it 
can resonate to the critical minority, like a shared ‘Aha erlebnis’. However, these can 
transform, via participation mystique, into obsessions: 
The louse in symbolism usually carries the meaning of a completely 
autonomous thought; something that sticks in your mind, though 
you don't want it, and sucks your blood. It is a beautiful symbol for 
thought obsession: an idea that stays in your mind, obsesses all 
your other thoughts, and at the same time sucks your blood, takes 
away your psychic energy. (Von Franz, 1995, p.44) 
I believe the neuronal basis for this process is mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were 
discovered about two decades ago by neuroscientists at the University of Parma 
(Italy)152. Much research has since been done to uncover their purposes 
(Ramachandran, 2006; Rizzolatti et al., 2007, Mukamel et al., 2010).153 The term 
mirror neuron system (MNS) is used to refer to the cortical network they form. In 
this section I will highlight the properties of mirror neurons via Gallese et al. (2007), 
primarily because they discuss the MNS in the context of psychoanalysis and focus 
on “the experiential aspects of intersubjectivity” (footnote 1).  
First, they provide a brief summary of mirror neurons: 
The neural circuits activated in a person carrying out actions, 
expressing emotions, and experiencing sensations are activated 
also, automatically via a mirror neuron system, in the observer of 
those actions, emotions, and sensations. . . . this finding of shared 
                                           
152 Including Vittorio Gallese who I’ve met on a few occasions and have corresponded with. Apart from 
herding, we particularly discussed the potential role of mirror neurons in momentum. 
153 Although some controversy remains, e.g. Heyes (2009); Churchland (2011). 
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activation suggests a functional mechanism of ‘embodied simulation’ 
that consists of the automatic, unconscious, and noninferential 
simulation in the observer of actions, emotions, and sensations 
carried out and experienced by the observed. (Ibid, p.131, emphasis 
mine) 
Embodied simulation is different from standard interpretations of simulation, like the 
theory-theory account. Those perspectives suggest that the observer explicitly and 
cognitively simulates the other’s emotional state. The observer makes a conscious 
effort by pretending to feel the same as the other via generating similar actions, 
emotions, and sensations. Instead of relying on such introspection, embodied 
simulation is: 
a mandatory, nonconscious, and prereflexive mechanism that is not 
the result of a deliberate and conscious cognitive effort aimed at 
interpreting the intentions hidden in overt behavior of others (Ibid, 
p. 143; emphasis mine) 
Next, the authors echo the description by Jung of participation mystique:  
The other’s emotion is constituted, experienced, and therefore 
directly understood by means of an embodied simulation producing 
a shared body state. It is the activation of a neural mechanism 
[MNS] shared by the observer and the observed that enables 
experiential understanding . . . Based on the mirror neuron 
phenomenon and related findings, one can say that in virtually any 
interpersonal interaction there is an automatic unconscious 
“induction” in each participant of what the other is feeling. (Ibid, p. 
144, 149; emphasis mine) 
Recognise the resemblance between their expression of an “unconscious” “shared 
body state” and the following description by Jung: 
The mass is swayed by a participation mystique, which is nothing 
other than an unconscious identity. Supposing, for example, you go 
to the theatre: glance meets glance, everybody observes everybody 
else, so that all those who are present are caught up in an invisible 
web of mutual unconscious relationship. (CW11, para. 226; 
emphasis mine)  
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Importantly, the unconscious recognition and subsequent replication of these 
patterns may include their symbolic manifestations, like linguistic expressions and 
numbers: 
the same neural structures are activated both during the subjective 
experience of pain and in the direct observation or symbolically 
mediated knowledge of someone else’s experience of the same 
painful sensation. (Ibid, p. 142; emphasis mine) 
Embodied simulation is a central element in the process of pattern recognition and 
enables the mind to model its interactions with the environment, in particular those 
with other minds. It generates a specific phenomenal state of “intentional 
attunement” leading to “a peculiar quality of familiarity with other individuals” (Ibid, 
p. 144). Specifically, mirror neurons play a role in intention understanding and 
action prediction: 
action prediction and the ascription of intentions are related 
phenomena, underpinned by the same functional mechanism, 
embodied simulation. In contrast with what mainstream cognitive 
science would maintain, action prediction and the ascription of 
intentions—at least of simple intentions—do not appear to belong to 
different cognitive realms; rather, both pertain to embodied 
simulation mechanisms underpinned by the activation of chains of 
logically related mirror neurons. (Ibid, p.137) 
Participation mystique has the biggest potential impact if there is: 
- a simultaneous observation by multiple participants, 
- of a shared symbol of attention (or desire)154 
- which captures human (e.g. their own) behaviour.  
Let’s take a closer look at how this is manifested in markets. 
                                           
154 In another paper, Gallese (2009) links the MNS to Girard’s Mimetic Theory and mimicry. Specifically, 
he highlights the object of shared attention, or the “Third” in Jungian terms: “The intrinsic value of 




   
 
7.4 PARTICIPATION MYSTIQUE IN MARKETS 
 
In capital markets the shared symbol of attention consists of the price, whereas the 
shared object of attention is the security.155 Via participation mystique multiple 
minds interact at the unconscious level to form a “web of mutual unconscious 
relationship” to the point of “a shared body state”. Jung adds that because this is 
such an easy and convenient way of raising one’s personality to an exalted rank, 
masses are always a breeding ground of psychic epidemics (CW11, para. 226-227). 
Bubbles and hypes in financial markets qualify for such epidemics. They reflect the 
culmination, and subsequent collapse, of a particular Zeitgeist in the economic 
domain156 or, alternatively worded, the economic dimension of a societal Zeitgeist. 
The internet bubble is an obvious example, when technological progress seemed 
unbounded. As far as the spreading of uniform behaviour is concerned, Sornette and 
colleagues, unwittingly, expanded upon Jung’s example of a theatre crowd in a 
paper on the bubble in Chinese equities: 
the audience expresses its appreciation with applause. In the 
beginning, everybody is handclapping according to their own 
rhythm. The sound is like random noise. There is no imminence of 
collective behavior. This can be compared to financial markets 
operating in a steady-state where prices follow a random walk. All of 
a sudden something curious happens. All randomness disappears; 
the audience organizes itself in a synchronized regular beat, each 
pair of hands is clapping in unison. There is no master of ceremony 
at play. This collective behaviour emanates endogenously. It is a 
pattern arising from the underlying interactions. This can be 
compared to a crash. There is a steady build-up of tension in the 
system (like with an earthquake or a sand pile) and without any 
                                           
155 See also Schotanus, 2013. 





   
 
exogenous trigger a massive failure of the system occurs. There is 
no need for big news events for a crash to happen. (Bastiaensen et 
al., 2009; emphasis mine)   
Kelso provides the neuroscientific proof that such convergence in clapping is 
involuntarily: 
From these experiments, a rather profound message emerged . . . 
With a colleague in one booth and me in another, sight unseen but 
not sound unheard, I tapped out a rhythm with my hand. The 
colleague’s task was to syncopate with me. “Try to produce a beat in 
between my taps,” I requested. As in the hand movement 
experiments, I gradually increased the tapping rate . . . At a certain 
critical rate my colleague spontaneously starts to synchronize with 
me. He can’t help himself. (1995, p. 93; emphasis mine) 
Like Jung, Von Franz saw participation mystique as a psychological condition in 
which various inanimate objects and people interact and are connected with each 
other beneath the surface of consciousness. In this condition, there is no 
differentiation between the subject and the crowd because each individual identifies 
with the object which symbolises the theme the crowd stands for. This object 
represents the crowd identity: it becomes the shared object of experience through 
which each individual identifies with the crowd. Jung points to a regression of the 
individual mind to a primordial unconscious state: 
I use the term identity to denote a psychological conformity. It is 
always an unconscious phenomenon. . . . It is a characteristic of the 
primitive mentality and the real foundation of participation 
mystique, which is nothing but a relic of the original non-
differentiation of subject and object, and hence of the primordial 
unconscious state. (CW 6, para. 741) 
The identity with an object which symbolises a (magic) theme is a characteristic 
aspect of participation mystique. It originates with Jung’s distinction between 
“fantastic thinking” and “directed thinking”.157 
                                           
157 As an aside, this inspired Freud to write his paper “Formulations on the Principles of Mental 
Functioning”, according to Adams (2004, p. 2). 
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In general investment terms an asset, or rather its security, is that object of shared 
attention. Examples of popular securities during hypes include the Nasdaq-100 index 
(ticker: QQQ aka “cubes”) at the time of the internet bubble, Markit’s ABS/MBS158 
indices (tickers: ABX/CMBX) during the US housing bubble, and gold (ticker: GC or 
its ETF GLD) during its recent bubble. A security’s theme is the story which captures 
the symbolic narrative (i.e. the myth) and, initially, unites the crowd. The security’s 
price is the ultimate, namely numerical, symbol (of success/failure) of this theme, 
which has an unconscious and reflexive impact. Its dynamics not only reflect the 
observable behaviour of the crowd but also trigger the unconscious induction which, 
for example, leads to the imitation so characteristic in that behaviour. Price 
dynamics express the emotions of the composite investor and I would argue 
therefore that prices fulfil Gallese’s “symbolically mediated knowledge of someone 
else’s experience.” Physiologically speaking, observing price movements on a screen, 
which is a daily ‘obsession’ of investors, trigger the mirror neurons and may explain 
the phenomenon of momentum.  
The mutual influence of crowds and the individual scale from the destructive to the 
creative. In terms of the latter, participation mystique is the perception of the 
individual investor to be part of a larger whole to which he contributes, and becomes 
co-creator. Trader Tom Belsanti expressed it as follows: 
All the markets I’ve been involved in—Eurodollars, bonds, 
currencies—are markets that are watched throughout the world. 
After making a trade . . . and it’s the high or low of the day, and 
reading the newspaper the next day, I like to say to myself, “Oh, 
that eight trade, that was me! I sold those or I bought those.” For 
me that is a tremendous high. The mystique of knowing the whole 
world is watching what we’re doing and just to be part of it. (Koppel, 
1996, p. 173; emphasis mine) 
                                           
158 Asset-Backed-Securities, respectively Mortgage-Backed-Securities. 
192 
 
   
 
This is particularly the case in uncertain situations where individuation is at an early 
stage, and the encounter is with abstract, unknown objects. The process of 
individuation, instigating contrarian psychology, is difficult (see also chapter 10). The 
individual has to discover values other than the collective to enrich, i.e. pay back, 
the collective. Jung talks about individuation cutting one off from personal 
conformity and hence from collectivity. And about guilt, the need to redeem and 
offer a ransom. Crucially: 
Whoever is not creative enough must re-establish collective 
conformity with a group of his own choice, otherwise he remains an 
empty waster and a windbag. Whoever creates unacknowledged 
values belongs to the condemned, and he has himself to blame for 
this, because society has a right to expect realisable values. For the 
existing society is always of absolute importance as the point of 
transition through which all world development passes, and 
demands the highest collaborative achievement from every 
individual. (Jung, CW18, para.1095-1098; emphasis mine) 
Again, this is very applicable to markets where the abstract object is a security and 
the relationship is entered by way of a trade for a price, which results in a sense of 
ownership. Balsanti’s ‘time stamp of his price’ can be viewed in the Jungian terms of 
“mineness” the affinity of which with personality is, according to Jung, aptly 
characterised by participation mystique. It is an irrational, unconscious identity, 
arising from the fact that anything a person comes into contact with is not only 
itself, but also a symbol. This symbolisation comes about firstly because every 
human being has unconscious contents, and secondly because every object has an 
unknown side. “Where two unknowns come together, it is impossible to distinguish 
between them. The unknown in man and the unknown in the thing fall together in 
one. Thus there arises an unconscious identity” (Jung, CW11, para. 389).  
Jung always warned about the risk of mass neurosis, for example in situations where 
the archetypal nature of symbols are lost in the rituals surrounding them, in 
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particular the confabulations to rationalise and sustain the theme, ironically often 
against all reason. We can interpret this as the influence of the crowd in terms of 
assimilation thereby separating the individual from the market, the true centre of 
price discovery: 
The inevitable psychological regression within the group is partially 
counteracted by ritual . . . But if there is no relation to a centre 
which expresses the unconscious through its symbolism, the mass 
psyche inevitably becomes the hypnotic focus of fascination, 
drawing everyone under its spell. (Jung, CW9i, para.227) 
The ego of the individual requires a healthy balance in order to avoid either a godlike 
ascent above everybody else (i.e. super-ego) or, at the other extreme, an 
annihilation into crowd-consciousness. Each crowd has its leaders, spoke persons to 
defend the ‘cause’. They often create the aforementioned confabulations which 
distort the true meaning, in the sense of its symbolism, of the theme. As Jung points 
out, leaders want decision in favour of one thing, and therefore the utter 
identification of the individual with a necessarily one-sided ‘truth’. “Even if it were a 
question of some great truth, identification with it would still be a catastrophe, as it 
arrests all further development.” (CW 8, para. 425). 
Nowhere is this more applicable than in financial markets where symptoms 
overwhelm the cause, gurus become all-knowing, and ‘maps are confused with the 
territory’. Ultimately, people basically lose sight of the symbolic nature of numbers: 
• a chart pattern is not a true reflection of price dynamics; 
• a risk model is not a true reflection of dealing with uncertainty; 
• a backtest is not a true reflection of trading; 
• a price is not a true reflection of value.  
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Investment note: housing bubble159 
How destructive can participation mystique be? Scarily destructive, as the crisis has 
shown. The urge to participate in the American dream of owning a home turned into 
an awful nightmare, with devastating consequences worldwide. The idea of the 
‘ownership society’ was initially advanced by president Clinton and subsequently 
followed up with targeted policy initiatives by president Bush (expressed as late as 
2005 in his inaugural address at the apex of the housing boom.)  
Clearly, participation involved more than buying into the symbol of ‘the home’, and 
extended beyond home owners. It involved a worldwide credit binge facilitated by 
interest rate manipulations, subsidies, securitisation and shadow banking, all of 
which distort price discovery. Its hangover has affected investors and non-investors 
alike, from Icelandic banks to UK mom-and-pop stores. Alan Greenspan 
characterised it as a once-in-a century crisis, and most experts agree that the global 
financial system had teetered on the edge of the abyss. Various artificial measures, 
mostly politically motivated like subsidies and (implicit) guarantees, distorted the 
delicate process of price discovery due to the emphasis on the quantitative 
dimension of the price: ‘View a home as a (sure) thing, i.e. an investment object’. 
They caused natural deep-seated emotions regarding uncertainty (i.e. fear) to be 
repressed (e.g. losing a roof over one’s head/collateral) or vice versa allowed their 
counter-balancing emotions (i.e. greed) to overflow (e.g. making a buck/gaining 
excess yield by ‘flipping’ an apartment). Psychologically, home ownership became 
house possession in the sense that the search for home values got swamped by the 
chase for house prices. Technically home ownership became property securitisation 
where underlying mortgages were sliced and diced. We can interpret this in 
Archetypal Valuation160 terms: the price of a home no longer properly reflected the 
qualitative dimension of ownership, in the sense of conveying its qualia.  
The common psychological denominator to this mania, as always, is the loss of 
individual identity, as one’s consciousness is submerged into a mass movement: “A 
group experience takes place on a lower level of consciousness than the experience 
of an individual.” (Jung, CW9i, para. 225) And with it goes individual responsibility 
out of the window, exemplified by dumping one’s house keys in the mail box when 




                                           
159 See The Big Short (Lewis, 2011), as well as the movie of the same title. 
160 See Chapter 9. 
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To conclude, participation mystique adds to other suggested drivers of group 
behaviour. They, however, with a few exceptions, do not explain the unconscious 
nature of herd instinct, nor the neuronal processes underlying it. The common neural 
substrate of the MNS, which leads to an “unconscious induction”, is the 
neurophysiological dimension of participation mystique. The insights into the 
innateness of numbers provide neuroscientific support for the primacy of numerical 
archetypes within the mind’s unconscious processes. Combined into the AMH they 
offer a powerful explanation for herd instinct involved in emotionally charged 
numbers, i.e. prices.  
As the numerical objects of shared attention, prices take centre stage in markets. 






   
 
CHAPTER 8. PRICES AND THEIR DISCOVERY 
 
We’re trading mob psychology. We’re not trading corn, soybeans, or S&P’s. We’re trading 
numbers. 
Tom Willis 
Original Turtle, protégé Richard Dennis 
 
 






This chapter deals in more detail with the symbolic nature of prices, among others 
by contrasting it with the mechanical nature assumed by the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (REH) which is central, for example, in EMH. First, I will discuss AMH’s 
perspective on rationality and highlight the origins of various ‘counting’ terms. In the 
second section I will provide arguments from Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT) 
on the limitations, in particular incompleteness, of EMH. This follows similar critiques 
on rational expectations, all from a complexity, i.e. Gödel-Turing, perspective (e.g. 
Arthur, 2005; Spear, 1989). The third section emphasises the duality in price. It 
‘sets the stage’ for applying Jung’s view on the Binarius as the elementary pattern in 
price moves.  
As a reminder (of terminology), the term system in general is short for a complex 
adaptive system (CAS). There are many types of systems. The term financial system 
is, more or less, equivalent to ‘the market’ and refers to all the individual markets, 
i.e. their participants, combined. The singular system refers, in that context, to an 
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individual market within it unless specified differently. And environment refers to the 
outside world of which both form part. In another context, the unknown is the space 
where discovery takes place. It confronts the mind with uncertainty. For the sake of 
simplicity I assign the terms unconscious and cognitive to the two systems of mind, 
in the context of dual-system theories of mind. They form the opposing forces whose 
competition (and cooperation) generates the mind’s discoveries. The phenomenal 
system provides the third system, a qualitative overlay, the culmination of Jung’s 
“tension” between these forces (see below). In dealing with the unknown, the 
unconscious remains unknowable, the cognitive thinks it knows, and the phenomenal 
feels how it’s like. 
8.2 RATIO, CALCULATION AND COMPUTATION 
 
Such a really remarkable discovery. I wanted your opinion on it. You know the 
formula m over naught equals infinity, m being any positive number? [m/0 = ∞]. 
Well, why not reduce the equation to a simpler form by multiplying both sides by 
naught? In which case you have m equals infinity times naught [m = ∞ x 0]. That 
is to say, a positive number is the product of zero and infinity. Doesn't that 
demonstrate the creation of the Universe by an infinite power out of nothing? 
Doesn't it? 
Aldous Huxley, Point Counter Point (1928), Chapter XI 
 
The origin of rationality lies in the meaning of the word ratio. Ratio refers to the 
relation in degree or number between two things in terms of a shared unit of 
measurement which allows comparison.161  This highlights the numerical expression 
of the relationship and harks back to the earlier comments on distinction as the 
                                           
161 Latin: calculation, derived from ratus, past participle of rērī: to reckon, to count (Source: The American 




   
 
trigger for consciousness to emerge. In particular, allow me to repeat Jung’s 
reflections concerning the One, and the Other (Two): 
Thus there emerges a tension of opposites between the One and the 
Other. But every tension of opposites culminates in a release, out of 
which comes the “third”. In the third the tension is resolved and the 
lost unity is restored.  
Contemporary use of the word rationality implies reason and optimality in decision 
making. Among others, it requires a problem to be formulated in numerical terms, 
specifically ranking. For example, Savage’s axiom states that rationality dictates that 
if I is preferred to II, and II is preferred (or indifferent) to III, then I is preferred to 
III. Whatever the properties of I, II or III, they are ‘comparable in nature’ so that 
the resulting numerical values, which make reason and optimality possible, can be 
ranked. In equation terms: I > II; II ≥ III => I > III. One example of a ratio is 
probability, e.g. 50/100.162 Another example is an exchange rate between 
currencies, like the number of dollars per pound. As aforementioned every price is in 
fact the ratio of the units of one item over the units of the other item in an 
exchange. 
Although rationality is dominant in most situations of decision making, it often fails 
when these numerical values become contaminated by intersubjectivity, instigated 
by archetypal dynamics involved in collectively dealing with the uncertainty of the 
unknown. Specifically, what Jung adds to Knight’s uncertainty is the extent of 
uniformity in unconscious attunement within groups, driven by participation 
mystique, as the level of uncertainty changes. If we view the group’s mind as a 
                                           
162 Another example comes from trading. First, in the broader context of numerical archetypes, no single 
number or category of numbers can be the exclusive representation of the “archetype an sich”. In 
fact, the ratio 0.618, also known as the golden mean, can be viewed as a clear example of a 
number outside of the integers with archetypal qualities. In practise, this ratio, and others based on 
the Fibonacci number sequence, have been applied by traders for decades, in many cases via 
technical analysis methods, like the Elliott Wave Principle. 
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complex adaptive system, we can express its healthy state as a relatively stable 
ratio between the internal innovations (i.e. ‘insights’ which are endogenously 
generated) and external surprises (i.e. ‘news’). In general, a healthy mind can 
handle uncertainty in that it shows healthy growth: the numerator can keep up with 
the denominator and increases at the same pace, i.e. the ratio remains stable. 
Others can’t handle surprises and get ‘taken over by events’. And then there are 
those whose exposure to external surprises is artificially constrained. What are the 
consequences for these latter two unhealthy conditions where the ratio becomes so 
large, respectively small, that rationality is lost? More broadly, what does it mean 
when we end up with an “irrational” number, one that cannot be expressed as a 
ratio of integers? Surely it means that the perceived ‘probability’ of being able to 
deal with uncertainty (i.e. select contents “best suited to themselves”) becomes 
skewed?  
First, let’s assume that the external surprises are exactly that, externalities which 
are beyond the system’s control. Consequently, the cause for the imbalanced ratio 
must be within the system: its ability to (be creative and) discover is hampered. 
Within a market (for a security), the opposing forces are two groups, the “One” and 
the “Other” (e.g. bulls/bears, longs/shorts, commercials/hedgies, etc.). Each has a 
competing objective for a shared object of attention. The shared object of attention 
is a security, symbolically represented by its price accompanied by a narrative (i.e. 
theme.) Price moves reflect the composite behaviour163 of the market, as well as its 
intent. For example, the shared objective is reflected in the price’s (extrapolated) 
trajectory. In terms of the narrative, myth refers to the original story as shaped by 
the initial investment insights, i.e. how the theme came to be. Accompanying its 
                                           
163 More specifically, the allocated attention in consciousness. 
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price, the myth of an investment can convey the meaning of holding it.164 In fact, it 
is supposed to symbolically transmit the archetypal experiences of discovery which, 
at the time and by definition, involve instinctive emotions due to the confrontation 
with the unknown. However, like price, the perception and meaning of the myth can 
be distorted if understanding is limited to one-mindedness, i.e. overreliance on 
either the unconscious or the cognitive.  
Let me come back to what hampers the system’s discovery. It is the growing 
imbalance between the opposing forces within the system. In short, the two groups 
merge165 to form a crowd with single mindedness. Whereas their healthy “ratio” 
leads to the productive tension underlying the search, distortion now leads to 
consensus and the erosion of diversity in thinking. If the healthy ratio is the number-
image of the numerical archetypes in a balanced market, the distorted ratio is the 
number-image of the complex in a crowded market. The crowd growing confidence 
in how to ‘manage events’ leading to a misplaced sense of ‘certainty’ comforted by 
its ‘safety in numbers’. Contrary to the established opinion I belief that the sequence 
in crowd dynamics starts with too much rationality and is followed by the eventual 
release of (counter-balancing) repressed emotions, initially from a few ‘mad’ 
contrarians. The crowd’s single-mindedness is mechanical, initially engineered with 
an overemphasis of the cognitive arguments in the form of a confabulation which 
rationalises (continued) participation in the group, i.e. to convince even more 
outsiders to buy the story.166 The unconscious induction (see Chapter 7) of 
participation mystique explains why those price movements, which are driven largely 
by growing crowds, receive more ‘outrageous’ valuations and accompanying stories: 
                                           
164 Again, “holding an investment” simply means having a long or short position/trade in the security. 
165 This should be interpreted broadly to include “assimilation”, “takeover”, etc. of one group by the other.  
166 Somehow I also think Rubinstein’s (2001) argument of “over-researching” fits into this category but I 
need to think more on this.  
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only more extreme (Jung would say ‘God-like’) versions of the theme attract more 
converts. Meanwhile, and more subtly, the emotional charge in the unconscious is 
building and eventually leads to a counter movement. Thus, members of crowds 
cannot rationally explain their trading behaviour because it was unconsciously 
driven, induced by embodied simulation and skewed numbers. An example may 
clarify the latter. The current climate of artificially low (i.e. zero-bound or even 
negative) interest rates may ‘rationally’ induce investors to move into risky assets, 
but it undoubtedly unconsciously induces a misplaced lack of fear for the unknown, a 
massive blind spot.  In the final analysis, the “ratio” is itself a number symptomatic 
for the ordering by numerical archetypes. Numerical archetypes are mandates that 
only care about (the survival of) the total market, and inspire individuals to 
individuate by contrarian thinking in order for the market’s mind to rebalance. It 
means that the bigger the complexes of the crowd (e.g. hypes) the more profound 
the impact of the eventual market correction.  
Specifically, confabulation relates to the numerical, respectively narrative, as 
follows: 
1) It quantifies price, emphasising the signalling property; 
2) It objectifies the narrative, emphasising the logic.  
The first causes investors to lose sight of the symbolic nature of price, i.e. the 
reflection of something unknown. The second distorts the imaginative myth, which 
originally inspired the search for discovery, and now turns it into an official storyline. 
Combined they provide the illusionary veal of control and determination over the 
‘inconvenient truth’ and discomfort from an uncertain environment with potentially 
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nasty surprises. In turn, such crowd thinking suggests, for example in Myers-Briggs 
(dichotomy) terms, that the market’s mind: 
- has tilted too far to Introversion along the Extraversion-Introversion scale; 
- and/or has tilted too far to Sensing along the Sensing-Intuition scale; 
- and/or has tilted too far to Thinking along the Thinking-Feeling scale; 
- and/or has tilted too far to Judging along the Judging-Perceiving scale; 
It is in that state, where the overreliance on (collective) rationalisation threatens the 
broader system that the collective consciousness needs to be compensated via the 
unconscious. As aforementioned, the way it achieves this is via individuation, i.e. 
instigating contrarian psychology at the individual level. For the individual investor, 
to oppose the consensus, is a difficult process, as is the resulting re-discovery of 
true symbols in hyped markets: 
Only the passionate yearning of a highly developed mind, for which 
the traditional symbol is no longer the unified expression of the 
rational and the irrational, of the highest and the lowest, can create 
a new symbol. . . . For this collaboration of opposing states to be 
possible at all, they must first face one another in the fullest 
conscious opposition. This necessarily entails a violent disunion with 
oneself, to the point where thesis and antithesis negate one 
another, while the ego is forced to acknowledge its full participation 
in both. If there is a subordination of one part, the symbol will 
predominantly be the product of the other part, and, to that extent, 
less a symbol than a symptom . . . a symptom of the suppressed 
antithesis. . . . Since life cannot tolerate a standstill, a damming up 
of vital energy results, and this would lead to an insupportable 
condition did not the tension of opposites produce a new, uniting 
function that transcends them. (Jung, CW6, para. 823-824) 
On the other hand, let’s assume (as some do) that external surprises are no 
externalities and can be guarded against. It means that the market can be partly 
isolated from the larger system. The way this is achieved in practise is via artificial 
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barriers, like trade restrictions, subsidies, capital controls, non-transparency (e.g. 
shadow banking, OTC), etc., which cause the denominator of the ratio to be filtered 
or constrained. It also means that the system builds up ‘overcapacity’ in terms of 
generating the innovations in the numerator. Consequently there is no effective use 
for these, i.e. they become a waste. Resources are no longer properly allocated. In 
terms of the Red Queen principle, aka the arms race, there is no need to run to stay 
in the same place. The system becomes ‘lazy’ with all the implied risks involved. I 
have more to say on this in section 8.5.   
We now return to a key numerical activity involved in investment: calculation. The 
inputs, as well as the end result of this calculation are numbers, mostly prices. 
Calculation is the analytical process for transforming one or more inputs into one or 
more results. In terms of origin, the word calculation is based on the term calculare 
which indicates the counting of numbers with beads (or pebbles). Calculare was 
already in use during the early Roman times. The Romans, like the Greeks and other 
cultures, often calculated by moving and placing pebbles (calculi) around a flat 
surface (abacus) marked out in squares. It followed the earlier terms numerare and 
computare which both meant ‘to reckon’ and ‘to count’ (on one’s fingers). Another 
interesting historic fact is that early scientific attempts to use calculation focused on 
time measurements, i.e. to determine the calendar.167  
The link between calculation and computation is therefore historically strong. For our 
purposes, the main distinction I’d like to make is that calculation is preserved to the 
human brain and refers to the mental transformation of numbers, particularly large 
numbers, whereas computation is the physical transformation of numbers (i.e. bits) 
by computers. In other words, and in the spirit of both Searle and Penrose, I invoke 
                                           
167 See Borst (1993) for more details. 
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the distinction between a transformation performed by a biological entity (calculation 
by a human brain), and a transformation performed by a machine (computation by a 
computer).  
The definition of calculation also refers to the analytical, which in respect of investing 
can be interpreted as the conscious effort to determine the intrinsic, or ‘true’, value 
of a security. In terms of behaviour, and viewed per security, a calculation can lead 
to a trade, i.e. a buy or a sell. It should be clear that the distinction between 
calculation and computation in practice gets blurred, because of the intense and 
growing interaction between both processes in modern finance. However, complexity 
theory has shown the limitations of computation, in particular via invoking Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem, the topic for the next section. 
8.3 COMPLEXITY AND FINANCE 
 
Complexity theory has produced serious challenges to the assumptions underlying 
the REH in general, and the EMH in particular. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
relevance of complexity for my thesis lies in the applicability of the concept of a 
complex adaptive system (CAS) to the human and, by extension, to the market’s 
mind. In particular, I argued that complex psychology provides a robust and 
practical explanation of how the human mind satisfies the requirement which is the 
sine qua non of any CAS: the ability to endogenously generate innovations within 




   
 
In this section I will follow-up by more formally criticising the dominant thinking in 
finance, i.e. EMH. My approach is to detail my simplified interpretation of the 
complexity issues involved in modern finance via Algorithmic Information Theory 
(AIT, aka Kolmogorov Complexity) which is a special interpretation of the Gödel-
Turing framework. I loosely follow Chaitin (e.g. 1982, 1987, 1998), one of the 
founders of AIT. AIT enables the formal assessment of the (level of) complexity of a 
system, as well as any theory of that system. It particularly equates the complexity 
of a system with the size (in bit-strings) of a program that produces the (exact 
same) output of that system. The fact that prices are concentrated units of 
information, ultimately expressed in bits, makes this approach highly relevant, for 
example.168As far as I know my application of AIT to criticise EMH is novel.169 
From the outset I introduce the following general principles: 
- Assets are traded on markets via securities. For simplicity I assume there is 
one market per asset whereby that asset is traded via multiple securities. The 
value of an asset is determined via the no-arbitrage principle whereby a price 
of one security can be replicated by combining those of other securities.  
- The number of securities in a market determines the relative completeness of 
a market. In other words, by increasing the number of securities traded on it, 
a market becomes more complete; 
                                           
168 As an aside, despite their differences there is a surprising agreement between EMH and technical 
analysis (TA): prices contain all fundamental reflections, news, etc. TA subsequently makes one 
additional assumption: the market discounts everything except its own behaviour, i.e. the 
information generated by market action itself which impacts participants. This assumption of 
supplementary information disagrees with the weak version of EMH. 
169 Still, for empirical AIT-inspired research, e.g. tests, on the properties of market data see, for example, 
Zenil and Delahaye (2011); Giglio, et al. (2008); Chen and Tan (1999). 
206 
 
   
 
- In the limit I accept Cramer’s Rule in the sense that as soon as the number of 
securities equals the number of states, the market (and more broadly the 
economy) becomes deterministic (it is 'fully complete’). 
- I now introduce game theory’s Common Knowledge (CK): 
o World events, i.e. news, provide the fundamental signals that trigger 
the market’s calculations. These signals are transported through the 
network of which markets are part. In terms of the CK puzzle, the 
world ‘announces’ to the market that there are ‘wrong’ prices among 
securities. 
o We assume that the number of securities, n, in a market is at least 
one larger than the number of wrong prices, k. 
o Calculations involve the algorithm, i.e. price function, to compare 
prices. The price is not known intrinsically for each security but can 
only be determined by comparing it with prices of (combinations of) 
‘similar’ securities within the no-arbitrage framework. 
o The costs of trading consist of running this algorithm. Specifically, the 
costs involve units of computer time to do calculations. 
o In general, for k > 1 news is ‘(kn – 1) knowledge’ in the market and 
requires kn units of computer time to calculate prices which are 
‘corrected’, i.e. to maintain no-arbitrage,  by way of trading. 
To appreciate the motivation of using AIT, let’s begin with the following statement 
by one of the founders of postmodern economics and the REH, Robert Lucas: 
I prefer to use the term 'theory' in a very narrow sense, to refer to 
an explicit dynamic system, something that can be put on a 
computer and run. This is what I mean by the 'mechanics' of 
economic development - the construction of a mechanical, artificial 
world, populated by the interacting robots that economics typically 
studies, that is capable of exhibiting behavior the gross features of 
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which resemble those of the actual world. (1988, p. 5; emphasis 
mine) 
This is, in fact, what Turing’s Universal Computer facilitates as interpreted by AIT. 
Any theory entails a model of a (formal axiomatic) system (FAS) which produces its 
output after calculations. In turn, and specifically, AIT considers a computer program 
to be a theory for its output and both theory and output are finite strings of bits 
whose sizes can be compared. Specifically, the size of the program amounts to the 
number of bits (i.e. in the software) that implements the theory. This size can be 
compared to other ‘bit-sizes’ to determine (the level of) complexity. Schematically: 
General: Program => Universal Computer => Output 
So, complying with Lucas, a theory is the program that a universal computer runs, 
i.e. which executes its calculations from which it produces the program’s output. In 
our case this means that a theory of the market is the program, Lucas’ “artificial” (or 
model) market, which a universal computer runs, whereby it executes ‘calculated’ 
trades, with prices as their output. Schematically: 
Finance: Market => Trading => Prices 
This initial set up or model thus simulates a market with the following assumptions, 
A.1 to A.6: 
1. A market, M, executes trades in security Sn (with n = 1 . . . N; N being the 
number of securities). 
2. The size of M, expressed in (strings of) bits, is determined by N, i.e. as a 
minimum. 
3. A price, Pn, of Sn is the numerical output of M. Specifically, it is the result of 
an actual trade in terms of the amount of money exchanged for Sn. 
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4. A value, Vn, of Sn is the numerical input of M. Specifically, it is computed by 
the price function, Hn, as the fair amount of money exchanged for Sn. after 
comparing the prices of all securities in M. It is fair in the sense that, if a 
trade would take place at Vn, it would reflect an equilibrium between the 
quantities of supply and demand of Sn.
170 
5. A trade, Tn,i , in Sn is executed if Pn  Vn whereby the absolute risk-adjusted 
difference between Pn and Vn, Rn,i, exceeds any trading costs, Cn,i.
171 In 
symbolic terms: Tn,i = IIF(Rn,i > Cn,i). 
6. Ignoring subscripts, M, using H on input V, computes P, or M(V) = P. M halts 
if it reaches equilibrium, i.e. executes T at V. If M never halts it means that 
no T at V exists and M(V) is undefinable, in symbolic terms M(V) = . 
The (semi-strong) EMH, as the dominant theory, argues that in an efficient market 
prices almost instantly reflect all available relevant information. It means that, at 
any point in time, P is so close to V that any R implied by the difference between the 
two is negligible compared to C.172 Effectively this means that M, employing H, 
always leads to P = V, i.e. M is in equilibrium.173 We call this state “minimally 
rational” (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 18) or minimally efficient.174 It also implies that the 
market “knows more than any individual investor can know.” (Bernstein, 1992, p. 
136).  
In view of the above I make the following statements: 
                                           
170 Although here V stands for “equilibrium value”, I would argue that in this Gödelian context it is just as 
applicable to any value concept that acts as an aggregated input from an implicit computation. 
171 We assume C>0, i.e. in trading there are always costs involved. The individual buyer and seller 
involved in T, by definition, agree on P, on abs(R )> C, but not on V. In fact, they don’t know V, but 
make their own estimate, E(v). According to the EMH, V equals the aggregated E(v)’s. 
172 This argument is not inconsistent per se with A.4/5. It just states that a trade “is not worth it.” 
173 As an aside, the problem of the EMH in light of A.4/5 is that no trade takes place. Admittedly, others 
have made the same point but with different arguments (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). 
174 It is (indirectly) related to Markowitz efficient portfolio. 
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1. Finance’s version of the liar’s paradox is: “This price is false”. Specifically, this 
should be interpreted as: Price equals Value is false. Translated in a theorem:  
P = V is unprovable. 
2. Finance’s version of Turing’s halting problem is: there does not exist an H 
which can decide whether M halts.  
Furthermore, I derive the following preliminary conclusions: 
a) If the theorem is false, that is if P = V is provable, then the EMH is 
inconsistent because it means that P actually exists, that is to say as 
an output which, following A.3, implies that one can trade P at V. But 
no trade exists according to A.5, i.e. T = 0; 
b) If the theorem is true, that is if P = V is unprovable, then the EMH is 
incomplete because of its halting problem: H cannot decide whether M 
halts, i.e. reach equilibrium. 
The second conclusion is based on complexity theory which argues that the halting 
problem is unsolvable: 
The most interesting thing about the idea of program-size 
complexity, of measuring the complexity of something by the size of 
the smallest program for calculating it, is that almost every question 
you ask leads straight to incompleteness. Wherever you turn, you 
immediately smash into a stone wall. Incompleteness turns up 
everywhere. (Chaitin, 1998, p. 15) 
In this case, there is no effective procedure to determine whether a market stops 
trading, i.e. whether a market actually is in equilibrium and outputs a P which equals 
V. This follows from AIT’s argument that data follows a law (e.g. P = V) only if the 
model for calculating it (and by extension the underlying theory) is smaller than the 
data it explains. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, an efficient model (again, 
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implemented via a program) is the smallest model possible to produce the output is 
does. Its output is minimally complete if the size of the output is larger than that of 
the model which produces it. In our case, if we assume one P per S, as well as one 
bit per P, the size of M in bits is at least N. In other words, to qualify as a true 
“efficient” model, bit-wise M needs to be smaller than the prices it produces while 
including the equation that represents (proof of) equilibrium. From this, we can show 
that proving whether a market is efficient and minimally complete is not possible.  
To do that, I link AIT to the concept of complete markets (e.g. Arrow and Debrue, 
1954)175 which states that a larger market means more securities, e.g. derivatives, 
which increase its completeness. Back in AIT-terms, at the minimum the size in bits 
of a ‘model-market’ is equal to the number of securities and a larger market thus 
means it is more complex, i.e. contains more bits.  
First, we assume the opposite of what we want to prove is true. Namely, assume 
that there is a general ‘valuation-checking’ market176 that can decide whether any 
market will halt, i.e. has reached equilibrium. From this assumption we shall derive a 
contradiction, a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ proof. Next, I introduce the following 
situation: M’ is our valuation-checking market which produces the output of the first 
provably efficient market that is minimally complete. This leads to assumption A.7: 
7. There exists a market, MM, that is larger than M if it executes trades in more 
securities than M which simultaneously makes it more complete. The above 
assumptions A.2 to A.5 also apply to each security listed in MM. MM only 
halts if each of its securities has been traded, i.e. all trades have been 
executed to the point of equilibrium. 
                                           
175 For a less technical explanation, see Flood (1991). 
176 Again, think “model-market” here. 
211 
 
   
 
M’ embodies its own size in bits, say X. This means that there is sufficient space in 
M’ for it to contain the number X itself. Next, employing H (which M’ contains as a 
subroutine) M’ takes a look at all markets larger than X, say up to 100X bits in size, 
to check which halt, i.e. reach equilibrium, and which do not. Then M’ runs all the 
markets that halt to determine the output that they produce. Their output has to be 
larger than their respective sizes in order to be called a “provably efficient market 
that is minimally complete”. The output will be a set of prices with a degree of 
complexity (i.e. the number of bits required for their description) up to 100X. Finally, 
M’, our valuation-checking market, outputs the smallest positive integer not in this 
set, that is, with complexity greater than a hundred times X. And then M’ itself halts. 
So M’ halts, its size is X bits, and its output is a number that, according to EMH, 
cannot be produced by a market whose size is less than or equal to 100 times X bits. 
But M’ has just produced this integer as its output, and it is much too small to be 
able to do this, because the size of M’ is only X bits, which is much less than 100 
times X. A clear contradiction of the EMH as FAS if it is to remain consistent!  
Let me rephrase this via a variation. M’ runs through the tree of all possible proofs 
(i.e. P = V) in the theory (i.e. EMH), searching for the first proof that an individual 
market, M’’, is minimally complete, for which it is also the case that the size of M’’ in 
bits is larger than the size of M’ in bits. When M’ finds M’’, it runs M’’ and then M’ 
produces as its output the output of M’’, after which it halts itself. But again, M’ is 
too small to produce that output as it cannot produce the same output as a provably 
efficient market that is minimally complete, that is if EMH is to be consistent.  
In fact, what this shows is that M’ can never find M’’, the first provably efficient 
market that is minimally complete. More generally in AIT, a procedure H for deciding 
whether or not programs ever halt cannot exist, for if it did then we could actually 
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construct this paradoxical program using H. The complexity of a theory just the size 
of the smallest program for generating all the theorems of that theory and the above 
shows that if a program M’’ is more complicated than the theory, the latter cannot 
enable you to prove that M’’ is efficient and minimally complete. 
Moreover, the EMH states that each price of a complete N-securities market contains 
all relevant information and that any price move of a particular security is random. 
Following Chaitin (1982) as well as others, let’s again consider such a market as a 
formal axiomatic system, A, for listing a set of theorems. The size of A is N, equal to 
the number of securities. In this case, there exists a market, M, of size N which lists 
its set of theorems as (P = V)i, with i = 1, N. Now toss an unbiased coin slightly 
more than N times. It is almost certain that the resulting binary string will be 
algorithmically random, but it is not possible to prove this within A. Chaitin argues 
that “In fact, within an N-bit formal axiomatic system it is not even possible to prove 
that a particular object [P.S.: a security’s price] has algorithmic information content 
greater than N, even though almost all . . . objects have this property” (1982, p. 
946). Punchline: you need an N-bit theory to proof that an N-bit market is efficient; 
nothing smaller will do. 
Summary Note 
In the context of Lucas’ earlier view, allow me to summarise how AIT’s use of 
“math”, “programs”, “bits”, “length” and “print” can be applied to “EMH”, “markets”, 
“prices”, “size” respectively “quote”. 
AIT says there's some length (size) L, such that you can't prove any particular string 
of bits (prices) needs a program (market) longer (larger) than L to print it out 
(quote). That is to say, if math (EMH) is consistent. If it's not consistent, then you 
simply can't prove anything.At the same time AIT also states there's some finite 
number of programs (markets) of length (size) L. So if you take a list of more 
numbers than that, for example 1, 2, ... , N, there will be at least one that needs a 
program (market) longer (larger) than L to print it out (quote). 
213 
 
   
 
Assume there is just one: Then we can go through all programs (markets) of length 
(size) L, find those that print (quote) all the other numbers on our list and thus, by a 
process of elimination, find the program (market) we are looking for. 
However, that means we've proved that this is a number that can only be computed 
by a program (market) of length (size) > L. And AIT says that's impossible! That is 
to say, again, if math (EMH) is consistent. 
Can there be more than one? No, because we can apply the same logic for each 
step, all the way up to N, until we rule out all the possibilities, at which point we get 
stuck. 
In short, if math (EMH) is to remain consistent we get a contradiction. 
Furthermore, implicit in the view presented here is the argument that the complexity 
of a market (and by extension its theory) is positively correlated with the number of 
prices in that market. More important is the observed fact that the complexity of a 
market reaches its pinnacle, i.e. randomness, as the number of prices, is extended. 
In general, as I have maintained above, this means that a larger number of 
securities is traded. However, this can be disputed if a smaller market, in terms of 
number of securities, can produce the same output. For example, instead of so-
called pure securities this market contains complex securities with pay-outs for 
multiple states (outcomes). But, again, it is ‘AIT-unprovable’ that such a market can 
exist. 
As far as the link between Gödel and Jung is concerned, this has been described, 
among others, by Robertson (1995). Recently I provided my own view on this 
(Schotanus, 2013). The next section details additional Jungian reflections on price 
and its discovery.  




   
 
Let me repeat why this thesis contributes to complex psychology. I argue that price 
discovery in the financial system provides exactly that what Jung himself was unable 
to find elsewhere during his lifetime: a means to measure collective psychic energy 
numerically, in the context of numbers bridging the physical with the mental (von 
Franz, 1974, p. 157).  
In this process, by which investors attempt to deal with uncertainty as they are 
confronted by the unknown, the central question put forth to the collective investor 
unconscious is “what is the true value of this security?” Apart from the almost 
exclusive reliance on analysis, this question itself already leads to tension because 
for each trade the seller and buyer agree on price, but not on value. A trade, 
resulting in a price, thus reflects at the same time agreement and disagreement. 
This touches the core of Jung’s psychology, the implicit duality of symbols. It also 
points to the elusiveness of “equilibrium” in capital markets. Specifically, price itself 
is divided. On the one hand, the unity of the phenomenal and the hidden (Jung’s 
unanschaulich) produces the realisation of information, i.e. the price’s signal, in the 
cognitive domain. On the other they escape capture because it would jeopardise the 
market’s intrinsic ability to “surprise”. In short, price has to remain symbolic. Prices 
reveal the empirical fact of the numbers at which level trades, the exchange of 
monies, took place. At the same time they conceal the hidden true values of the 
concerned securities, even the buyer and seller’s estimates for these values in the 
‘back of their minds’. 
Following Giegerich (2007), at the macro level prices are “the garb or garment in 
which the irrepresentable” market’s mind manifests itself. Giegerich calls the implied 
dynamics within a symbol its “logical drama”. Applied to the market, with price as its 
symbol, we can read the following script: 
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• 1st act: the market’s mind emerges in disguise. It expresses itself in 
symbolic garb and manifests itself phenomenally, i.e. it makes itself 
visible by way of price, the number realised (i.e. experienced) when an 
exchange takes place. The collective investor unconscious represents 
itself in this symbol which speaks in its name. 
• 2nd act: the phenomenal aspect of the price negates itself. It says: “My 
appearance, the way I look, is not what I’m about. Don’t take me at face 
value. In fact, I’m not really about value at all.” 
• 3rd act: the phenomenal aspect of the price pushes itself off from itself 
and points to something hidden, an implied “other”, invisible as to that 
which it is actually about. It says: “In truth, I am about this non-
phenomenal other”. 
• 4th act: the price says “But only through me, this garb, can you get access 
to this other. The latter is not wholly other, not anything outside of me, 
like you, the trader, do not exists outside and independently of your 
trades. That other to which I point out, as that which I am actually about, 
exists exclusively within me; there is nothing behind me. I am its valid 
and true representation, its best possible representation. In fact, that 
other represented by me exists only through me, is produced by me, 
posited by and within myself, precisely through my negation of myself.” 
• 5th act: the price clarifies its own negation: “Because my meaning is 
absolutely negative, I really mean nothing, not in the sense of total 
emptiness, but in the sense that I mean exactly what I phenomenally 
show and represent.”    
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As Giegerich points out, the symbol is this internal drama with all five acts acted out 
simultaneously. In terms of price, what from the outside appears as a simple static 
number, a unitary phenomenon is, viewed from within, a dynamic drama. It is 
dynamic for two reasons.  
First, the ‘logic’ of the drama is, as it were, ‘behind the mask’ of price and the logic 
of the symbol is:  
a circular, uroboric logic. The end result of this logical drama (PS: 
5th act) returns to where we were at the very beginning (PS: 1st 
act). But this does not imply that we could simply eliminate and 
forget about the intermediate acts of this drama. No, the end 
contains all the stages that the movement passed through within 
itself, so that the end is not at all identical with the beginning. It is 
immensely enriched. (Ibid, p. 260) 
Second, this drama unfolds in an expanding but endless chain, as each symbol 
generates mental reflections (i.e. price discovery) and behavioural reactions (i.e. 
trades) which, in turn, create new symbols. Those new symbols include not only new 
prices, but also (add to) their patterns and the dramas they represent. In other 
words, the logical drama within the price is acted out on the larger stage of the 
market due to the dynamics of duality. This, for example, makes price the ultimate 
fractal (see also below). As previously discussed, this never-ending story also 
embeds confabulations. 









Imagine prices (and their patterns) to contain both a yin and a yang aspect. In 
particular, we could think of price to reflect the real ‘hard’ current cash (for the 
seller), as well as the imagined ‘soft’ future benefit (for the buyer). We can build on 
from there177: 
1. Yin and yang do not exclude each other, rather they complement. 
Everything has its opposite: although this is never absolute - only 
relative. No one thing is completely yin or completely yang. Each contains 
the seed of its opposite. For example, ‘what goes up, must come down’: a 
bullish price has a bearish shadow. 
2. Yin and yang are interdependent. One cannot exist without the other. For 
example, reward cannot be gained without risk. Each return has its 
volatility. 
3. Yin and yang can be further subdivided into ‘smaller’ yins and yangs. 
Prices and their patterns are fractal in nature. Within each spectrum, 
there is a smaller spectrum. Every pattern is a phase in time of which its 
                                           
177 Freely adapted from http://psychology.wikia.com/wiki/Yin_and_yang . 
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closing price embodies its historic path, of ‘how it got there’. At the same 
time, that price is the beginning of its future path, embodying its 
potential.  
4. Yin and yang consume and support each other. Yin and yang are usually 
held in balance: as one increases, the other decreases. However, 
imbalances can occur: by excess of yin there is a yang deficiency and vice 
versa. The imbalance is also a relative factor: the excess of yang ‘forces’ 
yin to be more ‘concentrated’, like a crowded trade.  
5. Yin and yang can transform into one another. At a particular stage, yin 
can transform into yang and vice versa. For example, a bear morphs into 
a bull. However this transformation is relative. Bears and bulls can coexist 
in the financial system. 
6. Part of yin is in yang and part of yang is in yin. As the picture above 
shows, the dots in each serve as a reminder that there are always traces 
of one in the other. For example, there are always green shoots in every 
recession, there is always the contrarian within the crowd.  
7. These dynamics are a reminder that extreme yang at some point 
transforms instantly into yin, and vice versa, or that the labels yin and 
yang are conditioned by an observer's point of view. For example, the 
steepest trend is easiest to break. This can show that absolute 
discrimination between the two is artificial. 
We can extend the Yin Yang symbol to another Chinese numerical symbol, namely 
the hexagrams of the I Ching. For example, this is Hexagram 4: 
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As an aside, it is striking how these represent combinations of Cantor sets, to the 
point of Cantor dust, a well-known pattern in chaos theory: 
 
From these symbolic numerical patterns I will now move to price patterns. 
8.5 PATTERNS IN PRICE 
 
Prices (for the Dow, Nasdaq, US Treasury Bond, Brent Oil Future, etc.) become the 
numeric symbols in the process of finding order by investors, e.g. “The Dow 
10,000”, “The 666 SPX”, “$100 oil”. Over time, apart from hard cash emotional 
energy has been invested along this ‘path of prices’, and revelations of the ‘true 
value’ are reflected in (violent) moves in price. The resulting price patterns become 
the symbols that reveal, to some directly but for most in hindsight, the mystery. In 
the spirit of what I wrote in 8.2, Peter Bernstein (1996) notes: “After the fact . . . 
when we study the history of what happened, the source of wildness appears to be 
so obvious to us that we have a hard time understanding how people on the scene 
were oblivious to what lay in wait for them.” The crash of 1929, the burst of the 
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internet bubble in 2000, Lehman’s collapse, and generally patterns in technical 
analysis, like the “Head and Shoulder”, are obvious examples of these stories. 
Thus, price is established at each point in time as, in Jung’s own words, “the best 
possible expression at the moment for a fact as yet unknown”. This leads to tension 
and is the reflective source for dealing with uncertainty. Any (perceived) increase in 
external surprises (either in size or number) is compensated, in a healthy mind, by 
increasing the (size or number of) innovations. However, the tendency within groups 
(influenced by unconscious induction) is to feel less vulnerable and more secure by 
focussing on a shared explanation, i.e. consensus.178 I call this process participation 
confabulation (e.g. explaining away surprises, errors, and the like), not only because 
the group represses internal novelty179 but also because it has to sound convincing 
from a cognitive point of view: only rational arguments have the power to repress 
the pushback from the (contrarian) emotional feelings of individual non-believers, 
albeit only for so long. Consequently, and most clearly observed during the 
formation of a financial bubble, the imbalance grows, or rather feeds on itself, as the 
shared views of investors increasingly become one-dimensional. The link between 
the collective unconscious and quantum-physics is thus fairly intuitive: investors 
attempt to estimate a move along space and time of an object they cannot 
objectively observe. Furthermore, the concept of number sense has taught us that 
large, i.e. growing, numbers are projected in space to the right and, in fact, are 
associated with growing uncertainty, i.e. decreasing accuracy in our estimation. Let’s 
try to visualise this in a moment. 
                                           
178 Along the lines of “If we stick together we stand strong and can face this uncertainty”. 
179 Along the lines of “We need to focus and not allow distractions. So don’t bother me with your insights, 
we ‘know’ how to deal with this crisis.” 
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But first, let’s return to Jung’s emphasis on the importance of the first four natural 
numbers. I repeat the following quote because it is so crucial, in this case providing 
an appropriate prelude to the Binarius, my definition for the most basic price 
formation which I will introduce shortly: 
one is not a number at all; the first number is two. Two is the first 
number because, with it, separation and multiplication begin, which 
alone make counting possible. With the appearance of the number 
two, another appears alongside the one, a happening which is so 
striking that in many languages ‘the other’ and ‘the second’ are 
expressed by the same word. . . . The ‘other’ can have a ‘sinister’ 
significance—or one feels it at least, as something opposite and 
alien. . . . Two implies a one which is different and distinct from the 
‘numberless’ One. In other words, as soon as the number two 
appears, a unit is produced out of the original unity, and this unit is 
none other than the same unity split into two and turned into a 
‘number’. The ‘One’ and the ‘Other’ form an opposition, but there is 
no opposition between one and two, for these are simple numbers 
which are distinguished only by their arithmetical value and nothing 
else. The ‘One’, however, seeks to hold to its one-and-alone 
existence, while the ‘Other’ ever strives to be another opposed to 
the One. The One will not let go of the Other because, if it did, it 
would lose its character; and the Other pushes itself away from the 
One in order to exist at all. Thus there arises a tension of opposites 
between the One and the Other. 
This “tension of opposites” leads to Jung’s concept of enantiodromia. It basically is 
the psychological version of reversal and equilibrium in the sense that it 
counterbalances the overarching tendency. In Jung’s words: 
This characteristic phenomenon practically always occurs when an 
extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in time an 
equally powerful counter-position is built up, which first inhibits the 
conscious performance and subsequently breaks through the 
conscious control. (CW6, para. 426) 
Enantiodromia became a key aspect of the archetypal hypothesis. It is the corrective 
mechanism which provides an archetype with its binary nature: the two opposites 
which complement one another. We can place this in the quarternity concept of 
Jung, i.e. 4 squaring the circle:  
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1. An impulse leads to “an extreme, one-sided tendency” away from the 
origin.  
2. The emergence of a new symbol (e.g. number) not only suggests that the 
archetype is projecting its archetypal image (‘the unit out of the original 
unity’), it also suggests enantiodromia is operational, i.e. the counter-
balancing force has become active. 
3. Initially this force only inhibits conscious control, i.e. it is restraint. But 
“every tension of opposites culminates in a release, out of which comes 
the ‘third’. In the third, the tension is resolved and the lost unity is 
restored. Unity, the absolute One cannot be numbered, it is indefinable 
and unknowable; only when it appears as a unit, the number one, is it 
knowable, for the ‘Other’ which is required for this act of knowing is 
lacking in the condition of One. 
4. Eventually a resolution, as in renewed equilibrium, completes the 
correction. The completion of three means the squaring of the circle by 
four, in Von Franz’s terms (see below). However, at the same time it 
creates the set-up for the next impulse.  
This leads to my naming and definition of the most basic price formation which is at 
the core of all price patterns: the Binarius. The Binarius is formed once the price 
retraces to a previously attained level. Assuming the time dimension along the x-





   
 
 
Its mirror image is the reversed Binarius: 
 







   
 
• Binarius contains 2 moves. The initial price move in one direction, 
graphically represented as the left leg, is technically not a pattern, only a 
line. In Jung’s terms, it is the “numberless” one. It is the connection 
between the base and space, nothing and (pointing to) something. It is 
this move, which plants the seeds for disequilibrium, as well as for the 
build-up of the emotional charge. 
• The second move is equal, but opposite to move one. Once it has 
emerged it contrasts the one as “the other”. As it appears, uncertainty is 
revealed for the first time. In technical terms, there is price action 
(impulse move), followed by price reaction (correction move). 
• Binarius reflects both disequilibrium, as well as equilibrium. Disequilibrium 
is at its extreme point in space, equilibrium is the return to its base. In 
technical terms, it reflects a full reversal, whereby the return of one leg is 
equal, but opposite to the other leg180. 
So, archetypically the number 2 represents duality. It is the archetype for division 
and repetition. It enables the formation of Yin and Yang. It signifies the start of the 
formation of Cantor dust. Furthermore, it is also identified by Maturana and Varela 
as the number that allows distinction between the individual entity and its 
surroundings, which is at the centre of awareness, again echoing Jung. In financial 
markets, it captures bull and bear phases.  
The completion of the Binarius reveals the uncertainty, and is the prelude to the 
next move, move number 3, the first leg of a new Binarius. Let’s repeat what Jung 
states: 
                                           
180 Measured from the initial point. 
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But every tension of opposites culminates in a release, out of which 
comes the “third”. . . Three is an unfolding of the One to a condition 
where it can be known—unity becomes recognizable; had it not 
been resolved into the polarity of the One and the Other, it would 
have remained fixed in a condition devoid of every quality. 
This brings us to the interpretation of those sections in price moves which didn’t see 
any reversals (yet), i.e. Ones without a Two. In other words, a straight line only. 
This is fairly intuitive: there is no conscious uncertainty, the numbers reflected in the 
prices along this path have no quality (yet). Technical analysts will recognise this as 
price levels where there is no indication of support or resistance. The space is a void, 
without any reference of having been there. Although this invokes images of infinity 
and other “Godlike” properties, such a move plants even stronger seeds of reversal 
exactly because of this. The only asset which we ‘know’ will, in principle, continue as 
a straight line is the price index of cash. It is ‘risk-free’.181  
This leads us into the next chapter which will discuss Archetypal Valuation as a 
framework of thinking within which a new investment research method (see chapter 
10) is embedded. 
  
                                           
181 I ignore the risk of debasement of the underlying currency, default by the sovereign, etc. 
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CHAPTER 9. ARCHETYPAL VALUATION: PSYCHURITIES 
AND PORTFOLIOS 
I suggest getting to know your feelings, by experiencing them, expressing them, letting 
them pass through 
Ed Seykota, trader 
 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern finance has dealt with valuation from an outdated materialistic, i.e. 
mechanical, paradigm. It assumes that such assessment is largely rational and, in 
line with the natural sciences, that the investor can be separated from the market to 
make objective observations. Instead, as I have argued in the previous chapters, the 
movements in price and related data within the financial system reflect a collective 
consciousness that is intersubjectively experienced by investors: whatever cognitive 
impulses lead to buying and selling, they originate in the unconscious and are 
enriched by sensations. How do we bring these together? 
Continuing with the analogy between mind and market, I will introduce in this 
chapter a portfolio management perspective of mentality. It starts with the view 
that, reflected symbolically in prices, the process underlying the allocation of 
physical resources mirrors that underlying the allocation of mental resources. 
Damasio (1999, p. 82) points out, for example, that attention is “something of a 
finite commodity” in terms of mental resources. As usual I place special emphasis on 
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the primacy of the unconscious182 in the relationship between the objective event 
and the (inter)subjective experience. As before I emphasise the role of numerical 
archetypes in mapping the external onto the internal, i.e. as an emerging image, in 
particular enabling differentiation and integration: 
So long as a thing is in the unconscious it has no recognizable 
qualities and is consequently merged with the universal unknown, 
with the unconscious . . . But as soon as the unconscious content 
enters the sphere of consciousness it has already split into the 
‘four’, that is to say it can become an object of experience only by 
virtue of the four basic functions of consciousness. It is perceived as 
something that exists (sensation); it is recognized as this and 
distinguished from that (thinking); it is evaluated as pleasant or 
unpleasant . . . (feeling); and finally, intuition tells us where it came 
from and where it is going. (Jung, in Von Franz, 1974, p. 121; 
emphasis mine) 
In viewing mentality in general, and the collective unconscious in particular, from a 
market perspective the reader should keep in mind Jung’s earlier words (see 1.1.4) 
regarding the unconscious: it is like “a collective human being” who, based on 
“immeasurable experience”, is “an incomparable prognosticator” who possesses “a 
living sense of the rhythm of growth, flowering and decay”. To be clear, this does 
not make the unconscious, nor the market fully perfect or purposeful. 
Below, by invoking Roll’s second critique, I point to the similarity, at least 
metaphorically, between the collective unconscious and the ‘overall market’, both of 
which can only be inferred. Crucial in the current context is the element of surprise 
which both exhibit. The aforementioned primacy of the unconscious follows from 
this: to endogenously (but secretly) generate the internal surprises (innovations) 
which enable the mind to adapt to external ones. Although mentality includes both 
Systems 1, e.g. emotion, and System 2, e.g. thought, in terms of dual-system 
                                           
182 In that respect I have more sympathy with, for example, the view expressed by Damasio (1999) and 




   
 
approaches to mind, I will focus on emotions because they are more prominent in 
complex psychology and are underrated in modern finance.  
The investment angle from which I view emotions means that instead of employing 
the more common computational terminology used, for example, in evolutionary 
psychology to describe emotions (e.g. ‘superordinate programs’), I invoke 
terminology from portfolio management albeit without the association to modern 
finance. In the following I therefore assume that the reader is familiar with the 
basics of portfolio management. 
Valuation is central in portfolio management. Panksepp provides a nice confirmation 
of the primordial status of numerical archetypes as symbolising values at the core of 
consciousness: 
These flickers of consciousness were created by the neural 
mechanisms that first allowed organisms to behave as internally 
motivated, coherently functioning creatures that could be proactive 
as opposed to simply reactive. They would therefore have been 
emotional in quality—the precursors of feelings like fear and desire. 
The rudiments of consciousness were probably built upon neural 
systems that symbolise . . . values—the basic motivational and 
emotional systems of the brain that inform organisms how they are 
faring in the game of survival. (in Carter, 2002, p. 186; emphasis 
mine) 
Apart from the similarities, there remains a gap in the ultimate translation of 
monetary values of assets and the mental values of emotions which these assets 
invoke. Although the numbers, represented by prices, form Pauli’s “common 
language” to bridge the physical with the mental, something gets lost in translation. 
This is caused, first and foremost, by the difference between cognitive expectations 
and archetypal expectations about value. Whereas the former ‘deal in’ matters of 
reason, the latter ‘deal in’ matters of the heart. As part of the broader ‘arms race’ 
within the system, this difference leads to tension and ultimately to price dynamics. 
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9.2 EMOTIONS AS PORTFOLIOS OF PSYCHURITIES 
 
First, we need to make the distinction between an investment portfolio or IP (which 
contains securities) and an emotion portfolio or EP183. Specifically, emotions can be 
viewed as portfolios of sector-specific psychological securities, which I call 
psychurities. A psychurity is simply the finance-inspired term for a single 
psychological adaptation: its activation or trigger is event-dependent or, in finance 
terms, ‘state contingent’. As such, a psychurity embeds a contingent claim, or 
payoff. Each EP is structured to replicate a strategy to respond to an event, 
ultimately aimed at gaining a reward or hedging a risk. The mind consequently forms 
a multi-layered complex of EPs (a ‘fund-of-fund’ if you will) which, via allocation and 
dynamic rebalancing, allows it to seek or avoid exposure to a multitude of 
circumstances. At the same time, like the fund-of-fund leads to a stream of pay-offs, 
the combined EPs result in a ‘stream of consciousness’. 
The values of these EPs are ultimately intersubjectively determined. First, they are 
appraised via the interaction, in the form of competition and cooperation, between 
the subcomponents in the individual mind. Specifically, the competition for neural 
resources in the brain between deliberative thoughts and instinctive emotions is an 
extension of the broader polarity between the unconscious and conscious forces. 
Second, they are also appraised via the interaction with other minds. Regarding the 
latter, mirror neurons seem to play a central role in the collective unconscious 
assessment of emotions (see Chapter 7). We can consequently view this as a global 
market of emotions. Together with the local (i.e. personal) market, emotions are 
                                           




   
 
evaluated according to their fitness to a certain situation: an emotion becomes more 
valuable if its payoff, implied by the strategy as a response to the situation, 
increases the emotional utility of the overall complex of portfolios. Also, due to their 
ancient existence (making System 1 much older than System 2), the history of 
emotion valuation is much longer than that of cognitive valuation. (For comparison, 
the history of gold valuation is much longer than that of oil). 
There are four arguments why the EP interpretation is useful in general, and why it 
is more appropriate than a macro-economic interpretation of emotions184 in 
particular.  
1. Focus on leading indicator of emotions 
In line with my thesis, we are mostly interested in clarifying the earliest phase of the 
emergence and impact of emotions, in particular instinctive emotions. In other 
words, we are interested in the leading indicator of emotions. How is this mirrored in 
the physical world of economics? Capital markets are generally considered the 
leading indicator for the real economy. They are an economic meta-adaptation in 
that they solve a crucial economic problem: to allocate capital, in a reasonably 
efficient way, to investments which eventually find their way into physical assets 
(i.e. output) of the real economy. In the words of Bill Miller, legendary fund manager 
of the Legg Mason Value Trust: 
One of the things capital markets do is consider possible worlds. The 
level and direction of prices reflect the markets’ assessment of the 
probabilities of possible worlds becoming actual. There are 
advocates for many of these views. Investors consider the risks and 
rewards and allocate their money accordingly. 
                                           
184 See, for example, Neu (2008) on Rolls’ theory. 
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With this interpretation, I use financial investments (i.e. sector-specific securities) as 
a metaphor: they are the economic equivalent of domain-specific psychological 
adaptations. Like the latter, securities have a risk/return profile reflecting 
simultaneously historic experiences and implied expectations. Combined in a 
portfolio this makes them appropriate responses to (benefit from/hedge against) the 
stimuli from the real economy. But just like emotions and behaviour are not clearly 
separable, neither are the capital markets and the real economy. In other words, 
both embed intricate and complex feedback loops, in particular concerning 
expectations and actual outcomes, which make cause-and-effect relationships 
difficult (if not impossible) to determine. Specifically, the complexity arises: 
 from the reflexive influence on each other (i.e. emotions on behaviour, 
respectively capital markets on the real economy, and vice versa for both), 
and 
 from the intersubjectivity between the constituents, particularly the influence 
of ‘the collective’ on the individual constituents.  
Regarding the latter, whereas individual emotions are correlated to (historic) 
collective emotions (i.e. themes), individual assets are correlated to the risk factors 
of the broader markets. In short, a portfolio reflects historic experiences, future 
expectations, and intersubjectivity. Again, this makes portfolio management so 
appropriate as a shared and mutually applicable concept between securities and 
psychurities.  
2. Focus on valuation 
Using the finance metaphor of securities as the constituents of a portfolio implies 
that the value embedded in an emotion, as a portfolio of psychurities, is not always 
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clear-cut and can fluctuate. Specifically, my approach emphasises that there is 
always a flipside to the return of the psychurity, namely its risk, e.g. the cost of 
selecting it. This is consistent with the original meaning of responses to stimuli, for 
example in terms of foraging. The attractive prospect of the stimulus food may not 
outweigh the cost of obtaining it, i.e. it can be bad or poisonous, too risky to pursue, 
not adding (diversification) value (i.e. similar food is already available or stored), 
etc. More importantly, as aforementioned, the value of emotions is ‘above all’ 
assessed collectively. This not only concerns ‘nature’s emotions’, that is to say the 
primordial instinctive emotions which reflect values with a rich history that we 
commonly share with our ancestors. It also includes ‘nurtured emotions’: those more 
social and culturally biased emotions, e.g. morals, which we commonly express in 
our relationships while we simultaneously are experiencing the same situation (e.g. 
a family mourning the death of a family member). As discussed previously (Chapter 
7), embodied simulation via mirror neurons suggests that the capturing of an 
expressed emotion by the senses, e.g. via observation, unconsciously already 
triggers a similar emotion in the observer. In short, emotions may be experienced 
privately but, like portfolios, they receive their ‘objective’ appraisal collectively. On 
that note, a bubble is not only an excessive valuation in financial wealth (e.g. US$) 
terms, but also in terms of collective single-minded emotional values, i.e. euphoria. 
3. Focus on dynamic rebalancing 
Dynamic rebalancing of the weights of the constituents of a portfolio enables in 
principle the replication of an unlimited array of payoffs. In other words, the concept 
of portfolio management includes a principle which can explain the flexibility and 




   
 
4. Focus on price dynamics in capital markets which differs from those in 
the real economy 
Price discovery in capital markets is different in nature from that in the real 
economy. Consequently, the relationship between emotions and financial assets is 
different than between emotions and consumer products. Specifically, the dynamics 
of supply and demand in response to (extreme) price action in capital markets is 
counter-intuitive from an economic perspective. For example, in the build-up of a 
crowded trade demand, in the form of volume, frequently goes up as prices increase. 
This leads, for example, to the phenomenon of momentum. In short, EP is the 
proper metaphor to think about ‘managing’ emotions, at least for those involved in 
investing. 
To summarise, a portfolio management approach to mentality (e.g. emotions) is 
consistent with and fits within evolutionary psychology. Evolution, via natural 
selection, has resulted in psychological functions or capabilities directed at solving 
specific adaptive problems, mainly those that existed among our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors. Following Rolls (2007) and Panksepp (1998) the problems that confronted 
our ancestors basically involved the questions of how to gain rewards (pleasure) 
and/or how to avoid penalties (pain). In other words, the evolved capabilities have 
economic characteristics: they enable responses to stimuli which suggest either a 
return (profit) or a risk (loss). These capabilities are adaptations which enhance 
survival by assessing the risk/return profile of situations and structuring an 
appropriate payoff. Placed back in the settings of our contemporary ‘financial jungle’, 
they enhance, in principle, economic survival and value creation. However, there are 




   
 
1. As aforementioned, they also contain a strong historic/primordial bias which 
frequently does not fit the current circumstances. In other words, the ancient 
‘nature’s jungle’ of our hunter-ancestors may not always properly reflect our 
modern-day ‘financial jungle’. For example, whereas nature’s jungle led to 
losses of lives, the financial one leads to losses of livelihoods. 
2. They also include adaptations which attempt to optimise an individual’s 
wellbeing, irrespective of the individual’s wealth. An example is charity. 
Translated in utility terms, emotional utility maximisation is not always 
aligned, and in fact frequently inconsistent with, economic utility 
maximisation. From a statistical perspective, this is due to issues such as 
bounded rationality (i.e. incomplete information about the likely outcomes of 
a series of actions) and the “inability to use optimal algorithms when 
combining conditional probabilities” (Rolls, 2007, p.410). These conditional 
probabilities are implied, via their EEA, by the selected psychurities in the 
emotional portfolios. In Jungian terms, the archetypal expectancies 
embedded in the emotions, as symbolic expressions of the archetypes, are 
non-linear. 
Although the level of specialisation of these psychological capabilities varies, each 
reflects its characteristics in the form of a risk/return profile and can thus be 
considered as psychurities. Combined they require some form of management as 
argued, for example, by Tooby and Cosmides (2005). Emotions are among the 
higher-level functions which achieve this via portfolio management: they form 
portfolios of lower-level, or sector-specific, psychurities. These portfolios, in turn, 
can become part of higher-level portfolios. Via emotions the mind manages multi-
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layered portfolios of psychurities, each characterised by a particular risk/return 
profile, replicating a strategy with an implied payoff.  
At its source the evaluation of EPs involves numerical principles and is guided by the 
numerical archetypes. Numerical archetypes ultimately provide the subliminal bridge 
between assets and emotions, matter and mind, as they symbolically emerge, via 
price discovery, in the form of prices. In general archetypes form the systematic 
emotion factors around which emotions cluster. This brings us to the next section. 
9.3 ARCHETYPAL VALUATION 
 
If one of the challenges of this Ph.D. is to better understand the reflexive workings 
of the market, the question is to what extent my investment model of the mind, 
inspired by Jung’s archetypal hypothesis, can be interpreted or compared to 
traditional models of the market? And how does the related research philosophy, 
which I call Archetypal Valuation, compare to traditional methods of financial 
analysis? The following clarification could help in particular finance experts who are 
familiar with those models and methods, although I hope it will be intuitively 
appealing to others as well. 
9.3.1 COMPARED TO TRADITIONAL MODELS 
First, let’s take a particular look at the pillar of modern portfolio theory, the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The link with complex psychology is that the end-point 
of the CAPM, namely the second element of Roll’s critique (1977) which states that 
the market portfolio cannot be observed, is the starting point of Jung’s model, 
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namely that the collective unconscious cannot be observed. Specifically, the fact that 
the CAPM cannot be verified has not prevented investors (nor finance academics) to 
use the model in one way or another (e.g. Fama and French, 2004). On that note, if 
we allow Jung’s model the same treatment, particularly since it tries to capture 
similarly elusive behaviour, how far we can extent this analogy?  
We can consider the collective unconscious as managing the all-encompassing 
emotion portfolio, like the market manages the all-encompassing asset portfolio in 
the case of the CAPM. Although it cannot be observed, Jung’s model suggests 
nevertheless that there are certain systematic emotion factors which can explain the 
dynamics (e.g. variance) of individual emotions. These “ordering” factors are the 
archetypes and they symbolically emerge in consciousness, for example via 
numbers, myths and other symbolic themes. At this point I would like to introduce 
another pillar of modern finance, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), which basically 
is an extension of the CAPM. The APT holds that the expected returns of financial 
assets can be modelled via a multiple regression as a function of various factors, 
whereby the assets’ respective sensitivity to changes in each factor is represented 
by a factor-specific beta coefficient. In other words, unlike the CAPM, which 
‘identifies’ the market as its one and only factor, the APT suggests there are multiple 
factors at work. However, the APT does not itself reveal the identity of these factors 
which remain elusive. Still, over time various economic (e.g. yield-curve) and style 
(e.g. momentum) factors have been tried and tested which seem to act as proxies 
for consistent cross-sectional drivers of asset returns. They seem to capture 
recurring investment themes which investors buy into or sell out of. They form 
risk/return patterns, so-called risk premia, to which investors seek or avoid 
exposure. Indeed, this sounds very similar to the role of archetypes. Obviously Jung 
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never actually ran regressions across the emotions of his patients (as expressed in 
their dreams, etc.) nor across the emotions he identified in historic accounts of 
myths, religions, and art. Nevertheless, in his analysis he found consistent thematic 
factors reflected in the form of archetypal images.  
Investment Note185 
Like the APT’s risk factors, archetypes are elusive but a number of them have been 
identified. Similarly, the ‘expected’ value of an archetype can be compared to the 
expected value of the premium of a risk factor. More specifically, the expected 
archetypal value can similarly be viewed as the outcome of a cross-sectional 
regression over an extremely long historic period, which makes it rather stable. 
Archetypal values also cannot be fully replicated, only mimicked via the archetypal 
images. In narrative terms, for example, this is formed by the myth. Over shorter 
time periods the ‘archetypal mimicking value’ oscillates around the expected 
archetypal value, depending on the symbolic meaning represented in the archetypal 
image, as well as the oscillations of other archetypes. Buyers (sellers) buy (sell) 
something emotionally and justify it logically. The archetypal image, the core 
meaning of what was bought or sold, attracts the emotions which cluster around it. 
In times of excessive emotional imbalances, usually justified via confabulation, the 
initial symbolic meaning of the archetypal image (which at the start of its emergence 
was closely representing the expected archetypal value) gets so distorted by 
emotional exuberance around it that it leads the unconscious to compensate. The 
motivation of the collective unconscious to compensate is the risk embedded in the 
convergence of emotions around singular themes, i.e. single-mindedness, 
exemplified in crowded trades (see Chapter 7). It compensates by intersubjectively 
increasing the (perceived) value of neglected archetypes via the emergence of their 
respective images. In other words, like a healthy market, the collective unconscious 
operates at the global level where it dynamically rebalances, like a reversal to the 
mean, the rewards for exposures to factors, in this case emotional themes captured 
via archetypal images. Consequently, and similar to the sensitivity of a portfolio to a 
risk factor, the raw ‘score’ of an emotion embeds its sensitivity to an archetype. The 
second element in this psychic regression equation, which I call the Archetypal 
Equation, is the meaning which the archetypal image represents, i.e. its current risk 
premium. Jung called this the emotional charge or feeling tone of the archetype. 
Overall, the ultimate value or affect of an emotion is dependent on its sensitivity 
multiplied by the underlying emotional charge of the archetypal image, similar to the 
valuation of the marginal return contribution by a risk factor in the APT. Therefore, if 
the meaning of the archetypal image is changing, due to the compensating actions 
of the collective unconscious, the value of the emotion, i.e. its desirability in terms of 
fitness to a situation, changes too. It explains the wide swings in emotions, 
particularly in collective settings during turbulent times when symbols, both 
numerical and narrative, are created and destroyed at a rapid pace. 
                                           
185 This note delves further into the similarities between risk factors and archetypes. It should particularly 
appeal to those familiar with (BARRA-type) risk factor models. 
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Finally, to a large extent emotions seem ‘managed’. That is to say, the mandates for 
most portfolios are discretionary in the sense that they get consciously interpreted 
via deliberation, i.e. determining the specific buy and sell orders. However, there are 
a number of portfolios which remain non-discretionary. They are true black boxes. 
These portfolios, although part of the mind’s ‘stable of funds’, are created non-
consciously via program trades which get triggered autonomously. Sometimes they 
get triggered in order to form an overlay to balance an overly biased view of one of 
the other discretionary portfolios. In any case, all portfolios aim to match the 
appropriate internal state to the external environment by dynamically rebalancing 
the sector-specific psychurities. Still, ‘appropriate’ is eventually reflecting the 
individual’s complexes via the biases in the discretionary portfolios. 
 
9.3.2 COMPARED TO OPTIMISATION 
A regression is an example of a method to optimise. Optimisation is a mathematical 
practice frequently applied in trading strategies and portfolio management. I believe 
it offers us a powerful analogy to further clarify the meaning of archetypes, as well 
as Jung’s concept of the transcendent function.  
The aim of optimisation is to find an optimal solution to a constraint problem, often 
in terms of finding a minimum or maximum value from within an allowed set. In 
investing, for example, practitioners optimise the weights of the holdings in their 
portfolio to achieve the minimum level of expected risk or, alternatively, the 
maximum level of expected return. The optimisation problem should be viewed in a 
larger framework, usually called a system. Within such a system, we can identify 
objective functions, search spaces, domains, constraints, equalities, and inequalities, 
among others. 
So let’s apply this to the archetypal hypothesis. We can interpret the collective 
unconscious as a mental optimisation system. Specifically, archetypes form the 
‘objective’ or ‘cost’ functions which generate values to be modelled. These values 
come from within the domain of each particular archetype, its complex at the 
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personal level, and are “feeling values” or the “emotional charges” in Jung’s terms. 
They appear as images, or symbols, and in our optimisation analogy are the so-
called ‘feasible solutions’. However, only those symbols that bridge (i.e. minimise the 
distance between) the conscious to the unconscious are optimal solutions. In Jung’s 
terms they are the “living” symbols that will perform the transcendent function by 
“putting an end to the division and forcing the energy of the opposites into a 
common channel” (CW6, para. 827), or factor if you will. Specifically, the collective 
unconscious attempts to fit consciousness to the model represented by the 
archetypes by selecting contents “best suited to themselves” (CW5, para. 232). 
Again, I have called this model the Archetypal Equation. In other words, the aim of 
the collective unconscious is to minimise the deviations between the two, or 
alternatively to maximise convergence. The difference between traditional 
mathematical optimisation and psychological optimisation comes from the fact that it 
is the unconscious, mandated to the archetypes, which drives this convergence (e.g. 
via enantiodromia) within the optimisation process as well as provide its objective, 
or goal, in the form of a symbol. At the individual level such optimisation ultimately 
comprises individuation, i.e. the transcendent function, and concerns the Self. As 
Robertson (1995, p.212) explains, the Self “is both process and goal. This is quite a 
paradox and paradoxes are usually not welcome, but this paradox is not the result of 
some metaphysical speculation, but a simple description of how symbolic resolutions 
emerge.” In finance we are familiar with such a paradox: you can only hope to 
receive a return if you accept the risk. And that moment occurs when you trade, 
with the price as symbolic resolution. 
We can translate the optimisation process from mathematical terms into 
psychological terms for the individual investor:  
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 Overall, the optimisation process is Jung’s individuation. 
 The domain for each of the objective functions is personal, namely the 
individual’s complex. For an investor this means his personal relationship to 
the symbol, the archetypal image, of an investment theme, a stock, or 
ultimately the price.186 
 The solution to each of the objective functions is always local, i.e. the ‘true’ 
value of the symbol for the investor whereby the price triggers a trade. 
 The ego-consciousness is the most obvious limitation, or constraint.  
The translation in terms of the collective, i.e. for the financial system, follows the 
description of the metaphorical regression of section 9.3.1. Specifically, for an 
individual market: 
 Overall, the optimisation process is wholeness (a balanced allocation across 
emotions). 
 The domain for each of the objective functions is universal, namely the 
market’s complex, specifically the relationship between the quantitative and 
the qualitative characteristics of its prices. 
 The solution to each of the objective functions is global, i.e. the ‘true’ value of 
the symbol. 
 Herd consciousness, a single-mindedness to the point of “irrational 
exhuberance” reflected in crowded trades, is the most obvious limitation, or 
constraint. 
                                           
186 That relationship exceeds a monetary commitment and more broadly extends to the investor’s overall 
relationship to the market. 
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9.4 ADAPTIVE PURPOSE 
 
With these analogies it hopefully becomes much clearer what the archetypal 
hypothesis contributes to our understanding of the (market/investors) psyche. It is 
simply for the same reason the APT helps us, in an analytical sense, to model the 
capital market. Understood in this functional (e.g. regression) framework, combined 
with comments from previous chapters (in particular Chapter 2), it explains what the 
use of archetypes is for the human mind. Specifically, the adaptive purpose of 
archetypes in terms of increasing the emotional fitness is now clear. Like the elusive 
risk factors in the APT, subconsciously the archetypes: 
 drastically reduce the number of input variables to make forecasts (Jung’s 
“prognosticate”), i.e. to prepare an emotional response (e.g. behaviour) to an 
emerging pattern (i.e. situation); 
 provide an evaluation in the form of an estimate for ‘expected’ response, 
helpful as a benchmark; 
 allow a separation of systematic response (i.e. uniform instincts) and 
idiosyncratic response (i.e. personal complexes); 
 provide a framework to assess exposures to emotional themes (e.g. irrational 
exuberance). 
Clearly, the archetypes operate at the unconscious level and the comparison with 
the regression based CAPM and APT is only meant in a metaphorical sense. Still, I 
believe the interpretation of the archetypal hypothesis in terms of its adaptive 
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purpose agrees, for example, with the Effort-Reduction Framework proposed by Anuj 
K. Shah and Daniel M. Oppenheimer (2008). 
To summarise, my investment framework of emotions, based on Jung’s archetypal 
hypothesis, is metaphorically comparable to the combined CAPM and APT models for 
assets. Simultaneously I have also placed Jung’s statement (1.1.4) on the 
unconscious in the proper context: the collective unconscious as the emotional 
equivalent of the market portfolio must indeed be an “incomparable prognosticator”. 
Its role is to provide, via the archetypes, the implicit mandates for the strategic 
emotion allocation across all minds which include constraints for any tactical biases 
within emotion portfolios of individuals or crowds. These allocations revolve around 
eternal emotional themes, the myths and fairy tales surrounding “the rhythm of 
growth, flowering and decay” so clearly reflected (e.g. in booms and busts) in the 
capital markets. Again, that does not mean that the unconscious, nor by extension 
the market, is flawless.   
Investment Note 
But how should we interpret this in terms of “measuring” emotional factors in 
markets? Let me again point out that in principle all traditional methods of 
investment research are analytical and only measure the quantitative dimension. 
These forms of analysis operate at the cognitive level, whereby investors either 
remain unaware of any biases, or these biases are ‘explained away’ via 
confabulation, e.g. in the form of a model. The other dimension of investment 
insights concerns intuitions, where the phenomenal ‘head of the Ouroboros’ bites the 
unconscious ‘tail’ to immediately ‘get it’. As stated previously, Archetypal Valuation 
is about this qualitative meaning of price patterns, i.e. to feel the emotional charge 
of investment themes. This can only be experienced, not analysed. To put this into 
practical tools, including a proposed experiment is what Chapter 10 is all about. 
Personally I therefore do not believe that the application of any quantitative 
analytical method on archetypes is useful. Nevertheless, for those who want to 
explore this, one can imagine a very rudimentary approach which would progress 
along the following lines:  
1. Identify the symbols in the market which could represent Jung’s traditional 
archetypes like the Shadow, the Self, and the Anima/Animus. It should be fairly easy 
243 
 
   
 
to identify for any (historic) period manifestations, like themes or people, which 
symbolise these archetypes. For example, for the internet bubble many would 
identify Alan Greenspan as symbolic for the Self (or Hero) whereas he has turned 
into the Shadow (or Trickster) in the credit crunch. The symbols identified in this 
way represent the archetypes, i.e. they form the archetypal images. Let’s call them 
emotional investment themes or factors. 
2. Next, one could use media services like Factiva, Google Insights, or Twitter to 
quantify the popularity of these emotional factors. In other words, the frequency of 
occurrence, multiplied by the tone (positive/negative) would result in the quantified 
‘meaning’ of the archetypal image, a synthetic feeling-tone of the archetype. 
3. Running a regression of the returns, or changes in asset prices, against the 
(changes in) these meanings would produce the sensitivity (or beta) to those 
themes.  
In mathematical terms, according to this rudimentary analytical approach, the 
unconscious evaluates the collective emotions according to an equation which 
explains the variance in returns (Ri) along various themes. It roughly has the 
following format: 
Ri =  + β1 * Theme1 + β2 * Theme2 + β3 * Theme3, etc. 
After writing this note in early drafts of this thesis, Hageback (2014) published his 
book about, what I suspect is, a similar approach on this particular aspect. 
 
9.5 EVALUATION OF EMOTION PORTFOLIOS 
 
According to the view described in the previous sections, the expression of an 
emotion is reflecting the weighted value of a portfolio of psychurities. That 
expression is dynamic in the sense that the portfolio is dynamically rebalanced in 
order to benefit from/hedge against an (emerging) situation, thus reflecting 
fluctuating values. Rebalancing involves quantitative, or rational deliberations, as 
well as qualitative, or pre-rational, affects.  
9.5.1 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
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Quantitative evaluation involves planning or “syntactic operations” (Rolls, 2007), in 
short it manipulates symbols. This takes place in the linguistic centre which is part of 
a larger higher-order-thought system (HOTs, or Rolls’ ‘conscious processor’) located 
in the cortical area of the brain. It enables conscious reflections on emotions. The 
linguistic centre tries to quantify emotions, including those expressed by other 
minds, by modelling their sensitivities, their fitness, to an emerging situation. 
However, like the CAPM in finance, its main assumption is rational behaviour. The 
implication of this assumption is, in simple terms, that the variables are assumed to 
be linear and lead to stable relationships. To interpret this in terms of our metaphor 
of running a regression of emotions versus a similar historic situation, the linguistic 
centre uses an ordinary linear equation for its model. In this process of symbol 
manipulation it translates, as it were, the pre-rational representations into rational 
predictors of future behaviour. In fact, Rolls argues that in order to avoid 
inconsistencies in behaviour, the conscious processor has to have the belief that it is 
in control, even if it is an illusion: 
This belief held by the system may partly underlie the feeling of free 
will. At other times, when other brain modules are initiating actions 
(in the implicit systems [PS: the unconscious]), the conscious 
processor (the explicit system) may confabulate and believe that it 
caused the action, or at least give an account (possibly wrong) of 
why the action was initiated. The fact that the conscious processor 
may have the belief even in these circumstances that it initiated the 
action may arise as a property of it being inconsistent for a system 
which can take overall control using conscious . . . processing to 
believe that it was overridden by another system. (2007, p. 410) 
9.5.2 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
The qualitative dimension of the evaluation, on the other hand, involves the 
semantic representations, or symbols, themselves and is performed by the non-
analytical capabilities of the mind. As Jung reminds us the archetypes are, so to 
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speak, organs of the pre-rational psyche. Nevertheless, its end result, the qualitative 
meaning of the archetypal image, emerges in consciousness as Jung’s emotional 
charge or feeling-tone, and subsequently influences the value of the emotion. This 
value is felt which, if rationalised, becomes a confabulation: the story to explain the 
emotional response. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru “a man of action in a crisis 
almost always acts subconsciously and then thinks of the reasons for his action.” 
This emotional charge consists, firstly, of its symbolic impact due to the shared 
meaning recognised (‘appraised’) by all agents in the ‘emotions market’. For 
example, in the capital markets emotions are collectively expressed via price 
patterns. Each pattern is symbolic for the behaviour of a fictional composite investor 
(e.g. Mr Market) which, once subliminally recognised, triggers the mirror neurons. 
This part of the emotional value is most uniform or non-personal because physically 
the evaluation follows the same path, culminating in Gallese’s “same body state”. It 
goes through the limbic system, containing the more archaic parts of the human 
brain, specifically the amygdale, which particularly deal with the most uniform 
emotions, i.e. the instincts. Secondly, the charge includes a personal impact in that 
it has subjective meaning. The evaluation at the individual’s level is influenced by 
the subjective perception of a pattern, biased by the accumulation of previous 
personal experiences concerning similar patterns.  
In short, the perceived image of a situation emerges as a result of the interactions 
between and integration of the various subcomponents of the mind. This emerging: 
 Is embodied by way of an expressed emotion which reflects: 
o a quantitative value according to a deliberate appraisal via cognitive 
processing: depending on the source of the emotion, the appraisal can 
be a confabulation; 
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o a qualitative value according to an archetypal appraisal via affective 
processing: it is autonomous by the subjective complex as well as the 
objective archetype; 
 Is dominated by the influence of the unconscious: “The struggle between 
rapid unconscious pattern-detection processes and their slow, effortful 
modulation by deliberation is not a fair contest: so automatic impressions will 
influence behavior much of the time.” (Camerer et al., 2005, p. 21) 
Let me introduce the following table which encapsulates what was just discussed: 
The securities market: The psychurities market: 
Demand and supply of securities Demand and supply of psychurities 
Allocation (via competition and 
cooperation) of monetary resources 
Allocation (via competition and 
cooperation) of mental resources 
Securities allow adaptation to economic 
situations 
Psychurities allow adaptation to 
ecological situations 
A security has a monetary risk/return 
profile 
A psychurity has a mental risk/return 
profile 
Securities form investment portfolios Psychurities form emotion portfolios 
Value reflects economic utility Value reflects emotional utility 
Value embeds historic fitness to previous 
monetary conditions 
Value embeds historic fitness to previous 
mental conditions 
Investment analyses are quantitative 
evaluations. They explain value. 
Investment intuitions are qualitative 
evaluations. They feel value. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, evaluation consists of a quantitative and a qualitative 
dimension. Price discovery is the intersubjective process followed by these 
evaluations, whereby the collective unconscious compensates any excess reliance on 
either dimension via increasing/decreasing the risk premiums to 
underexposed/overexposed emotional themes. In Jung’s words: 
The activity of consciousness is selective. Selection demands 
direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything 
irrelevant. This is bound to make the conscious orientation one-
sided. The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen 
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direction sink into the unconscious, where they form a 
counterweight to the conscious orientation. The strengthening of 
this counterposition keeps pace with the increase of conscious one-
sidedness until finally . . . the repressed unconscious contents break 
through in the form of . . . spontaneous images . . . As a rule, the 
unconscious compensation does not run counter to consciousness, 
but is rather a balancing or supplementing of the conscious 
orientation. . . . the unconscious supplies all those contents that are 
constellated by the conscious situation but are inhibited by 
conscious selection, although a knowledge of them would be 
indispensable for complete adaptation. (Jung, CW 6, para. 694) 
 
Jungian note 
Constellations of multi-layered emotion portfolios can form complexes around 
themes reflecting risk and return. The exposure to the theme (i.e. the correlation of 
the value of the emotion with the theme) reflects the extent of the imbalance, and 
thus the risk. Others have previously argued that the limbic system plays a crucial 
physical role in the emergence of archetypal images (e.g. emotions). I would add 
that dopamine can be the physical ‘currency’ of exchanging Jung’s emotional charge 




The above makes clear that the value of an emotion, Jung’s “emotional charge”, is 
the result of a subliminal evaluation to recognise patterns: situations are assessed in 
order to deploy the most efficient portfolio of sector-specific psychurities for the 
confronting situation. I argue that this evaluation of emotions, particularly instinctive 
emotions, originates at the unconscious level with archetypes acting as systematic 
subliminal regressors, or emotional factors, because: 
 Emotions proceed along a path that is similar for all healthy adult humans. 
Specifically, emotions are uniformly mapped because the statistical structure 
248 
 
   
 
of ancestral situations, e.g. their distribution of historic occurrences, and their 
relationship with the evolved specialised psychological functions is the same 
in every human. Translated in terms of portfolio management, this means, 
for example, that per situation the portfolios for different individuals will 
contain similar psychurities. The extent of similarity between the portfolios 
depends on the common value, or shared meaning, of the confronting 
situation. In Jungian terms, some events and symbols reflect more uniform 
meaning than others. They broadly evoke the same emotional response and 
thus lead to more instinctive responses. This manifests itself most clearly, for 
example, when individual consciousness is subsumed by crowd consciousness 
which simultaneously allows an emotional escape valve from personal 
complexes (see Chapter 7).  
 It involves competition for emotional capital. This capital is allocated by the 
unconscious across emotions according to the (expected) value of the 
respective emotion depending on the archetypal sensitivities. This value 
embeds an historic correlate, an expected fit to situations and events based 
on previous experiences which created the emotion as an evolved strategy. 
Ultimately the emotional charge of the archetypal image reflects the meaning 
of those experiences (internally) and correspondent events (externally) and is 
contained in a symbol. In Jungian terms, the goodness of fit between the 
emotional charge or archetypal expectancy embedded in the symbol and the 
real experience is the cause of the re-evaluation of emotions, and thus by 
extension the dynamic rebalancing of the portfolios. 
 Requires a non-conceptual numerical template to enable the numerical 
operations involved, in particular counting, scaling and trigger setting, as well 
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as to translate various emotional exchange rates into a “common (neural) 
currency” (e.g. Rolls, 2007; Levy and Glimcher, 2012). Emotions deal with a 
large variety of psychurities, reflecting the immense arsenal of stimuli. Their 
resulting values not only need to be ‘expressed’ in a common currency in 
order to make ‘fair’ comparisons possible, i.e. benchmarking, but also in the 
right ‘dose’ to trigger a bodily response. 
 The numerical archetypes form this template. Although they remain 
unconscious, as part of their function they offer the most powerful symbols 
due to the fact that numerical symbols by their very nature, i.e. in their 
appearance, reflect the quantitative aspect of any emotional value 
immediately. In that respect, these symbols provide the most objective form 
of communication, a non-verbal language. It is most objective because, 
compared to words for example, numbers express undisputedly this aspect of 
reality and consequently directly focuses individual consciousness. On the 
other hand, the qualitative aspect remains hidden and its tension with the 
quantitative aspect is the cause of the change in emotional charge, i.e. the 
dynamics in emotional values. For example, the names Google and Amazon 
are considered symbols for the internet. Although we could endlessly debate 
whether Google is a better symbolic internet company compared to Amazon, 
if Google is quoted at, say, $200 compared to $100 for Amazon, we all agree 
that we need to pay more for a Google share. That’s the reality. But this 
quantitative aspect has a qualitative flipside and the tension between the two 
leads to even more heated debates, i.e. “is Google worth $200?” In other 
words, the meaning of numeric symbols in terms of their emotional impact, is 
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more concentrated than names, slogans or logos. Their dominating impact 
manifests itself: 
o on individual consciousness via numerical intuition,  
o and on collective consciousness via participation mystique triggered 
cerebrally by mirror neurons. 
If Archetypal Valuation is aimed at inclusion of the archetypal impulses into 
investment research, archetypal meaning is what this approach is trying to reveal. 
Specifically, by projecting market data in a format that appeals to those 
psychological functions associated with the unconscious, e.g. intuition, the revelation 
of unconscious contents of the market mind is facilitated. 
Jung made a few (implicit) references to archetypal meaning. The following quote is 
indicative of what he meant: 
It always seems to us as if meaning―compared with life―were the 
younger event, because we assume, with some justification, that we 
assign it of ourselves, and because we believe, equally rightly no 
doubt, that the great world can get along without being interpreted. 
But how do we assign meaning? From what source, in the last 
analysis, do we derive meaning? The forms we use for assigning 
meaning are historical categories that reach back into the mists of 
time—a fact we do not take sufficiently into account.  
Interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are 
themselves derived from primordial images.  From whatever side we 
approach this question, everywhere we find ourselves confronted 
with the history of . . . images and motifs that lead straight back to 
the primitive wonder-world. (CW9i, para. 67; emphasis mine) 





   
 
CHAPTER 10. AVIR, OR THE MARKET SPEAKS ITS 
MIND: A PROPOSAL FOR AN AUDIOVISUAL 
EXPERIMENT 
 
Reason is the organ of truth, but imagination is the organ of meaning. 
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity 
 
If one really wishes to be a master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. One 
has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an “artless art” growing out of the 
unconscious. 
D.T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism 
 
I need to know what is happening in the markets . . . I hooked up a music synthesizer to 
the computer, linked it to the interface between the computer and quote screen, and 
generated a program that would give a musical summary of the markets. I used piano 
tones for stocks, strings for interest rates, the cello for short-term rates, and the violin for 
the 30-year bond. The Japanese yen was registered with the high flute, corresponding to 
the favorite instrument in Japan, the shakuhachi. The English horn, the French horn, and 
the Alpenhorn stood in for the other currencies. 




This chapter describes a skeletal framework for future (follow-up) empirical 
research. It is one way in which the ideas developed in this thesis might be taken 
forward. It contains a suggestion or proposal for an experiment (10.7) that would 
test a few of the (implied) sub-hypothesis of my thesis. It centres on Audio Visual 
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Investment Research (AVIR), a new investment research method187 I am developing 
which puts the theoretical concepts discussed in this thesis into practise. Overall, 
successful tests would support that AVIR could improve the investment performance 
of subjects according to the test criteria. In other words, such an outcome would not 
only support the theoretical sub-hypotheses of my thesis but would also suggest 
AVIR as complementary to existing investment analysis (e.g. fundamental, 
quantitative, etc.)  
Ultimately AVIR’s central aim is twofold. First, help investors make better investment 
decisions (however, as I will explain below, it is likely that not everybody will benefit 
from AVIR equally.) Second, by providing a complementary, more contemplative, 
method of research AVIR can compensate for the current overreliance on, including 
overconfidence in, quantitative investment analysis, thereby possibly contributing to 
a healthier, more balanced market mind. 
I would hope that I will, in due time, be able to set-up and complete the experiment 
myself (perhaps in combination with other [extended] tests). In the meantime I 
hope this proposal clarifies what I have in mind (and may perhaps inspire somebody 
else to perform it.) 
Before discussing AVIR from section 4 onwards, I will provide a brief recap, 
respectively some background in the next two sections. 
 
                                           
187 In the following, AVIR refers to the combination of method (i.e. active imagination) and the software 
tools used for this purpose. On previous occasions I have also referred to it as Market Audio 
Visualization (MAV). The software is in a preliminary stage and has not been fully developed yet. 
Earlier market sonification software tools include Sonify!, Accenture and Sandbox, but all have 








As discussed in the previous chapters, my thesis suggests that the market manifests 
mentality, i.e. collective consciousness. Like any conscious entity it expresses a 
broad range of behaviours, varying from rational to emotional. We are particularly 
interested in those mental categories that originate in the unconscious and/or 
culminate in the phenomenal domain. Why? Because both are irreducible to 
cognitive functions, escape axiomatic capture and thus make traditional investment 
analysis methods inappropriate. The prime example of such a category is mood. 
There are three important points to repeat and further clarify here: 
1) The U.S. sociologist Robert E. Park coined the term collective behaviour, and 
defined it as “the behavior of individuals under the influence of an impulse 
that is common and collective, an impulse, in other words, that is the result 
of social interaction.” Like Park, Jung also emphasised that it is the collective 
aspect that leads to this impulse. In his case the impulse originates from the 
shared archetypes of the collective unconscious whereby the numerical 
archetypes are primary and of particular relevance for market behaviour. 
Translated in terms of AMH, market behaviour is the composite behaviour of 
market participants under the (subliminal) influence of prices that are the 
result of price discovery by way of exchanges (i.e. trades). This makes the 
process reflexive: prices impact the behaviour that results in prices. They 
instigate while simultaneously capturing those behaviours in a concentrated, 
namely numerical, form. 
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2) Some of these behaviours, including embedded nuances and intentions, are 
not always picked up consciously by the participants (let alone observers, for 
that matter). Specifically, market data can contain patterns which are non-
random and have archetypal meaning. That is to say, patterns can at a 
subliminal level reveal information about the more primordial expressions of 
the mentality of a market state, e.g. emotions. As I have argued before, 
echoing Jung, archetypal meaning originates in the unconscious and is 
understood in the archetypal experience. The latter is important: market 
data, either recorded or live, needs streaming to convey such meaning. As far 
as discovery is concerned, it culminates in the phenomenal sphere as an 
internal surprise, an Eureka moment or “A-Ha Erlebnis”. It is an insight, a 
creative breakthrough, as distinct from any cognitive deliberations about the 
market state that take place in analysis.  
3) Archetypal meaning escapes axiomatic capture and is not perceived in an 
analytical sense (e.g. captured in a regression in Excel). More broadly, Jung 
argued that primordial expressions are uniform across cultures and 
generations and therefore instantly recognised at the subliminal level. They 
particularly occur, for example, in forms of art because art is the epitome of 
such communication. This is one reason, for example, that Jung looked at art 
and other creative expressions of myths. The ability of art to convey meaning 
depends on the objectivity of the symbolism used, thus underlining the power 
of numbers and their relationships as they are the ultimate objective 
symbols. An obvious example of this power is the use of the golden ratio in 
architecture, music, paintings, etc. Above all, comprehension of archetypal 
meaning adds to experiential knowledge, gained through a qualitative 
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intuition rather than a quantitative analysis. In our case this is conveyed 
when market patterns are experienced dynamically with ‘live’ prices (i.e. for 
historic time series this means bringing prices back ‘alive’ by streaming 
them.)  
In short, to comprehend the market’s full state we deal, first, with prices as the 
symbolic expressions of its mind. Being numbers they are the most objective 
symbols available for shared meaning across cultures and generations. Second, we 
focus on the qualitative aspects of these symbols via an 
intuitive technique for grasping the total situation . . . For obvious 
reasons, a cognitive operation of this kind is impossible . . . 
Judgment must therefore rely much more on the irrational functions 
of consciousness, that is on sensation (the “sens du réel”) and 
intuition (perception by means of subliminal contents”) (Jung, 1955, 
p. 49; emphasis mine). 
It is clear, first, that this interpretation of market dynamics is a far cry from the 
random patterns which EMH advocates. It is also clear that both the method and the 
tools with which we traditionally research markets are inadequate to reveal 
archetypal meaning in a format that appeals to the psychological functions 
associated with such understanding. Therefore I will also explain in this chapter 
which method and which type of tools could be used to achieve this: appeal to 
intuition and other System 1 abilities to reveal the market’s unconscious contents, 
its subliminal messages, as well as its phenomenally manifested mood. To 
distinguish it from analysis I will occasionally use the term synthesis for this. Again, 
just to be clear, such undertaking should be viewed as complementary, not contrary, 
to analytical methods of investment research. 
Perhaps unusual for a chapter on a proposal for an experiment, I regularly quote 
various experts because, as discussed, I have no empirical proof yet for my 
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proposal. All I can do at this stage is to use these quotes to weave my arguments 
together. They support and clarify my thinking and motivation concerning the 
investment research method I am developing as well as the proposed experiment to 
test it. 
So, how to get “in sync” (see 5.4) with the market’s rhythm? How to sense its 
emotional excitement? These questions need to be answered both from a theoretical 
perspective, as well as from a practical one. Specifically, what are the theoretical 
arguments that the market’s rhythmical movements are ‘like’ music? Ciardi (2004, 
p. 1), for example, argued that there are at least two reasons to explore the musical 
potentiality of stock market information sonification. First, as the rate of stock prices 
is often sharp and unexpected, unforeseeable sonic results might occur in the 
sonification of stock data. Second, the inner and subtle correlation of stock price 
variations may be considered similar to the correlation of patterns within a musical 
composition of stock market environments, in which large numbers of changing 
variables and/or temporarily complex information must be monitored 
simultaneously, are well suited for perceptual research in sonification. Also, a 
number of well-known traders have made comparisons between markets and music 
(e.g. Schwager, 1992; Niederhofer, 1997). Finally, by sonification of prices and 
exposing them to the resulting sounds Marcovici trained rats to trade forex and 
commodity futures.188 
Next, what tools are required to mediate this in a proper format, that is to say a 
format that improves the investor’s understanding of market movements? Although 
ultimately price qualia (like all qualia) are experienced from a first person 
                                           
188 Although his motivation was different, i.e. whether rats can replace human traders. Michael Marcovici, 
“Rattrader”; Art and Economy; Institut für Kunst im Kontext, Berlin, September 2014, pp. 52-59. 
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perspective only by those who have ‘skin in the game’ and reflexively act on these, 
extreme adherence to this would limit the opportunities to enhance our 
understanding of markets too much. Instead, to recognise the market as a collective 
animated entity and to appropriately interpret its communication accordingly is the 
message that this chapter is trying to bring across, also aimed at other 
researchers189 of markets.  
I’d like to use a quote from Damasio, which I freely interpreted by replacing his 
“(living) organism” and “biological systems” with “market”, respectively “assets”: 
The miniconcert of fear is ready to be played whenever the situation 
demands it . . . It may be helpful to think of the behaviour of [a market] 
as the performance of an orchestral piece whose score is being invented 
as it goes along. Just as the music you hear is the result of many 
groups of instruments playing together in time, the behaviour of [a 
market] is the result of several [assets] performing concurrently. The 
different groups of instruments produce different kinds of sound and 
execute different melodies. They may play continuously throughout a 
piece or be absent at times, sometimes for a number of measures. 
Likewise for the behavior of [a market]. Some [assets] produce 
behaviors that are present continuously, while others produce behaviors 
that may or may not be present at a given time. The principal ideas I 
wish to highlight here are: First, that the behavior we observe in [a 
market] is not the result of one simple melodic line but rather the result 
of a concurrence of melodic lines at each time unit you select for the 
observation. Second, that some components of behaviour are always 
present, forming the continuous base of the performance while others 
are present only during certain periods of the performance; the 
“behavioral score” would note the entrance of a certain behavior at a 
certain measure and the end of it some measures later. . . Third, that in 
spite of various components, the behavioral product of each moment is 
an integrated whole, a fusion of contributions not unlike the polyphonic 
fusion of an orchestral performance . . . something emerges that is not 
specified in any of the parts. (1999, pp. 87-88) 
In answering the question of how to sync with markets we can be more specific if we 
judge them to be animated entities: 
                                           
189 Again, with the third-person caveat. 
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The answer, oddly enough, can be found in music . . . The melding of 
sight and sound generates a powerful set of memories . . . Lives are 
conducted to a musical score, proceeding to a beat and a rhythm that 
operate below usual human awareness. Music provides the moods, the 
emotional texture . . . In music, a pivot chord is one that contains 
elements of several different keys, providing a natural transition to a 
new key. The point at which the pivot chord is struck is one of 
maximum ambiguity, as the score could proceed in any of several 
directions. Composers often sustain a sense of anticipation and drama 
by prolonging pivot chords, creating a build-up of tension to be released 
in the subsequent key shift. . . . mood will swamp any message that is 
offered. The first step, then, is to achieve a mood shift. That is the 
purpose of the pivot chord. . . . Evoke an enhanced state, and a pivot 
becomes possible—a new melody, a new rhythm. . . . people will 
process information more deeply and more enduringly when they are in 
such enhanced states. . . . in routine states of mind, people can only 
see things in routine ways and behave according to routine. It is when 
they shift their musical scores that they become able to process even 
the thorniest emotional patterns in new and constructive ways. 
(Steenbarger, 2003, pp. 35, 36, 39; emphasis mine)190 
The topic of “pivot chord” is echoed by trader Howard Abell as he reflects on his 
transition from floor to screen trader: 
sights and sounds, more importantly, lead to your feelings . . . I rely on 
my intuition. As the market moves and I watch the screen, I monitor 
my own feelings and mental images. With each price movement, I can 
see and hear and feel what’s going on as if I were still on the floor. I 
can literally hear the sound of the ticks being made on that screen. I 
can visualize . . . Based on all those sights and sounds and intuitions, if 
you will, I decide where to enter and exit the market. . . . When you’re 
sitting in front of a screen, if you think about it, you can see and feel 
the climax that takes place, which is to say, the sudden cessation of 
emotionality in the market. You can “feel” that the market is at a 
turning point. (Koppel, 1996, p. 150) 
Others need more help with such imagination which is where AVIR comes in. But 
first some background. 
 
 
                                           
190 Brett Steenbarger is a professor of psychiatry and behavioural sciences and an active trader. He also 
counsels other traders on trading psychology. 
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Earlier I stated that the premise of the market as a mind-body not only throws up 
thorny philosophical issues but also practical challenges. The latter concerns the 
research methods with which we could approach the elusive sensations that 
complete market states. Current practise prefers not to deal with this phenomenal 
overlay of market conditions. Specifically, market moods escape the cognitive 
domain in the sense that they are not contained in a representational cognitive 
format (in contrast to, for example, memories). Consequently, they do not become 
available to cognitive functions like reasoning and thinking. It is ironic that the great 
minds of physics became comfortable with Bohr’s complementarity, originally 
inspired by James’ mental concept of it, but that the mind sciences seem allergic to 
such interpretations by labelling them as another form of dualism. As I have argued 
throughout, the mind sciences could live with the mind-body problem but it requires 
their own quantum leap by becoming comfortable with complementarity and 
collectivity. It is particularly helpful in dealing with the shared reality of 
intersubjectivity, i.e. the collective experience of mind, which is an irreducible part of 
any individual subjective experience. Crucially, complementarity suggests that, like 
its physical cousins (i.e. the particle and the wave), the cognitive and the 
phenomenal have a shared origin, in this case the unconscious, but manifest 
differently and require complementary ‘readings of the mind’.  
What does this mean, for example, in terms of EMH which argues that prices contain 
all information? The question we should ask is whether the analysis of prices 
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transmits all this information. This reminds one of Einstein’s famous sign191 in his 
Princeton office which is very much in the spirit of Jung’s thinking. Ignoring the 
unconscious origin for now, the irreducibility of consciousness means that qualia are 
inclusive of experience but resist reduction to the cognitive domain. This implies that 
the qualia of prices cannot be reduced to the processes of the market. The latter are 
the focus of analysis via traditional methods of research. Those methods rely on 
representational content via access consciousness. They only reach part of the 
information, leading to analytical knowledge. But prices contain information over and 
above this. Specifically, their dynamics embed qualities of experiencing market 
states and we should harvest these to expand experiential knowledge.192 They are 
the phenomenal realisation of the same information, i.e. the feeling of their 
discovery. We rely on them to notice Bateson’s “difference that makes a difference”, 
i.e. that it “counts”. 
The traditional view on how this phenomenal aspect could be appreciated and 
comprehended is from the first person perspective. Critics of a first person 
perspective will argue that it is not objective. Still, some have argued that, in 
studying consciousness, data that are accessible through first person methods 
should be put out for intersubjective validation (e.g. Blackmore, 2005, p. 224). 
Kahneman and Krueger, on subjective reporting of well-being, seem to agree: 
the data are a valid subject for study in the sense that they 
capture at least some features of individuals’ emotional states. . . . 
Acceptance of self-reported measures of well-being, subject to the 
many caveats that subjective measurement requires, could have a 
profound impact on economics. (2006, p.22) 
                                           
191 “Not everything which can be measured counts, and not everything that counts can be measured”. 
192 One approach in that vein, based on Soros’ reflexivity, has been developed by Flavia Cymbalista and is 
called market focusing. See References section. 
261 
 
   
 
However, the difference with the traditional first person perspective is that the 
phenomenal in the case of markets extends to intersubjectivity. The intersubjective 
nature of market states provides a second person perspective that dominates (i.e. 
frequently overwhelms) the first person perspective. Within the broader 
consciousness debate this makes prices so valuable as a data source: they are 
empirical data not only of the underlying physical assets but also of shared 
experiences in dealing with those assets when people engage in exchanges. Prices, 
in other words, provide objective testable evidence for intersubjectivity, the 
phenomenal essence of the market’s mind. As we saw earlier, they are “the means” 
that Jung’s associate, von Franz, had been looking for. 
However, to uncover these qualitative patterns requires a different methodology and 
there clearly is no tradition in finance for researching market states from this 
perspective. AVIR attempts to fill this gap. 
10.4 AVIR 
 
In the following quote the neurologist Oliver Sacks points to a phenomenon that is at 
the heart of AVIR:  
The almost irresistible power of rhythm is evident . . . Rhythm and 
its entrainment of movement (and often emotion), its power to 
“move” people, in both senses of the word, may well have had a 
crucial cultural and economic function in human evolution, bringing 
people together, producing a sense of collectivity and community. 
(Sacks, 2007, p. 246; emphasis mine) 
This has been researched thoroughly and widely (see, for example, Kelso as quoted 
in 7.4). In fact, the historic roots of AVIR start in the 1970’s. Richard Voss, who 
worked with Benoit Mandelbrot at IBM’s Thomas J. Watson Research Centre, may 
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well have been the first to experiment with sonification of financial time series, in his 
case IBM stock prices. Voss also played a seminal role in the visualisation of fractal 
patterns in music. Other sonifications (some in combination with visualisation) 
included sonification-mapping, sonification to support trading, and multi-modal 
sonification. In his bestseller, The Education of a Speculator (1997), Victor 
Niederhoffer spent a whole chapter on music and markets (e.g. see quote at start of 
this chapter). 
AVIR takes this into a different and potentially more practical direction by combining 
sound and visuals, supported by recent insights in the mind sciences. It facilitates 
pattern recognition in market data by appealing to the mind’s System 1 capabilities, 
but in a structured and disciplined way, using advanced software tools.  If nothing 
else, it helps System 1 to compete more fairly against System 2 in any ‘judgement 
contest’ (e.g. Kahneman and Klein, 2009) on their competence to contribute to, for 
example, investment decision making. The creative dimension was recognised, for 
example by Ben-Tal and Berger: 
Our line of work reveals interesting glimpses of creative processes. 
We propose that listening, in itself, is a creative process, in that, by 
identifying patterns and detecting trends, a meaningful mental 
image is elicited from a stream of air pressure changes. (2004, p. 5) 
The importance of a balanced mind and allowing creativity was also acknowledged 
by trader Ed Seykota: “. . . if I didn’t allow myself the freedom to discharge my 
creative side, it might build up to some kind of blowout. Striking a workable ecology 
seems to promote trading longevity, which is one key to success.” (Schwager, 1993, 
p. 154) 
We need to perceive this in the broader context of price discovery as the collective 
self-organising principle that orders the market’s mind. In (Schotanus, submitted), I 
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state, among others, that crowds of investors are emotionally involved in this 
process and embody “affective expectations” (Jung, 1955, p. 36).  It is in the sense 
of wholeness, namely the complementary affective or archetypal expectation within 
a “psychic probability” (Ibid, 138) that choices and judgements are made “for 
grasping the total situation” (Ibid, p. 49 as well as earlier quote), in our case 
grasping the full market state, in particular its mood.  
By appealing to the “irrational functions” (Ibid) AVIR attempts to invoke the 
market’s mood. Also, it is generally agreed among mind scientists that qualia escape 
cognitive capture and cannot be represented in an axiomatic sense. Nevertheless, 
they form the culmination, an overlay if you will, of both unconscious and conscious 
expressions, and complete the mental state. At the collective level they tend to 
overwhelm any individual mentality and can lead to crowd psychology, extreme 
examples being exuberance, respectively despair. In short, mood is the most elusive 
property of market mentality and traditional analytical attempts to ‘measure’ it (e.g. 
put-call spread, bull/bear ratio, VIX Index, etc.) completely fail to convey its 
essence, namely how it feels like. Most traders realise this. In an interview with 
Active Trader Magazine193, for example, the following exchange took place: 
Interviewer: So, to be clear, when you refer to sentiment, you’re not 
talking about data inputs such as Bullish Consensus, or put-call ratios, 
or similar data or indicators? 
Trader: No, We don’t use any specific sentiment gauge or tool to track 
market sentiment. It’s more of a general feeling you get from trading a 
market and understanding the relevant dynamics. 
Crucially, what seems to be missing is the ineffable sense of (rhythmical) 
‘animation’, mediated primarily via moving prices, which is an intricate characteristic 
                                           
193 “Ebullio Far East fund’s fundamental difference”. Active Trader Interview. Active Trader Magazine, April 
2014, Volume 15, No. 4, pp. 44-49. 
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of the experiences associated with (swings in) market moods. This brings us to 
music.  
Music is unique among the arts for numerous reasons, but for our purposes the 
following is of particular relevance: 
 It allows large amounts of data to be efficiently combined (e.g. a song can be 
incredibly complex without sounding as such); 
 it is dynamic and has duration; 
 it has an aesthetic, specifically mathematical, order (e.g. fractal patterns); 
 it facilitates anticipation194; 
 and most importantly, it can express/instil/invoke emotions and feelings; 
Allow me to let others provide additional arguments. First, Sacks: 
We humans are a musical species no less than a linguistic one. This 
takes many different forms. All of us (with very few exceptions) can 
perceive music, perceive tones, timbre, pitch intervals, melodic 
contours, harmony, and (perhaps most elementally) rhythm. We 
integrate all of these and “construct” music in our minds using many 
different parts of the brain. And to this largely unconscious 
structural appreciation of music is added an often intense and 
profound emotional reaction to music . . . Much that occurs during 
the perception of music can also occur when music is “played in the 
mind.” The imagining of music, even in relatively nonmusical people, 
tends to be remarkably faithful not only to the tune and feeling of 
the original but to its pitch and tempo. Underlying this is the 
extraordinary tenacity of musical memory, so that much of what is 
heard during one’s early years may be “engraved” on the brain for 
the rest of one’s life. Our auditory systems, our nervous systems, 
are indeed exquisitely tuned for music. (2007, p. xii; emphasis 
mine) 
Sacks is an expert on music therapy. Others have argued more broadly to use art 
forms in general, and music in particular, to broaden our scientific research of the 
                                           
194 “[R]esearch has now shown that so called responses to rhythm actually precede the external beat. We 
anticipate the beat, we get rhythmic patterns as soon as we hear them, and we establish internal 
models or templates of them. These internal templates are astonishingly precise and stable; as 
Daniel Levitin and Perry Cook have shown, humans have very accurate memories for tempo and 
rhythm.” (Sacks, 2007, p. 240) 
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human psyche. Like Jung and Pauli before them, physicists David Bohm and David 
Peat, for example, have been reflecting on what makes the material and mental 
complementary, i.e. what coordinates a shared order.  They discuss the implicate, 
explicate and generative (e.g. fractal) orders in their book Science, Order and 
Creativity. Of particular interest to us in light of the animated and temporal nature of 
experiencing price patterns, e.g. trends, is the following: 
the implicate order can be experienced directly, not only in 
connection with the fluctuating background of consciousness but 
also in relationship to perception of certain kinds of well-defined 
forms. Consider, for example, how music is comprehended. At any 
given moment, a particular note may be sounding in awareness, but 
at the same time, a kind of “reverberation” of a number of earlier 
notes can also be sensed. Such reverberation is not the same as 
recollection or memory. Rather it is more like a part of an unbroken 
enfoldment and unfoldment of the notes concerned into ever subtler 
forms, including emotions and impulses to physical movement, as 
well as a kind of “ethereal” echo of the original notes within the 
mind . . . This suggests that, at any given moment, a number of 
notes are present in awareness in various degrees of enfoldment. 
The simultaneous awareness of all of these is what constitutes the 
sense of unbroken flow that has been described above. But this 
means that it is possible to be directly aware of an implicate order 
as a set of similar differences that are present simultaneously in 
different degrees of enfoldment of successive notes. (2000, pp. 187, 
188) 
AVIR aims to achieve the intuitive attunement of the individual mind to the market’s 
mind by representing market data in the form of sound and visuals. In section 10.6 I 
will provide a link to a file that contains an example. 
The contemplative method, consistent with mindfulness/mind walking research (see 
below) and the (e.g. relaxation) techniques it suggests, appeals to the non-analytical 
and creative capabilities of the mind. Its aim is to trigger the “enhanced state” to get 
“in sync” with the market by dynamically displaying market data, creating a 
multimedia experience of engagement with its mind:  
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a sense of total absorption in the market. In the “zone” conscious 
thought disappears and an ultimate sense of presence takes over . . 
. senses are heightened to the rhythms and sounds of the market 
and the flow of trades. Achieving oneness with the market can wipe 
away thoughts beyond the moment . . . Joshua Geller attributed the 
success of one of his traders to his musician’s access to the 
rhythmic flow of the market; . . . “He sways with the market”, Geller 
said. He followed the market cadence, switching his positions with 
the changing tempo of trading, moving his positions in and out with 
an improvisational technique. (Zaloom, 2006, p. 136)  
For example, by transmitting as audiovisuals the mesmerising ‘beats’ of the market 
surrounding hypes we can achieve an effect similar to that of trance music. Although 
some users will be content to have others create such audiovisuals and to receive 
them as research material, the biggest impact will be for those users who get 
themselves involved and create their own audiovisuals. In short, the method, which 
will require training, may help investors to understand market dynamics at another 
level than the analytical. AVIR as a complementary research method potentially also 
opens the door for future investigations to explore whether the “new” investment 
analyst is closer to being a therapist in her interactions with the market, for example 
in the links between intuition, empathy (i.e. with Mr Market), and her own 
subjectivity. Finally, AVIR is also, I believe, consistent with Jung’s intentions 
regarding active imagination (e.g. CW18, para. 396-397). 
The additional visualisation further emphasises the qualitative characteristics of 
market moods as captured in the sound. Kathryn Coe’s definition of visual art is 
appropriate in this context: “the modification of an object or body through color, 
line, pattern and form that is done solely to attract attention to that object or body” 
(2003, p. 76). The motivation for such multisensory display is to widen the 
computer–human bandwidth which is the amount of information—displayed by the 
computer—that users can perceive through their senses. This can be achieved by 
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mapping different data attributes to the different senses. (Nesbitt and Barass, 2004, 
p. 45). 
In terms of tools, whereas we use Excel, Matlab, R, and similar software for our 
cognitive analysis until now we have had no such tools available for our intuitive 
synthesis. Part of the reason was the lack of a proper format with which to appeal to 
intuition. As I will show shortly, by identifying audiovisuals as such a potential 
format, appropriate tools also become available by extension. These consist of 
advanced data-converters, DAWs, respectively audiovisual software. First, however, 
I will discuss the methodology AVIR subscribes to. 
10.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
Traditional research methodologies in finance vary from empirical, via experimental, 
to behavioural. Examples include statistical analysis (e.g. regressions) of time series, 
investment games in simulated markets, and investment questionnaires. What they 
have in common is the general objective of identifying whether or not the results 
show any anomalies to existing theories or confirm them. Moreover, although they 
may, for example, state that they test (the flaws in) System 1 capabilities, they all 
use tools and methods among subjects (including researchers themselves) that are 
tailored to and facilitate mental capabilities associated with System 2. If nothing 
else, this is unfair. In the context of this chapter, it’s like testing a subject on her 
overall understanding of music by providing sheet music that allows an analytical 
interpretation but denying her an instrument for a sensual interpretation.  
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The new methodology I propose is, instead, aimed at stimulating and guiding 
subjects’ intuition by using AVIR which provides support of System 1, similarly to 
what statistical analysis via Excel offers in support of System 2. Specifically, the aim 
of the proposal in section 10.7 is to see whether AVIR improves investment decision 
making. I propose a set-up for an empirical experiment to test some of my claims. 
Although different in set-up and purpose, it builds on previous research in: 
 Market sonification, particularly by Janata and Childs (2004) as well as Worrall 
(2009).195 The fact that sound has duration and can thus portray changes over 
time, that it can efficiently contain large amounts of different data sets, and that 
it dynamically conveys the underlying patterns and structure of that data are 
among the arguments used for sonification.196 
 Market visualisation, particularly by Nesbitt and Barass (2004) as well as 
Hasanhodzic et al (2014).197 Here the main argument centres on the way data is 
visually represented and how this can be improved by changing it, e.g. adding 
other visualisations of the same data.   
Janata and Childs set up pilot projects to test a system for the sonification of real-
time market data. Among others, their results “indicated a significant increase in 
accuracy when the auditory display was used”. In his PhD-thesis Worrall introduced 
a new technique for the audification of securities market data by sonifying net 
market returns, specifically of the Australian stock index, which preserved the 
autocorrelation in the data that could be aurally detected. 
                                           
195 Specifically, regarding tools for market sonification, see for example Ciardi (2009) and Van Ransbeeck 
and Guedes (2009). 
196 Here is an example of market sonification. 
197 In the broader context of data visualisation they are in the spirit, for example, of Edward Tufte’s work. 
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Hasanhodzic et al designed an experiment in the form of a video game, called 
ARORA. ARORA’s aim is to test whether human subjects can differentiate between 
actual vs. randomised prices, both represented in temporal charts.198 The motivation 
for their approach is to asses, among others, whether data represented in this 
format adds something to tabular representations. Overall they find statistical 
evidence that subjects can make that distinction.199 They conclude that temporal 
charts of asset prices convey to investors information that cannot be reproduced by 
summary statistics. Their results contrast previous anecdotal evidence and they call 
for more research on the usefulness of making such representations available to 
investors. 
Along similar lines, Nesbitt and Barass take the form of representation to the next 
level. Their goal was to develop a human perceptual tool by way of audiovisuals for 
traders to improve their ability to uncover trading patterns. Again, such audiovisual 
tools increase the computer-human bandwidth: the amount of data simultaneously 
transferred via the computer to the user’s senses.  
Guided by this research (which, in turn, contains references to related research) the 
motivation for the suggested empirical part of my thesis is as follows. First, 
compared to Hasanhodzic et al the proposed experiment does not focus on 
distinguishing real and synthetic/random data. Also, their temporal charts are used, 
for example, in technical analysis and thus still appeal primarily to System 2 
cognitive abilities. Instead, my approach originates in the methodologies of Jung, 
                                           
198 As an aside, their approach could also work for our purposes. For example, a simple laboratory 
experiment would be to test whether subjects can make a distinction between audiovisualisations of 
market data vs. those of random data. The aim is to proof that, at least under those controlled 
conditions, subjects can recognise the market as an entity which communicates in a purposeful (i.e. 
non-random) way. 
199 For an early (2010) critique of their research see, for example, http://www.burns-
stat.com/pages/Working/hypotheses_about_ARORA_financial_turing_test.pdf. I’ve been informed in 
personal correspondence that some of these criticisms will be addressed in their forthcoming paper. 
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e.g. active imagination, and others which appeal to the non-analytical or intuitive 
capabilities of the human mind (i.e. System 1). Second, compared to Nesbitt and 
Barass, the format with which the data is transferred and transformed via AVIR is 
expected to not only add to the bandwidth but also improve the attunement to the 
subject’s intuition. Specifically: 
1) It is in the dynamics of prices and other market data where the qualities of 
rhythmical patterns are embedded and AVIR thus advocates streaming that 
data ‘live’ to convey the overall sense of rhythm. This is in contrast to the 
static graphs and tables used in analysis. 
2) In order to appeal as much as possible to the primordial recognition 
capabilities in System 1, AVIR advocates creative forms of sounds and 
visuals. The emphasis is on the surreal and irrational, away from, while 
simultaneously complementary to, the analytic.  
The multimedia result can best be described as ambient and can consist, for 
example, of ‘trance’ audio accompanied by ‘psychedelic’ visuals. 
To get a better idea of what I propose, I repeat Gigerenzer’s “Jungian” statement:  
We think of intelligence as a deliberate, conscious activity guided by 
the laws of logic. Yet much of our mental life is unconscious, based 
on processes alien to logic: gut feelings, or intuitions. . . . We sense 
that the Dow Jones will go up. . . . Where do these feelings come 
from? (Gigerenzer, 2007, p.3) 
My short answer should be clear by now. Market data, i.e. prices, capture collective 
human behaviour in concentrated numerical format that reflect qualitative (e.g. 
rhythmical) patterns. These resonate with System 1 functions we share in our 
(collective) unconscious. These functions, ultimately derived from numerical 
archetypes and possibly neuronally supported by mirror neurons, mediate these 
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feelings. But there is currently no systematic way to support this process and make 
it a robust method of investment research aimed at sensing market moods. 
Gigerenzer subsequently discusses framing of empirical data and, referring to 
physicist Richard Feynman, he observes that different representations of the same 
information “helped Feynman to make new discoveries, and his famous diagrams 
embody the emphasis he placed on representation.” Specifically, in terms of the 
dual-system theories of mind Gigerenzer argues that intuition is richer than logic. 
Once again it echoes complementarity: entertaining different representations of the 
same data can appeal to a broader spectrum of our mind’s abilities, ideally 
enhancing our insights. In the words of Niels Bohr, and viewed in the context of the 
‘informational exhaustive’ assumptions underlying the EMH: 
Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be 
comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as 
complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena 
exhaust the possible information about the objects. (1949, p. 210) 
In short, the role of intuition as a dynamic gateway between the unconscious and 
the phenomenal is crucial in light of the fact that, according to complex psychology, 
the former is the shared uniform space where discovery starts for interacting minds. 
The representations which appeal to intuition, i.e. symbolic imagery, are often 
familiar but not always comprehensible. In the case of AVIR it consists of 
dynamically interacting sound and visuals derived from prices and other numerical 
market data. In general there is a large and growing literature on representing data 
by way of audio and/or visuals.200 Specifically, Bettner et al. make the case that: 
the mental pathways for the creation of auditory patterns and visual 
patterns are different. One forms anticipations of events in time; the 
other forms structures of points in space. One engages the emotions 
                                           
200 For an overview, see Pauletto and Hunt, 2005. See also Wolfram, 2002, specifically Wolfram Tones as 
far as sonification is concerned. 
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more directly than the other. Each employs different parts of the 
brain. There are indeed reasons why we might hear something more 
or at least something else in the music generated by an algorithm 
than we might see in a picture that was created from the same 
data. (2009, p. 294) 
My reasoning for the proposed experiment is that current investment research 
methodologies exclusively focus on analysis. They are not suited to address the 
internality of market states. Reducing this qualitative experiential level of a market 
state to the analytical quantitative level destroys the patterns we hope to account 
for. In order to understand this level we need, instead, to bring market data back 
into the interior (i.e. the mind and body) of the investor in a format that appeals to 
the mental abilities which facilitate the qualitative measurement, i.e. recognition, of 
such patterns. Ultimately, the method I envisage is aimed at systematically building 
experiential knowledge which would be complementary to any analytical knowledge. 
Such rebalancing, consistent with modern mental health views, is not only beneficial 
to our individual investor mind, for example by improving our decision making. It 
may also contribute to correct some of the major imbalances in the financial system, 
i.e. improve the health of the market’s mind which is being ‘brainwashed by 
algorithms’. As I stated more strongly elsewhere (Schotanus, submitted) how can 
we expect our creativity to generate the innovations in the real economy that we 
rely on for our progress and adaptation if these eventually are priced in a 
mechanistic way by a market that has become an automaton? Worse, accepting the 
market as an animated entity with a mind also means that the growing influence of 
these algorithms has a parasitic impact, i.e. the market increasingly becomes 
lifeless. 
There is one more issue I need to address in this section, although I’ve touched on it 
in previous chapters. I have argued that moods, like the physical processes they are 
accompanying, are registered in prices. Prices, in other words, also reflect the 
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phenomenal dimension in discovery. But there is something peculiar about prices 
compared to other carriers of qualia, beyond their intersubjectivity. Let’s compare 
moods with other phenomena to which we attach qualia, like smell and colour. 
Coffee, for example, is a substance which remains fairly static when it releases its 
smell. This is even more the case for an apple when it reflects its colour. Prices are, 
of course, linked to securities and the physical assets underlying these.201 However, 
prices do not exist as physical substances independent from subjects who discover 
them and experience their qualia. At those moments they appear on the dot as 
numerical carriers of emotional charge whereby “measurement” of that charge only 
applies in the phenomenal sense. Collectively and recursively we dis- and recharge 
by buying and selling, maintaining the “strange loop” of price discovery which 
involves the three chains of the unconscious, the cognitive and the phenomenal. In 
short, what makes prices unique is that they are psychic self-references rather than 
physical originators of qualia. It is the reflexive dynamics involved in their discovery 
process which drive this, making prices “living symbols” in Jung’s terms. To 
conclude, prices add meaning to our understanding of market states, over and above 
any knowledge derived from analysing them, because they convey how those states 
feel like. These are collective feelings although their uniformity is not always strong, 
i.e. they may not necessarily correlate with each and every subjective feeling.  
Ultimately the question is not whether the market exhibits ‘single-minded’ states 
which can be captured by mechanical (‘mindless’) algorithms which basically are 
context-free rules. Of course it does, but that doesn’t make the market an 
                                           
201 Ultimately prices are units of currencies and in our modern times of fiat money currencies have no 
intrinsic value. The original underlying ‘hard asset’ of gold has been replaced by collective 
psychological traits, in particular trust in the monetary authorities to maintain the value of the 
respective currency. The latter requires, among others, that debt issued in that currency is serviced, 
supported by tax revenues. History has shown that that can be wishful thinking and recent record 
levels of debt to GDP offer a warning in that respect. 
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automaton, just like we are not automatons. The question is rather what triggers the 
market state to shift whereby investor behaviour becomes sensitive to context (i.e. 
contrarian versus crowd mentality) and what this implies in terms of research 
methods and tools.202 This keeps finance’s hard problem at the epistemological level, 
which is something we can handle. Instead of making a drastic ontological 
commitment, i.e. “the market is different from us”, we accept that the market’s 
mind puts limits on our understanding. The aim thus becomes to explore and 
possibly push the boundaries of these limits. This is the goal of my method. 
Specifically, based on my hypothesis I predict that systematically using a non-
analytical research method to complement traditional (e.g. spreadsheet) analysis 
methods will improve the forecasting ability of the average user of this method, 
compared to exclusively using analysis methods. The Jungian caveat is that the 
benefits will likely disproportionally accrue to those psychological types which have a 
natural inkling for intuition and, so far, have been disadvantaged not only by the 
existing overreliance of analytical tools but, and related, by the lack of a systematic 
method to support their intuition and other functions of System 1.203 Finally, 
although historic data is crucial for training purposes for all time frames, the 
frequency of data in combination with the look-back period defines the forecasting 
period, e.g. current  intraday real-time data is the only format to assess “today’s 
mood”, but one needs more data to compare it to other periods like “this week’s 
mood”. 
                                           
202 Again, mirror neurons provide a promising explanation for the neuronal dynamics involved in financial 
contagion and herding. See Chapter 5. 
203 This is a sub-hypothesis and I could be wrong. Also, this applies to the number of subjects, not the 
relative impact of the method per subject. Specifically, although AVIR will not appeal to “quants”, it 
could potentially benefit them the most. In other words, AVIR could potentially benefit exactly those 
whose type suggests that intuition is their inferior function because AVIR offers a systematic way to 
use and develop it.  
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The initial experiment I’m about to propose (section 10.7) has less lofty ambitions to 
start off with. I will also describe briefly more ambitious extensions of the initial 
experiment. 
However, the next section will describe, first, the software tools to use for the 
proposed experiment. 
10.6 SOFTWARE TOOLS 
 
As we have seen, an investor is confronted with a psychological challenge at two 
integrated levels. First, she has to read other investors’ minds, collectivised in the 
market’s mind. In brief, she has to deal with collective psychology. Second, she is 
confronted with the personal psychological issues, e.g. heuristics, that are raised by 
investing while being part of this collective. Sometimes these issues have nothing to 
do with investing itself. In brief, she has to deal with the emotions, varying from 
stress to relief, to commit money to convictions. This challenge requires ways of 
overcoming it, apart from simply exiting or not entering the market, i.e. not 
participating. 
The BBC documentary “Out of Control” (2012) discusses the influence of the 
unconscious on our behaviour and decision making.204 Towards the end of the 
documentary (time: 54:50), one of the scientists, professor Scheider, discusses the 
generation of, what he calls, “a-ha signals”. He pinpoints nicely the non-analytical 
state of mind which my method, with the help of the software I will discuss in this 
section, attempts to accomplish: 
                                           
204 http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b01dlglq/Horizon_20112012_Out_of_Control/  
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when looking at these images, the best thing to do is relax, you’re 
getting into a zone 
Nesbitt and Barass argue that adding audio and deepening the visual experience of 
data increases the human-computer bandwidth. While in agreement my method 
hopes to add to this by maximising the investor’s “personbytes” (Hidalgo, 2015), in 
this case the amount of market knowledge that she can embody. Specifically, the 
aim is to optimise experiential knowledge by improving the attunement of the 
human mind to the rhythm of the market by presenting it in rhythmical format, i.e. 
as audio accompanied by responsive visuals. Both audio and visuals transform the 
market data in formats far removed from tables, charts and other standard, mostly 
static, research formats. In short, the tools I will describe shortly appeal to the non-
analytical, intuitive capabilities of the mind which we use to appreciate the 
qualitative aspects of other minds. Often art is used as the form of representation 
and the music of modern “house” DJ/VJs (e.g. my fellow Dutchmen Tiësto, Armin 
van Buuren and Ferry Corsten) comes close to the repeated “beats” I have in mind 
with regard to market rhythms, often accompanied by dynamic audiovisuals.  
These properties of the human mind, i.e. to perceive what is not immediately 
obvious analytically, are related, for example, to crowd thinking and creativity.  The 
sensation produced by the conjunction of primal instinct and cognitive rationality is 
particularly overwhelming when experienced in a crowd. The type of creativity we 
are after in markets is “grasping the total situation”, i.e. the market state in its 
rhythmical sense, particularly ahead of when the mood changes. Such creative 
breakthroughs at the thresholds of swings, i.e. at peaks and bottoms, require 
contrary thinking: 
It may sound peculiar that contrary thinking is required to achieve 
creative thought . . . This, however, becomes self-evident when we 
realize that thinking the way someone else thinks results in 
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mimicry—a “copy-cat” requires the minimum of creative thought . . 
. Therefore, the inference is that to achieve any creativeness, some 
change has to be made. From this, it stands to reason that the 
optimum in creativeness must approach the maximum change . . . 
and the maximum change must be close to the opposite. (Neill, 
1954, p. 148)  
Concerning creativity, insights and music there are a number of links to Jung’s 
theory. Dreams, for example, can play an important role. Klinger (1999) showed 
that people’s daydreams and night dreams reflect “current concerns”, involving the 
full scale of human motivations. In an overview of daydreaming, also known as mind 
wandering and unconscious thought, McMillan et al (2013) conclude that 
daydreaming is “adaptive and beneficial” and “critical to our ability to simulate 
events in the future”. They point to research suggesting there are four broad 
adaptive functions: 
1. Future planning which is increased by a period of self-reflection. Specifically, 
daydreaming may contribute to the successful management of long term 
goals (“delay discounting”/delayed gratification).  
2. Creativity, especially creative incubation and problem solving; 
3. Attentional cycling which allows individuals to rotate through different 
information streams to advance personally meaningful and external goals; 
4. Dishabituation which enhances learning by providing short breaks. 
Regarding music, William Benzon in Beethoven’s Anvil discussed the evolutionary 
functions and origins of music based on brain research. Among his interpretations is 
that music is a kind of daydream.  
Weinberger (1998), in an overview of research, concludes that “the findings to date 
provide solid support for the claim that music increases creativity . . . That creative 
278 
 
   
 
potential can be increased is of great importance. That music appears to be an 
effective means of accomplishing this goal should be glad tidings for everyone.” 
It is but a small step to aim for the type of multimedia experience of markets I have 
in mind. It involves three advanced specialised software tools: 
1. Compose205 transforms any numerical data into audio signals, i.e. music.206 
Files can then be saved in the industry-standard MIDI-format.  
2. In turn, this format can be imported and played by FL Studio207, a so-called 
Digital Audio Workstation (or DAW) to compose, arrange, record, edit, mix & 
master music. Among others it can digitally synthesise numerous 
instruments, including whole orchestras.  
3. Finally, via embedded links the resulting audio signals are dynamically, i.e. 
responsively and in real-time, visualised into animated spheres and other 
(three-dimensional) shapes via Magic208.  
Visualisation software has more generally been used to represent complex data in 
unconventional formats in order to facilitate pattern recognition. As aforementioned, 
music visualisation has been used to enhance the experience of the music’s mood, 
for example via video projections at house/trance parties.  
Combined these tools can create a format of market data which enables the user to 
experience this data dynamically as an audiovisual extravaganza. Here is an early 
example of an audiovisual production which I created by turning data (prices, 
                                           
205 Alternatives include Audacity and Sonification Sandbox. 
206 In fact, it even translates (EEG) brainwaves into music. This application may be of use to test 
separately the state of mind of investors while experiencing market data in audiovisual format, e.g. 
to look for any correlation, synchronised in the respective audio signals. 
207 Alternatives include Pro Tools, Live (Ableton), Cubase, Logic, and Studio One. 
208 Alternatives include Acrobat After Effects, ZGame Editor and Resolume. Less advanced visualizers 
include Aeon, Morphyre and Plane9. 
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returns, volatility, and other time series) from a number of benchmark assets into 
MIDI-format (via Compose). This was subsequently imported into FL Studio to create 
the musical composition. The latter was exported as a collection of WAV-files which, 
in turn, were imported into Magic. It captures a specific period in finance history.  
In terms of types of research, another example would be when investors perceive 
the recent market action as similar to previous historic period (or periods). By 
creating audiovisuals for both periods, the current and the historic, these can be 
compared by running them simultaneously. It will show audiovisually any differences 
in patterns which can enrich any insights from, say, a regression analysis of the 
underlying data. 
Depending on how the data was transformed into Compose I would argue that AVIR 
can induce professor’s Scheider’s “zone” in order to achieve the qualitative 
“rhythmical” pattern recognition, i.e. the market’s a-ha signals, we are after.  
To conclude, I let Linda Bradford-Raschke, another famous trader (who majored in 
music), emphasise the associations between market rhythms and music: 
A musical piece has a definite structure: there are repeating 
patterns with variations. Analogously, the markets have patterns, 
which repeat with variations. Musical pieces have quiet interludes, 
theme development, and a gradual crescendo to a climax. The 
market counterparts are price consolidations, major trends, and 
runaway price moves to major tops or bottoms. You must have 
patience as a musical piece unfolds and patience until a trade sets 
up. . . . In both music and trading, you do best when you’re relaxed, 
and in both you have to go with the flow. (Schwager, 1992, pp. 
306-307) 
 
10.7 PROPOSED FORMAT EXPERIMENT 
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As aforementioned this section contains a proposal, not a plan, for an experiment to 
be conducted sometime in the future. The below describes the basic version of the 
experiment, but there are many extensions thinkable.  
The proposed format for such a ‘hypothetical’ experiment consists of the following:  
A group of economics/business students are invited as subjects for an investment 
experiment that is spread over 3 half-days. The main requirements are that they are 
proficient with using computers but have no professional experience in investing.209  
In a briefing session, subjects will get background information and instructions about 
the experiment in general. These subjects are asked to manage a portfolio which can 
contain (any combination of) an equity index, a bond index, and cash. Subjects are 
free to decide the respective weights of these assets in their portfolio210. The 
experiment is divided in three phases, each taking place in either the morning or 
afternoon of a different day, whereby subjects are exposed to data provided in: 
- an analytical format (phase 1), 
- an audiovisual format (phase 2),  
- both analytical and audiovisual formats (phase 3).  
The setting is a laboratory environment, for example that provided by Essex Lab211. 
The test would be whether any of the formats, again in isolation (phase 1, 
respectively 2) or combined (phase 3), is superior in terms of the performance of the 
                                           
209 An example of a potential extension to the basic set-up is to get an equal number of female and male 
participants who will be submitted to a Myers-Briggs test (see next section). 
210 Long only portfolio, so no shorting. 
211 See http://www.essex.ac.uk/essexlab/  
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subjects as expressed in the returns of their portfolios. The subjects will not 
themselves use the actual tools with which the data was prepared in the respective 
formats. This would require too much time in terms of training them in using the 
software. Also, the priority for this experiment is to see how subjects perform using 
the same data in the same standardised format for each phase. Finally, the 
difference in capabilities of using the tools may skew the outcome of the test too 
much. Instead, all they are required to do is to interpret the data (in that uniform 
analytical, audiovisual, respectively combined format) in order to make investment 
decisions. 
In each phase the underlying market data is in the form of time series. Specifically, 
three samples each containing a sufficient amount212 of consecutive (and 
normalised) daily data will have been randomly drawn from a full history of data 
from 1970 to the most recent date of available data. The data itself consists of 
realised historic prices, rolling monthly (20-day) returns, and monthly (20-day) 
volatility of benchmark indices representing the three main asset classes, i.e. 
equities, bonds, and cash, from a particular country or region. Per stage each 
participant will receive one sample, again randomly selected from the three samples. 
It means that each subject will eventually receive the same three samples over the 
full experiment but the order of the data will be different across the subjects. This 
removes any potential bias from momentum or reversal patterns in the samples to 
sneak into any particular phase. 
In the first phase of the experiment, at T0, the subjects will all receive a read-only 
spreadsheet with the data of their selected sample represented in tables and charts, 
                                           
212 Sufficient in the sense of a base history to allow both analysis and listening. Personally I would think 4 
years of daily data as a starting history is enough, as it is considered the length of a business cycle.  
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including summary statistics. They will be asked to invest a hypothetical £10,000 in 
any ratio across the three assets on a (simulated) monthly basis, initially and during 
the next twelve months, i.e. they can re-allocate part or all of their capital each 
month. They will have an hour to prepare for their start allocation by the end of 
which they enter their decision at T1. Subsequently, every 15 minutes updated daily 
prices for a new month (roughly 20 additional new data points) will be provided in 
similarly formatted spreadsheets which now contain the previous and the new data. 
This means that the subjects have 15 minutes to update their portfolio, based not 
only on new additional prices but also knowing their investment performance. With 
this set-up, the first phase of the experiment will take a total of 4 hours (T0 to T13). 
The argument to use a 15-minute interval is to allow enough time for analysis, the 
latter being the prime cognitive ability of interest in this phase (compare with ‘real-
time’ feed in section 10.8). 
In the second phase, subjects will again be asked to manage a hypothetical £10,000 
portfolio across the aforementioned assets. They now receive a different sample but 
transformed into an audiovisual file they can play on their computer.213 Again, they 
will have an hour to prepare for their start allocation which they enter into the 
computer at T1. The subsequent steps will be exactly the same as in phase 1, except 
that the format which contains the (previous and updated) price data will be 
audiovisual. 
The final phase will see the remaining sample, determined per subject, represented 
in both formats: the spreadsheet and the audiovisual file. Subjects can now analyse 
the spreadsheet while viewing/listening to the audiovisuals of the same data. The 
                                           
213 An variation would be to use the same dataset, unbeknownst to the subjects. This would help in 
contrasting the performance across the two phases as the same data is involved. The obvious risk is 
that subjects will discover this and thus distort their performance. 
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goal remains to manage a portfolio of £10,000 based on this new set of regularly 
updated data. 
In light of the voluntary nature of the experiment, subjects can earn incentives (for 
an overview of the impact of incentives on experiments, see Camerer and Hogarth, 
1999). Small prizes (£50) are rewarded to the top performer in each phase, as well 
as a higher prize (£200) to the top performer on average (but adjusted for the 
spread between high and low scores) across the phases. The latter prize is 
significantly higher to control the house money effect, i.e. to motivate subjects not 
to make extreme bets during any of the individual phases. 
The main goal of the experiment is to test a number of forecasts based on my 
hypothesis. Specifically, I hope to show that across the group of subjects, so on 
average, phase three shows a statistically significant improvement in performance 
versus both phase one and two. I call this excess return R(3-1), respectively R(3-2). 
It is expected that phase one shows an overall better performance than phase two. 
However, I expect R(1-2) to be less pronounced, in absolute and statistical terms, 
than R(3-2).  
Other goals, in the extended variations of the experiment (see section 10.8), relate 
to differences in investment style/horizon, respectively investment personality. 
Specifically, I expect confirmation of the forecast that a change in the interval of 
investing, e.g. using a real-time feed of the data, will significantly impact the results. 
I also expect confirmation of the forecast that certain psychological types score 
statistically different across the stages. 
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This set-up, specifically the random selection of the samples per subject, counters 
some of the likely criticisms of this experiment, for example the claim that the 
periods are incomparable in terms of the statistical characteristics.  
The claim that the subjects in phase three have become much more used to the 
audiovisual format which may explain the improvement in performance can be 
countered by randomly changing the order of the phases, e.g. have some subjects 
start with phase 3. 
In the next section I will briefly discuss extensions (as variations) of the basic 
proposal for the experiment. 
10.8 EXTENDED VERSIONS OF EXPERIMENT 
 
If this empirical test confirms my hypothesis, the method could potentially help 
investors to improve their assessment of market states, adding to the theoretical 
relevance of my thesis. However, this benefit is unlikely to be universal, both in 
terms of investment style (i.e. trading vs. investing) and investment personality (i.e. 
psychological types).  
1. Investment Style 
An obvious variation to the above basic approach is to have a ‘real-time’ feed of the 
data. This does not necessarily require the use of high-frequency (intraday) data. In 
this particular case, the subsequent 12 months of daily data could be streamed in a 
much shorter interval, say every minute.  
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The argument that daily data can continue to be used is that the price data is fractal 
in nature as far as the rhythmical aspects are concerned. So, although daily 
frequency contains less noise it still contains the basic patterns, i.e. rhythms, we are 
after. Nevertheless, using intraday data could of course be another variation to the 
basic test. 
Overall, it is to be expected that such a continuous feed of data will have a 
statistically significant impact on the results. Clearly it simulates more closely the 
circumstances under which traders make their decisions, rather than those of longer-
term investors.214 
2. Investment Personality 
Another interesting extension of the experiment would be, first, to choose an equal 
number of female and male participants in order to assess any gender bias in the 
eventual results. Next, to dig even deeper in the results one can submit subjects to 
a Myers-Briggs test ahead of the actual experiment. The aim would be to see 
whether certain psychological types score statistically different for this experiment. 
This would, in turn, be suggestive for the usefulness of the tools across these types, 
i.e. who would potentially benefit most from using AVIR. 
Jung concluded that differences in behaviour between people originated in 
differences in dominance of the four psychological functions: thinking, feeling, 
intuiting and sensing.  
How does this apply to investing? Type theory claims that the best decisions are 
made by a balanced mind. In other words: 
                                           
214 I have potentially sourced the advanced trading-simulation software required for this variation. 
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- Both perception functions, i.e. sensing and intuiting, are used to ‘record’ all 
data.  
- Both judgement functions, i.e. thinking and feeling, are used to ‘assess’ this 
information. 
For many years Van Tharp has applied this framework, including the Myers-Briggs 
typology, to trading. He has discussed this extensively and I therefore refer to his 
website for more details: http://www.iitm.com/articles/Personality-Type-and-
Trading.htm. For other research on personality and investing, see for example 
Richard Peterson’s website, Market Psych: 
http://tests.marketpsych.com/personality_test.php 
Derived from my hypothesis is the expectation that certain types will score better in 
the test so the software will be most beneficial to them. Specifically, although the 
longer-term benefits of using my method are potentially greater for 
Extraverted/Sensing users, I predict that, for this test, those who score “IN” in their 
typology will show the biggest improvement because the tools appeal to the 
functions they already feel most comfortable with, i.e. are dominant. 
Moreover, even the general effects of music on behaviour are quite different in 
different people. For example, the effect to which background music affects learning 
and recall depends on this personality dimension (Furnham and Bradley, 1997). 




   
 
At the start of this chapter I indicated that, apart from describing a framework as a 
proposal for an experiment to test (sub-)hypotheses of my thesis, I would explain 
the method and tools with which the market’s subliminal messages could be 
received. The method, AVIR, entails a dynamic and creative representation of 
market data via audiovisuals. Earlier reflections by others discussed such an 
approach along similar lines:  
Another more anachronistic (the use remains limited) example of 
traders' apparent loss of a feel of 'the market' is software that 
simulates sounds of a virtual open outcry floor based on the 
information from the electronic system. This allows traders to react 
to the roar of the market which often signals volatile shifts in the 
market. The following is taken from an ad for a product . . .: 'Hear 
your electronic market in real time and real voice. Let our artificial 
intelligence software analyze and prioritize data faster than the 
human eye. Connect your mind to the market, not your eye to the 
screen.' The quote shows how the intention is to 're-embody' trading 
and to recreate 'connections' to the market (Arnoldi, 2006, p. 389). 
My proposal takes this to the next level. The tools include advanced software 
packages. The following quote from Brett Steenbarger is in line with how Marcovici 
trained his rats and in the spirit of how I see these tools being used, namely 
repeatedly playing the audiovisual files to train attunement: 
What traders can do to accelerate their learning is increase the 
intensity of their practice sessions, as an athlete would. Maybe 
practice trading in more than one market or simulate a whole day's 
worth of trading in 15 minutes . . . after looking at pattern after 
pattern, decision-making becomes second nature. (Stewart, 2002, 
p. 6; emphasis mine) 
In terms of the market’s ‘big data’, although noise to some is music to others, my 
argument is that more data is not necessarily better in understanding the market. 
Instead, the challenge lies in how we interact with its data in light of the fact that 
our current tools are limited, and often cause confusion rather than clarity. 
Gigerenzer and Edwards stated as much: 
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Statistical innumeracy is often attributed to problems inside our 
minds. We disagree: the problem . . . lies in the external 
representation of information. . . . Every piece of . . . information 
needs a representation—that is, a form. Some forms tend to cloud 
minds, while others foster insights. (2003, p. 741) 
Many resources are currently expensed on gathering even more data to add to the 
already big data of markets. Although I am doubtful this will bring the rewards its 
advocates list in their promotions (if only because they focus, again, exclusively on 
analysis), I do not think it necessarily hurts. On the other hand, we ignore another 
and complementary approach: to use that data in a different way. This is what AVIR 
is all about. Ultimately, assuming tests confirm my hypothesis, I would like to see 
these tools being used on trading floors across the world, next to analytical ones like 
Excel and Matlab. Based on Jung’s psychological types I suspect that they will not 
appeal to everybody but will benefit mostly those who are now disadvantaged by the 
overreliance on quantitative tools. In that respect, there is potentially a deeper 
consequence of using this methodology. Through experiencing prices the aimed-for 
knowledge of ‘the state of the world’ is “in one sense, self-knowledge. For knowing is 
a translation of external events into bodily processes, and especially into states of 
the nervous system and the brain: we know the world in terms of the body, and in 
accordance with its structure.” (Watts, 1966, p. 100) This, I believe, is what is 
behind Soros’ famous back pains (e.g. Cymbalista, 2003). It also links, for example, 
to Merleau-Ponty’s work on the role of the body in gaining knowledge and 
understanding which may be of interest for others to further explore. 
More broadly, due to the reflective nature of price discovery, where the individual 
mentalities fuse into the collective market mind via a dynamic feedback loop, the 
growing overreliance on quantitative research and investment methods has resulted 
in dangerous conditions. A rebalancing is long overdue and such levelling of the 
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playing field could make the overall market more balanced. Dare I say, lead to a 
healthier market mind?  





   
 
CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSION 
 
To answer Ayache, this thesis is my modest contribution to “generalise the notion of 
price to domains other than financial” (2010, p. 44). There are numerous related 
topics which are important but, due to size constraints, can unfortunately not be 
discussed in this document. Instead I will now end my thesis with a few concluding 
remarks. 
In summary, there are striking similarities between markets and minds. More 
broadly, the financial ecosystem operates according to similar dynamics as the 
natural ecosystem: individually and collectively we interact with nature and its 
resources by allocating our resources via competition and cooperation. This involves 
tensions centred on scarcity and uncertainty. Whereas mental demands (e.g. 
desire/wants) can be limitless, physical supply (e.g. of resources) to meet these is 
often limited. Vice versa, physical demands (e.g. imposed on us by our environment) 
can be limitless, whereas mental supply (e.g. emotional adaptation) to meet these 
can be limited. Forced to confront the unknown we go through a process of 
(sometimes painful) discovery and the resulting insights are our way to deal with the 
uncertainty involved.  
As humans evolved the globe became more interconnected and markets became 
centres of excellence in these processes concerning our survival. They facilitate the 
exchange of goods, services and capital which are priced uniformly while, 
paradoxically, valued differently. 
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Prices form the empirical building blocks of our psychophysical bridge in modern 
society. Specifically, they are the amount with which we match the allocation to 
physical assets with the allocation to psychic ones. Both are scarce resources which 
enable us, at a massive collective scale, to adapt, i.e. gain exposure to/hedge 
against circumstances. They are the numerical meeting points in the market’s mind 
where buyers and sellers collectively agree on quantity and quality. They capture the 
information that is doubly realised and, as numbers, have mental efficacy. In the 
words of Karl Popper, philosopher and mentor of George Soros: 
There is no reason (except a mistaken physical determinism) why 
mental states and physical states should not interact . . . If we act 
through being influenced by the grasp of an abstract relationship, 
we initiate physical causal chains which have no sufficient physical 
causal antecedents. We are then ‘first movers’, or creators of a 
physical ‘causal chain’. (1953, para. 6.3-6.4)  
Numbers are the prime symbols of such abstract relationships. As far as complex 
psychology is concerned, in hindsight and looking at the path along which it evolved, 
it is no surprise that Jung concluded that the numerical archetypes form the 
essential and irreducible archetypes. However, his associate, Marie-Louise von 
Franz, was left to contemplate that “no means of measuring psychic intensities 
numerically has been envisaged”. In light of the above, this search is over. Capital 
markets offer an empirical manifestation of psychophysical space because they 
generate measurable numerical data on “emotional . . . psychic processes”. Prices 
allow, to use Pauli’s terms, “physis and psyche [to] be conceived as complementary 
aspects of the same reality” (1952, p. 164). They form the elements of his 
“psychophysical unitary language”. Price discovery, as the search for shared values, 
is Jung and Pauli’s acausal connecting principle operating at a massive global scale. 
Von Franz points out that numerical archetypes symbolised in numbers “possess a 
dynamic, active aspect which is especially important to keep in mind. It is not what 
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we can do with numbers but what they do to our consciousness that is essential” 
(1974, p. 33). This archetypal dynamic is echoed in the words of Hayek when, 
talking about the “formation of abstractions”, he states that it 
ought to be regarded not as actions of the human mind but rather 
as something which happens to the mind . . . [and seems] . . . 
never to be the outcome of a conscious process, not something at 
which the mind can deliberately aim, but always a discovery of 
something which already guides its operation. (1967, p. 43; 
emphasis mine) 
In that process, ultimately of connecting physical and psychic events, the market’s 
apparent randomness is transformed into numerical patterns reflecting piled up 
coincidences, like the ‘unlikely’ events surrounding the collapse of Lehman in 2008: 
When coincidences pile up in this way, one cannot help being 
impressed by them―for the greater the number of terms in such a 
series, or the more unusual its character, the more improbable it 
becomes. (Jung, 1947-1954, para. 971)  
By extension, price discovery guides the other innovations in the economic system, 
the surprising novelty and creativity that make it a complex adaptive system. 
Finally, instead of making a drastic ontological commitment like “the market is 
different from us in nature” we accept the stylised fact that the market’s mind puts 
limits on our understanding, which makes it an epistemological issue. I hope that the 
mind-body perspective clarifies this and other issues involved, including ontological 
ones. Specifically, by accepting the premise of the market mind we are confronted 
with the market’s mind-body problem. This drags us back into ontology but is a 
more comfortable route to take than starting from “the market as machine”. That, 
literally, is a dead-end. 
Allow me to explain. Our involvement in markets and how they evolved was not a 
conscious decision or choice on our part, nor was the price mechanism centrally 
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planned and engineered. In the words of Hayek, we “stumbled upon it without 
understanding it” (1945, p. 528). Loosely interpreting both him and Gödel, we 
cannot design a system that is more complex than us. Instead, it is the 
(unconscious) interaction of human minds that generates the invisible hand of 
economics.  
Compared to the mind sciences, which focus on the what and how, I ask why is 
there a hard problem? Are there scientific arguments why nature throws this up? 
The short answer is that it is in our own best interest. Consequently I would be 
surprised if we find a clear and complete solution to the mind-body problem. But let 
me give the long answer as well. 
First, in the foregoing I implicitly argue that a healthy mind cannot be isolated from 
the collective sphere in which it is participating, in this case markets. This holds 
regardless of whether this participation is direct or indirect, if only because the 
economy’s ‘animal spirits’ know no boundaries, i.e. they touch everybody (or rather 
their wallets.) Unless one is willing to destroy the underlying phenomenal mood and 
the physical embodiment, e.g. by living completely isolated, any attempt to causally 
establish a ‘clean’ link between the subjectivity of an individual’s experience and her 
physical functioning is consequently futile. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in 
line with my earlier comments it is only logical that both the unconscious and the 
phenomenal have remained elusive because that’s why we survived. In so many 
words Jung once stated that archetypes can only be experienced, pointing to the 
direct link between the unconscious and the phenomenal. They are involved in 
trading but cannot themselves be bought nor sold. Let me put it more strongly, 
albeit in somewhat normative terms: numerical archetypes have to remain elusive if 
we want to survive. They are our collective ‘invisible hands’ that we subliminally 
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shake to complete trades in inter-human exchanges. They write Hayek’s 
“unconscious rules” (1967, p. 57) for our mutual engagement in price discovery, the 
process that organises markets, allocates capital and, by extension, orders modern 
society within ‘states of the world’. Beyond their quantitative properties, the 
resulting prices convey the qualities of a meeting of minds involved in such 
discovery, in particular an impression of shared symbolic meaning. In other words, if 
archetypes and qualia are captured (i.e. reduced) into an axiomatic system then the 
resulting products of the mind’s forces become predetermined and can no longer be 
considered innovations. Instead these products, varying from technological 
breakthroughs to (ultimately) their prices, become mere cognitive concepts whose 
emergence can be pre-specified, e.g. in functions, via algorithmic enumeration. That 
is no longer discovery. Apart from various complexity (i.e. Gödelian) issues this 
would raise, it is a bleak prospect from a survival point of view: to become 
predictable would be dangerous to both one’s health and wealth. Creativity is central 
in this regard. AVIR, the method that I propose to counter the growing overreliance 
on analytical methods, is my attempt to help investors to remain in contact with 
investment’s creative processes for which, in the words of Heisenberg, “no rational 
formulation as yet exists.”  
Ultimately, if life itself is speculation we better embrace the elusive sensations 
concerning the uncertainty life throws at us: 
And if you ask, “What are sensations, et cetera?” I can only answer, 
“Don’t be silly. You know very well what they are. We can’t go on 
defining things indefinitely without going round in circles. To define 
means to fix, and, when you get down to it, real life isn’t fixed. 
(Watts, 1951, p. 55) 
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APPENDIX;  
ARCHETYPES: A PERSONAL INTERPRETATION 
This appendix briefly describes my interpretation of archetypes. It is consistent with 
much of the foregoing, but is most relevant as an addition to chapters 3 and 5. The 
reason to put it at the end of this thesis is that I did not want it to distract from the 
mainstream interpretations, particularly provided in chapter 3. 
Interpretation of archetypes 
An archetype is an inherent mental subroutine in the form of an unconscious 
mandate to symbolise via a self-image, called the archetypal image. Stated 
differently, the archetype is an unconscious entity and the archetypal image is its 
conscious identity. Specifically, each archetypal encounter, particularly “archetypal 
life-challenging situations” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 123), invokes the neuronal firing 
pattern underlying its archetypal image. This makes an archetype self-
referential/reflexive, whereby the archetypal image influences the release (and by 
extension shape) of the neuronal firing pattern while it emerges in consciousness, 
i.e. as it is experienced. It is this recursive feedback between the archetype and its 
image, combined with the interaction with other archetypes, which makes an 
“archetypal experience” dynamic and an “archetypal situation” evolve.  
The unconscious, by way of the archetypes, enables the mind to deal with the 
uncertainty of the unknown, i.e. to imagine. It is in the unconscious where such 
novelty and innovations like ‘insights’ endogenously originate for the mind, a 
necessary requirement for any complex adaptive system to flourish. The adaptive 
purpose of archetypes is thus to provide prerational ‘surprise’ information as inputs 
to form categorised symbolic meaning, leading to an intuitive understanding of an 
emerging archetypal situation. In healthy humans this reduces incomplete 
knowledge and increases emotional fitness in terms of a ‘gut feeling’ response to the 
external surprises that form part of this situation. Often this response is of a 
compensatory and selective nature in order to rebalance emotional, respectively 
rational, excesses. 
Numerical archetypes 
Numerical archetypes are archetypes which symbolise via numbers, e.g. the natural 
integers. They are the prime archetypes because they enumerate, both cardinals 
and ordinals, thereby providing values required for selection, the main dynamic of 
evolution. Applied to the mind, and in terms of archetypal dynamics, numerical 
archetypes facilitate the selection by archetypes of “those contents which are best 
suited to themselves”. In general, numerical archetypes enable the numerical 
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operations required for all archetypal dynamics, typical examples being 
differentiation and integration, while bridging the mental with the physical. 
I thus use the plural “numerical archetypes” not because each number requires an 
archetype, but because the numerical operations (e.g. biomolecular computation) 
mandated via archetypes involve multiple numerical archetypes. Their interaction, 
more than the interaction among any other archetypes, underlies the complexity of 
archetypal dynamics. It is striking how this is echoed by modern insights: “In 
nature’s pattern-forming systems, contents aren’t contained anywhere but are only 
revealed by the dynamics. Form and content are thus inextricably connected and 
can’t ever be separated.” (Kelso, 1995, p. 1). 
In that light, numerical archetypes can be viewed as mandates to exchange values 
with, and thus influence, the emerging archetypal situation. Specifically, these 
include the coordinates for archetypal images to emerge in consciousness, i.e. in 
space time. In the final analysis, numerical archetypes perform the autonomous 
valuation of, i.e. attach a number to, our material state (e.g. wealth) as it relates to 
our mental state (e.g. wellbeing). To make my point in terms of finance I will 
regularly paraphrase Von Franz: “The question is not what we do with prices, but 
what they do with us.” 
To conclude, as archetype number: 
“. . . preconsciously orders both psychic thought processes and the manifestations of 
material reality. As the active ordering factor, it represents the essence of what we 
generally term ‘mind’.” (Von Franz, 1974, p. 53; emphasis mine) 
Archetypes make up the collective unconscious, so as a whole we could say that it is 
the collective unconscious that mandates. Archetypes, being mandates, contain two 
types of instructions, both emphasising the primacy of numerical archetypes:  
1. Those for the eventual shape of the image, i.e. its appearance in accordance 
with its symbolic meaning. Like a formula, this type of instructions shapes an 
internal mental image to closely match the objective ‘reality’, e.g. the 
Pythagoras theorem for a triangle, or the Mandelbrot set for a fractal. Vice 
versa, in case of capturing a mental image by way of an external (shared) 
object, its physical appearance should not influence its symbolic meaning. For 
example, whether a cross is made of wood, metal, or cloth should not change 
its interpretation, nor diminish its affect. Stripped of these and all other 
characteristics of its appearance (e.g. colour), there is ultimately some 
297 
 
   
 
numerical constellation (e.g. ratio) which captures the essence of the image 
in terms of its meaning. Number is irreducible which relates back to Von 
Franz’ declaration that numerical archetypes represent the “essence” of 
“mind”. This leads to something that clarifies the duality in the physical and 
the mental: no object can uniquely occupy two (or more) separate spaces.215  
This certainly applies to any physical object, like a table, but I would argue 
also for most mental ‘objects’. For example, an idea is still fairly different 
among those who share it. Numbers however, as the essential symbols, are 
unique and thus seem to be the only objects that can occupy two or more 
physical spaces (i.e. brains) at the same time. This particularly applies when 
such a number symbolises the key characteristic of a unique physical object 
(which, as we just pointed out, cannot be shared). “Objectivity” gets a clear 
meaning. 
2. Those for the physical route in terms of neural circuitry along which the 
emotional charge will build. I believe this ‘road-map’ is equivalent to what 
neuroscientists call “latent knowledge” (Dehaene et al, 2006, p. 209): 
“Knowledge stored in a latent form as synaptic efficacies remains inaccessible 
until it is used to recreate evoked patterns of neural firing. This constraint 
may explain . . . why we do not have conscious access to most of our mental 
algorithms”. Again, this knowledge is believed to be numerical: the terms 
“efficacies . . . to recreate” imply some underlying scoring and/or scaling of a 
trigger, respectively its creation versus an original, i.e. compared against a 
benchmark. 
                                           
215 Ignoring parallel universes, etc. Also, identical objects are not unique. 
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It is important to understand the role of archetypes in terms of bridging external 
(physical) events with internal (mental) perceptions and (bodily) responses. This 
holds specifically for the combined effect of the archetypal image as a perception 
with a symbolic meaning (i.e. a realisation) and the emotional response (i.e. a 
sensation) this evokes. There are three connected or overlapping dimensions to the 
“experience” of an archetype: 
i) The occurrence of a physical (external) event, i.e. the archetypal situation 
or encounter. 
ii) The (internal) mental representation of this event, i.e. the archetypal 
image; 
iii) The (internal) bodily response to both, i.e. the archetypal response or 
instinctive emotion. 
An archetypal situation is a meaningful situation in the sense that it ‘looks and feels 
familiar’. It resonates in that it gives rise to a similar understanding across all 
humans, i.e. it has occurred and will continue to do so in a universal format across 
cultures and generations. At the same time, despite its familiarity, an archetypal 
situation also always embeds uncertainty, because it involves the unknown. This 
makes each situation unique, with its own idiosyncratic character. 
A highly emotionally charged example is the terminal illness of a son’s father216. This 
situation is recognised by other individuals as well (not only at the same time, but 
also through time and across cultures) which makes this dimension objective: “Mr X 
is dying”. The second dimension is the internal projection of the first dimension: it 
becomes an image of which the symbolic meaning turns partly subjective, i.e. “my 
                                           
216 Although this is not of particular relevance here, traditional archetypal elements in this situation 
include the Father (figure), Death (and Rebirth), and the Anima/Animus . 
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(his) father is dying”. Next, and crucially, is the third dimension which projects the 
image externally again, because it is expressed, thereby shared, and reflexively 
impacts the archetypal situation, i.e. “I am (he is) like this because my (his) father 
is dying”.217 Consequently, it is this dimension (Jung’s “consequence”) which 
becomes the re-entry that continues the strange loop218 in the archetypal dynamics: 
it feeds on itself to renew itself, like the Ouroboros, with specific subjective inputs 
into the objective starting situation. In chapter 5 I will divide this strange loop into a 
chain of three components: the unconscious origin (i.e. archetype), the cognitive 
embodiment (i.e. functional behaviour) and phenomenal culmination (i.e. quale). 
Throughout the archetypal experience embeds uncertainty which, in turn, gives rise 
to the archetypal expectation (to be discussed later.) Also, it is the third component 
which not only completes219 the archetype “as an experience” in consciousness, but 
also hints at why science has so much trouble explaining the “hard problem” of 
consciousness: more than anything it is the phenomenal quality (i.e. quale) of 
emotions which defines consciousness and make us aware, ultimately of our 
subjectivity in the broader world. However, due to their unconscious origins and 
their intersubjective contagion (e.g. their regression in crowds) they are the least 
rational (i.e. cognitive) and thus hardest to scientifically capture.  
Based on the brief overview of Jung’s own comments in the previous section, as well 
as my preliminary interpretation, there are a few important additional points to 
make about archetypes. These follow in the next sections of this chapter. 
                                           
217 To be clear, this interpretation of empathy reflects the transfer from the collective unconscious to the 
collective consciousness of shared emotions. Specifically, the sentence should be read in flexible 
terms, e.g. “I am like this because his father is dying”. 
218 Beyond fractals, Hofstadter (2009) describes innovative ways with which he creates “strange loops”, 
like video-feedback, as metaphors for the self-referential loops in the mind. His book is also highly 
personal, following the death of his wife. 
219 As in ‘phenomenally realises’. 
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